MBlume

Karma: 5,988

The Epistemic Prisoner’s Dilemma

MBlume18 Apr 2009 5:36 UTC

97 points

46 comments2 min readLW link

Instrumental vs. Epistemic—A Bardic Perspective

MBlume25 Apr 2009 7:41 UTC

89 points

189 comments3 min readLW link

MBlume 1 Oct 2012 19:54 UTC
88 points
on: Rationality Quotes October 2012

Sometimes magic is just someone spending more time on something than anyone else might reasonably expect

--Teller (source)

MBlume 22 Apr 2009 5:49 UTC
83 points
on: Well-Kept Gardens Die By Pacifism
May I suggest that length of comment should factor significantly into the choice to up/downvote?

I once suggested that upvote means “I would take the time to read this again if the insights from it were deleted from my brain” and downvote means “I would like the time it took to read this back.”

Time figures into both of these. If you read a few words and don’t profit from them, well, neither have you lost much. If you read several paragraphs, reread them to ensure you’ve understood them (because the writing was obtuse, say), and in the end conclude that you have learned nothing, the comment has, in some sense, made a real imposition on your time, and deserves a downvote.
What links here?
- John_Maxwell's comment on Announcing The Effective Altruism Forum by RyanCarey (27 Aug 2014 1:07 UTC; 10 points)
- MBlume's comment on LessWrong Boo Vote (Stochastic Downvoting) by Vladimir_Nesov (22 Apr 2009 8:26 UTC; 6 points)

MBlume 8 Dec 2010 21:52 UTC
67 points
0
in reply to: Mike_Blume’s comment on: Eutopia is Scary
blinks bemusedly at past-self

MBlume 14 Mar 2009 2:21 UTC
64 points
1
on: The Least Convenient Possible World
I’m not sure if I’m evading the spirit of the post, but it seems to me that the answer to the opening problem is this:

If you were willing to kill this man to save these ten others, then you should long ago have simply had all ten patients agree to a ¹⁄₁₀ game of Russian Roulette, with the proviso that the nine winners get the organs of the one loser.

The Fundamental Question

MBlume19 Apr 2010 16:09 UTC

63 points

288 comments1 min readLW link

Welcome to Less Wrong!

MBlume16 Apr 2009 9:06 UTC

57 points

2,000 comments2 min readLW link

MBlume 21 Jun 2012 3:00 UTC
56 points
on: The Power of Reinforcement
Good post! Thank you for writing it Luke =)

MBlume 2 Feb 2010 19:26 UTC
56 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: The AI in a box boxes you
For a while we had a note on one of the whiteboards at the house reading “The Singularity Institute does NOT negotiate with counterfactual terrorists”.

MBlume 24 Jul 2012 23:32 UTC
49 points
on: Game Theory As A Dark Art
Note that I actually attempted to run a dollar auction at Benton and wound up selling my $20 for $1 to the first bidder. If memory serves, either the people in the room drew lots for the right to bid, or the bidder agreed to share profits with the others.

MBlume 19 Mar 2009 7:44 UTC
49 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: Counterfactual Mugging
Had the coin come up differently, Omega might have explained the secrets of friendly artificial general intelligence. However, he now asks that you murder 15 people.

Omega remains completely trustworthy, if a bit sick.
What links here?
- Vladimir_Nesov's comment on Counterfactual Mugging by Vladimir_Nesov (19 Mar 2009 14:04 UTC; 2 points)

MBlume 12 Jan 2012 23:46 UTC
48 points
on: Can the Chain Still Hold You?

When taming a baby elephant, its trainer will chain one of its legs to a post. When the elephant tries to run away, the chain and the post are strong enough to keep it in place. But when the elephant grows up, it is strong enough to break the chain or uproot the post. Yet the owner can still secure the elephant with the same chain and post, because the elephant has been conditioned to believe it cannot break free. It feels the tug of the chain and gives up — a kind of learned helplessness. The elephant acts as if it thinks the chain’s limiting power is intrinsic to nature rather than dependent on a causal factor that held for years but holds no longer.

