I might not be a rationalist by Eliezer’s definition. Eliezer said that there must be a rational solution to Newcomb’s paradox. I find that belief irrational. (Although there may be a rational solution to Newcomb’s paradox.) Rationalists don’t have faith in rationalism.
Or maybe the evidence he has justifies his belief in the possible solution to the paradox, and similarly for you. Its only after you two share your evidence and fail to agree that one of you can be called a non-rationalist (on these grounds).
No. He believes he has a proof now. But he said that he tried to build a proof because, before finding a proof, he believed there must be a proof—and it seems, from what he wrote, that he found the lack of such a proof offensive. That’s faith.
That’s a mixture of Trust in Bayes and the original driving purpose that causes me to define the word “rationality” a certain way. In any case, I did find an elegant answer and so I have no reason to label the driving intuitions involved as wrong.
I might not be a rationalist by Eliezer’s definition. Eliezer said that there must be a rational solution to Newcomb’s paradox. I find that belief irrational. (Although there may be a rational solution to Newcomb’s paradox.) Rationalists don’t have faith in rationalism.
Or maybe the evidence he has justifies his belief in the possible solution to the paradox, and similarly for you. Its only after you two share your evidence and fail to agree that one of you can be called a non-rationalist (on these grounds).
No. He believes he has a proof now. But he said that he tried to build a proof because, before finding a proof, he believed there must be a proof—and it seems, from what he wrote, that he found the lack of such a proof offensive. That’s faith.
That’s a mixture of Trust in Bayes and the original driving purpose that causes me to define the word “rationality” a certain way. In any case, I did find an elegant answer and so I have no reason to label the driving intuitions involved as wrong.