Salemicus

Karma: 2,605

Salemicus 10 May 2012 22:10 UTC
4 points
on: Welcome to Less Wrong! (2012)
Hi everyone. I’ve been lurking here for a couple of years, but decided to register so I could contribute. I work in software and am in my early 30s.

I found this site through overcomingbias, which in turn I came across through the GMU-linked economics blogs. However, I wouldn’t describe myself as a rationalist—I find the discussions here interesting, but I think that, by and large, folk wisdom is pretty accurate.

I love the sequences and Eliezer’s writings generally—they are what first got me reading the site, and I have been greatly enjoying following the reposts. The ones on zombies in particular have really caused me to re-evaluate my thinking.

Thanks, and look forward to meeting you all!

Salemicus 14 May 2012 13:43 UTC
4 points
in reply to: Dolores1984’s comment on: Thoughts on the Singularity Institute (SI)

If I knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, I could certainly build something smarter.

This is totally unsupported. To quote Lady Catherine de Bourgh, “If I had ever learned [to play the piano], I should have become a great proficient.”

You have no idea whether the “small changes” you propose are technically feasible, or whether these “tweaks” would in fact mean a complete redesign. For all we know, if you knew how the human brain worked well enough to build one in software, you would appreciate why these changes are impossible without destroying the rest of the system’s functionality.

After all, it would appear that (say) eidetic recall would provide a fitness advantage. Given that humans lack it, there may well be good reasons why.

Salemicus 14 May 2012 18:17 UTC
4 points
in reply to: TheOtherDave’s comment on: Thoughts on the Singularity Institute (SI)
I don’t doubt that it’s possible to come up with something that thinks better than the human brain, just as we have come up with something that travels better than the human leg. But to cover long distances efficiently, people didn’t start by replicating a human leg, and then tweaking it. They came up with a radically different design—e.g. the wheel.

I don’t see the evidence that knowing how to build a human brain is the key step in knowing how to build something better. For instance, suppose you could replicate neuron function in software, and then scan a brain map (Robin Hanson’s “em” concept). That wouldn’t allow you to make any of the improvements to memory, maths, etc, that Dolores suggests. Perhaps you could make it run faster—although depending on hardware constraints, it might run slower. If you wanted to build something better, you might need to start from scratch. Or, things could go the other way—we might be able to build “minds” far better than the human brain, yet never be able to replicate a human one.

But it’s not just that evidence is lacking—Dolores is claiming certainty in the lack of evidence. I really do think the Austen quote was appropriate.

Salemicus 15 May 2012 19:41 UTC
1 point
on: I Stand by the Sequences
I enjoyed reading (most of) the Sequences, but I’m stunned by this level of agreement. I doubt even Eliezer agrees with them completely. My father always told me that if I agreed with him on everything, at least one of us was an idiot. It’s not that I have a sense of “ick” at your public profession of faith, but it makes me feel that you were too easily persuaded. Unless, of course, you already agreed with the sequences before reading them.

Like Jayson_Virissimo, I lean towards the Sequences. Parts I reject include MWI and consequentialism. In some cases they have caused me to update away from them. For instance, before reading them, I leaned towards materialism, but they helped persuade me to become a substance dualist, despite the author’s intention.

Salemicus 16 May 2012 8:50 UTC
−2 points
in reply to: Desrtopa’s comment on: I Stand by the Sequences
EY convinced me that consciousness is causally active within the physical universe, and I have yet to find any good argument against the notion—just equivocations about the word “meaning.” At the same time, I do accept the argument that no amount of third-person description sums to first-person experience. Hence, substance dualism.

I am aware that this is not a full response, but I don’t want to sidetrack the thread with an off-topic conversation.

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Salemicus17 May 2012 19:19 UTC

7 points

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Salemicus 21 May 2012 21:22 UTC
−6 points
on: Question about Sociopathy/Psychopathy/ASPD

I’m seriously confused about what these mental disorders are, and how they work.

No-one really knows what these mental disorders are, or how they work. Worse, it’s by no means clear that this is a mental disorder at all, at least in any meaningful sense of the word. Even by the standards of psychiatric medicine the definition of ASPD is vague and value-laden. To the extent there is a condition, it exists pretty much entirely in the fact that third parties are unhappy with their behaviour.