This is such an excellent allegory that I do need to ask whether there’s a citation. I googled briefly and only found motivational texts and discussions of the morality of chaining elephants in circuses.

MBlume 16 Mar 2009 9:40 UTC
48 points
in reply to: Eliezer Yudkowsky’s comment on: 3 Levels of Rationality Verification
Thank you. You taught me (a large chunk of) everything I know, so that means a lot.

Honestly, thinking back, I suspect the best opportunity I ever had to deconvert her was when I myself did not yet identify as atheist—when the crisis of faith was still in full swing. I’d have been perceived as sharing my doubts, rather than as “attacking” her with arguments.

Of course, back then I feared atheism—I saw it as something terrible happening to me, that I should avoid doing to her. If I’d done a better job of leaving a line of retreat, I might have made better choices—I might have shared each doubt as it occurred to me, instead of winding up 30 inferential steps removed from the woman I loved.

(And no, explaining that there is an inferential distance between you greater than is likely to be encountered in the ancestral environment really does not help in a fight)

I’ve been thinking lately of trying to write something addressed specifically to those beginning to question their religions. Life doesn’t come with save points, but standing at the spot you went wrong, calling out advice to passers-by seems like the next best thing.

MBlume 15 Mar 2009 22:19 UTC
48 points
in reply to: Roko’s comment on: 3 Levels of Rationality Verification
I’ll be honest—my life has taken a sharp downturn since I deconverted. My theist girlfriend, with whom I was very much in love, couldn’t deal with this change in me, and after six months of painful vacillation, she left me for a co-worker. That was another six months ago, and I have been heartbroken, miserable, unfocused, and extremely ineffective since.

Perhaps this is an example of the valley of bad rationality of which PhilGoetz spoke, but I still hold my current situation higher in my preference ranking than happiness with false beliefs.
What links here?

MBlume 15 Jul 2009 17:02 UTC
47 points
1
in reply to: infotropism’s comment on: The Strangest Thing An AI Could Tell You
I really don’t think I could believe #4. I mean, sure, one hippo, but all of them?

MBlume 26 Aug 2011 20:43 UTC
45 points
on: Polyhacking

She got to date MBlume. (This one was important.)

blushes furiously

Buy Insurance—Bet Against Yourself

MBlume26 Nov 2010 4:48 UTC

42 points

69 comments2 min readLW link

MBlume 21 Mar 2009 8:33 UTC
41 points
0
on: Tolerate Tolerance
I’m going to make a controversial suggestion: one useful target of tolerance might be religion.

I think we pretty much all understand that the supernatural is an open and shut case. Because of this, religion is a useful example of people getting things screamingly, disastrously wrong. And so we tend to use that as a pointer to more subtle ways of being wrong, which we can learn to avoid. This is good.

However, when we speak too frequently, and with too much naked disdain, of religion, these habits begin to have unintended negative effects.

It would be useful to have resources on general rationality to which to point our theist friends, in order to raise their overall level of sanity to the point where religion can fall away on its own. This is not going to work if these resources are blasting religion right from the get-go. Our friends are going to feel attacked, quickly close their browsers, and probably not be too well-disposed towards us the next time we speak (this may not be an entirely hypothetical example).

I’m not talking about respect. That would be far too much to ask. If we were to speak of religion as though it could genuinely be true, we would be spectacular liars. Still, not bringing up the topic when it’s not necessary, using another example if there happens to be one available, would, I think, significantly increase the potential audience for our writing.
What links here?
- Gurkenglas's comment on Schools Proliferating Without Practicioners by Davis_Kingsley (28 Oct 2018 2:15 UTC; 1 point)

Rationalist Storybooks: A Challenge

MBlume18 Mar 2009 2:25 UTC

39 points

38 comments1 min readLW link

MBlume

The Epistemic Pri­soner’s Dilemma

In­stru­men­tal vs. Epistemic—A Bardic Perspective

The Fun­da­men­tal Question

Wel­come to Less Wrong!

Buy In­surance—Bet Against Yourself

Ra­tion­al­ist Sto­ry­books: A Challenge