Are these people genuinely figuring out what humans care about by looking?

But sociopaths are humans too. They know what they care about. They just care about different things than you, or at least are willing to take different courses of action to achieve them.

What makes you think that sociopathy is in need of an explanation? In my view it’s essentially the default, that we are all sociopaths when no-one’s looking. Non-sociopathy is what needs an explanation.

Salemicus 22 May 2012 11:40 UTC
4 points
in reply to: MinibearRex’s comment on: Question about Sociopathy/Psychopathy/ASPD

I’m going to call fallacy of grey on that. Yes, the human brain is a large mystery. But there’s been an awful lot of work done in the field of psychology, and I have a very limited knowledge of psychology, relative to people who work in that field. And some of those people may be on less wrong.

And I’m going to call fallacy of composition on that. Sure, some psychiatric disorders are fairly well understood. Sociopathy/Psycopathy/ASPD, however, are not well understood by anyone.

To the extent that there is a condition, it’s that there are a substantial number of people in the world who seem to exhibit similar personalities. Clusters in personality space, so to speak.

But that’s not what we mean by a medical condition. All sorts of things are clusters in personality space—e.g. “nerd”, “extrovert”, and “workaholic.” Generally speaking, if you aren’t unhappy with something, and it doesn’t inhibit your functioning in the world, it’s not a medical condition. If Mr. X says “I wish I wasn’t such an extrovert, please fix me doctor” then arguably Mr X. has a condition. But if Mr. Y says “I wish Mr. X wasn’t such an extrovert,” but Mr. X is fine with his personality, then it’s much harder to argue that Mr. X has a condition. This is doubly so if there is no known working treatment. This works equally well if you substitute “sociopath” for “extrovert.”

Typically, sociopaths do not believe they have a problem. Well, OK. If they break the law, they should be sanctioned/punished/etc. And to the extent that behavioural therapy/compulsory drugs/whatever can force them to behave more lawfully, then great. But we shouldn’t pretend that we are treating them for any problem they have—we’re training/forcing them to comply with our ethical norms, and that’s all there is to it.

Salemicus 29 Jun 2012 0:52 UTC
3 points
in reply to: Will_Sawin’s comment on: A (small) critique of total utilitarianism
There is the oft-repeated anecdote of the utilitarian moral philosopher weighing up whether to accept a job at Columbia. It would get more money, but it would uproot his family, but it might help his career… familiar kind of moral dilemma. Asking his colleague for advice, he got told “Just maximise total utility.” “Come on,” he is supposed to have replied, “this is serious!”

I struggle to think of any moral dilemma I have faced where utilitarian ethics even provide a practical framework for addressing the problem, let alone a potential answer.

Salemicus 30 Jun 2012 14:32 UTC
0 points
in reply to: Will_Sawin’s comment on: A (small) critique of total utilitarianism
Sure, but “costs” and “benefits” are themselves value-laden terms, which depend on the ethical framework you are using. And then comparing the costs and the benefits is itself value-laden.

In other words, people using non-utilitarian ethics can get plenty of value out of writing down costs and benefits. And people using utilitarian ethics don’t necessarily get much value (doesn’t really help the philosopher in the anecdote). This is therefore not an example of how utilitarian ethics are useful.

Salemicus 30 Jun 2012 20:21 UTC
2 points
in reply to: Will_Sawin’s comment on: A (small) critique of total utilitarianism

Writing down costs and benefits is clearly an application of consequentialism ethics.

No, because “costs” and “benefits” are value-laden terms.

Suppose I am facing a standard moral dilemma; should I give my brother proper funerary rites, even though the city’s ruler has forbidden it. So I take your advice and write down costs and benefits. Costs—breaching my duty to obey the law, punishment for me, possible reigniting of the city’s civil war. Benefits—upholding my duty to my family, proper funeral rites for my brother, restored honour. By writing this down I haven’t committed to any ethical system, all I’ve done is clarify what’s at stake. For example, if I’m a deontologist, perhaps this helps clarify that it comes down to duty to the law versus duty to my family. If I’m a virtue ethicist, perhaps this shows it’s about whether I want to be the kind of person who is loyal to their family above tawdry concerns of politics, or the kind of person who is willing to put their city above petty personal concerns. This even works if I’m just an egoist with no ethics; is the suffering of being imprisoned in a cave greater or less than the suffering I’ll experience knowing my brother’s corpse is being eaten by crows?

Ironically, the only person this doesn’t help is the utilitarian, because he has absolutely no way of comparing the costs and the benefits—“maximise utility” is a slogan, not a procedure.

Salemicus 10 Jul 2012 19:18 UTC
42 points
on: What Is Signaling, Really?
I enjoyed this post.

It also hints at the notion of signaling equilibria. Consider the Helen of Troy example—this is clearly not an equilibrium, because Helen ends up marrying a bankrupt. Soon “spends lots of money on diamonds” will no longer be a signal of wealth, but will instead be a signal of profligacy—as indeed it is where I live. A man walking around in flashy jewellery would be considered low-class, presumably because in the past there has been exactly this signaling reversal.

In a stable signaling equilibrium, the signal needs to be hard-to-fake. This is why easy-to-fake signals are unstable—in the flowers example, the proles can and will catch on, and switch to the upper-middle-class flowers, so the upper-middle-class have to keep moving to stay ahead of them. The same phenomenon is seen in baby names, where upper-middle-class names become prole after a generation.

One thing I would have preferred is a discussion of the positive externalities of signaling, not just the negative ones. For example, if Yvain and lukeprog are both trying to signal their superior intelligence by writing insightful posts, this may get into an “arms race” for them, losing utility. However, the Lesswrong community gains utility overall. I think the externalities of signaling are generally positive in the real world, they only tend to be negative in what are anyway zero-sum games (e.g. begging).

Salemicus 13 Jul 2012 15:56 UTC
6 points
in reply to: Luke_A_Somers’s comment on: What Is Signaling, Really?
I am assuming that it takes effort to generate insightful posts, and that, for sufficiently large numbers of posts, the disutility of the effort predominates.

Salemicus 20 Jul 2012 13:59 UTC
2 points
on: Imperfect Voting Systems
I wish this post would have more gone into the issues of what you are voting for, and how the appropriateness of the voting system depends on that. Counting the votes is not an end in itself, but a reflection of actual decisions to be made, often including further votes.

For example a British MP does not have authority in his own right; he only exercises power through his vote in Parliament. Few would argue that choosing ones own MP is an end in itself; the important thing is that the voter should be able to influence the decisions of the government as a whole. Indeed, it seems quite wrong to suggest, in the context of Parliamentary elections, that a “fair” voting system is the one that minimises tactical voting, as that will merely mean that the “tactical voting” will go on in Parliament itself, in terms of building coalitions of parties rather than coalitions of voters.

Electoral design needs to be looked at in terms of the whole system, not merely candidate selection.

Salemicus 28 Aug 2012 19:00 UTC
0 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test
Right, but don’t you think that position is suspiciously convenient? I used to believe something along those lines myself, but then I realised I was just rationalising for social applause.

If you genuinely think that abortion is immoral but that illegality is counterproductive, then you should support, say, punitive taxes on it. Yet that suggestion will win you no plaudits with the “immoral but not illegal” crowd. We must draw our conclusions accordingly.

Salemicus 28 Aug 2012 21:52 UTC
2 points
in reply to: DanArmak’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test
Because they can be set at a level high enough to discourage the action somewhat, but low enough that clandestine abortions are not chosen instead.

For example, where I live cigarettes are taxed at punitive rates (to the right of the Laffer maximum) in order to discourage smoking. It is theoretically possible to evade these taxes, e.g. by growing your own tobacco or smuggling, but taxes are not so high that this is an appealing alternative, given the risks and penalties for breaking the law. So we get less smoking than otherwise, and revenue for the Exchequer, but we do not have smokers turning to dangerous contraband cigarettes instead. It is possible to mess this up; some years ago, cigarette taxes were too high, and we had a problem with smuggling. But I think the principle is clear.

The same logic applies to a tax on abortions. Suppose that the risks and dangers of an illegal abortion are worth -$5000 to the pregnant woman. Then if we forbid abortions, any woman who values an abortion at over $5000 will have one in a clandestine manner. But if instead we put a $3000 tax on abortions, then the pregnant woman who values the abortion at over $3000 will have one legally and safely, and the pregnant woman who values the abortion at less than $3000 will not have an abortion at all.

(Numbers are for illustrative purposes only).

Now, no-one is proposing a tax on abortions. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-life, as you would see it as facilitating murder. I can see why you would oppose the tax if you are stringently pro-choice, as you might see it as an impermissible restriction on personal freedom. But consider the group who think that abortion is immoral, and thus presumably ought to be discouraged, but claim that their objection to a ban is that such a law would have bad practical effects. Surely then they should be searching high and low for ideas for other laws which would discourage abortion with better practical effects—like a tax. But instead people advance the argument that banning abortion would be counterproductive—and then leave it there.

My conclusion is that this argument an example of status quo bias, and fallacy of the excluded middle. I think it is popular because it allows the arguer to seem “onside” to both pro-life and pro-choice interlocutors.

Salemicus 28 Aug 2012 22:59 UTC
0 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test
Forgive me if I have misunderstood you, but you appear to be saying:
1. In your home town, most girls who got pregnant as teens kept the baby.
2. These girls are no less likely to abort than the general population.
3. Neither these girls nor anyone else is trying to make abortion illegal. Therefore
4. Judging by revealed preference, there are lots of people who think that abortion is immoral but should not be illegal.
I do not see how (4) follows from (1), (2) and (3). Firstly, getting pregnant is a benefit as well as a cost—being pro-choice doesn’t mean you will have an abortion even if you want the baby. Secondly, political activism is a niche activity, and “teenage single mum” is not exactly the most represented demographic among political activists. You don’t distinguish among the groups:
1. Thinks abortion is immoral, and should be illegal, but not politically active.
2. Thinks abortion is morally permissible, and should not be illegal, but wanted to keep the baby.
3. Genuinely thinks abortion is morally permissible and should not be illegal.
4. Does not have deeply considered moral views on the matter. If asked, the response will be very sensitive to the wording of the question. Not politically active.
IMO groups (1), (2) and especially (4) have many more members than (3).

I do not understand your point about Italy at all. Could you perhaps clarify?

Salemicus 29 Aug 2012 22:53 UTC
0 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test

Well, if you want a baby you don’t use contraception (not even coitus interruptus) in the first place. If you do, but it fails and you get pregnant anyway, and you still don’t abort...

With respect, I think this is far too simplistic an analysis. I too know teenage single mums who got pregnant by accident, but they didn’t talk about the morality of abortion as a factor in their decision.

Salemicus 29 Aug 2012 23:01 UTC
0 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test
I agree that a tax doesn’t occur to most people. Nor does any other solution. That’s exactly what I’m saying is suspicious—it looks very much like motivated stopping. And more than that—if you do propose a tax on abortion, or public shaming for those who commit abortion, or any other intermediate step, these people concoct special pleading reasons to be against it.

If you claim to believe that something is immoral, but you are not interested in preventing it and react against any proposal that might, then I think the simplest conclusion is that you don’t really think it’s immoral.

I should point out, for the record, that I am not actually proposing a tax on abortions, or that people having abortions be publicly shamed, etc. I am merely pointing out that these are logical steps if you think it’s “immoral but shouldn’t be illegal.”

Salemicus 29 Aug 2012 23:49 UTC
0 points
in reply to: A1987dM’s comment on: Is Politics the Mindkiller? An Inconclusive Test
I imagine his stopping is motivated partly by laziness/habit. Yet I’m sure he’d switch if you were able to convince him that fluorescent lightbulbs would save him (say) $1000 a month. So it’s also a question of cost/benefit.

But while I don’t think he’s lying, I do imagine that there’s more to his reaction to leaving the lightbulb on than the mere cost. It is also the fact that it is wasteful. Leaving a lightbulb on in a room you’re not in feels profligate, and wrong, in a way that failing to buy the most energy-efficient lightbulb does not.

Salemicus

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