Thanks for the feedback. Will change the format in the future!
Is there a deadline? I’m a bit busy until the end of this week, but I wanted to try my hand at doing some lit review soon anyways. I’ll probably take a shot at this sometime next monday.
The fact that Amazon rainforest produces 20% atmospheric oxygen (I read this somewhere, hope this isn’t fiction) should be a bigger political piece than it seems to be. Seems like brazil could be leveraging this further on a global stage (have other countries subsidize the cost of maintaining the rainforests, preventing deforestation as we all benefit from/need the CO2 to oxygen conversion)? Also, would other countries have a tree-planting supply race to eliminate dependence on such a large source of oxygen from any one agent?
Just a strange thought that occurred to me this morning. Obviously doesn’t reflect unfortunate realities of current politics (it isn’t much of a political piece if the other agents don’t believe it’s real), but it occurred to me as a alternative politics that might transpire in a world where everyone took climate change seriously as an existential threat.
Have you checked out any work on coherentist theories of epistemic justification? I definitely haven’t done the work to have an opinion on this, but I remember this dichotomy (foundationalism v. coherentism) being referred to in old introductory epistemology coursework.
cool. I’ll be sure to get something in by the 16th.
Thanks for helping me get informed. I was under the impression that (and this is a separate thread) planting trees was a viable initiative to fight climate change, and by extension the survival of the amazon rainforest was a significant climate change initiative? I guess I’m wondering if along these lines as well, if climate change is important on the world stage, then the health of the rainforest would be as well?
**Thanks for correcting me about the oxygen consumption line—that is what I said and it was misguided
From your post:
This is circular, but is this necessarily a problem? If your choice is a circular justification or eventually hitting a level with no justification, then the circular justification suddenly starts looking pretty attractive.
I think the coherentist article I linked to has some useful perspective here. The quote below is from a section in that article on regress. The first paragraph outlines a view similar to yours and raises an important objection against the circular justification view. The 2nd paragraph raises a potential response.
What is the coherentist’s response to the regress? The coherentist can be understood as proposing that nothing prevents the regress from proceeding in a circle. Thus, A can be a reason for B which is a reason for C which is a reason for A. If this is acceptable, then what we have is a chain of reasons that is never-ending but which does not involve an infinite number of beliefs. It is never-ending in the sense that for each belief in the chain there is a reason for that belief also in the chain. Yet there is an immediate problem with this response due to the fact that justificatory circles are usually thought to be vicious ones. If someone claims C and is asked why she believes it, she may reply that her reason is B. If asked why she believes B, she may assert A. But if prompted to justify her belief in A, she is not allowed to refer back to CC which in the present justificatory context is still in doubt. If she did justify A in terms of C nonetheless, her move would lack any justificatory force whatsoever.
The coherentist may respond by denying that she ever intended to suggest that circular reasoning is a legitimate dialectical strategy. What she objects to is rather the assumption that justification should at all proceed in a linear fashion whereby reasons are given for reasons, and so on. This assumption of linearity presupposes that what is, in a primary sense, justified are individual beliefs. This, says the coherentist, is simply wrong: it is not individual beliefs that are primarily justified, but entire belief systems. Particular beliefs can also be justified but only in a secondary or derived sense, if they form part of a justified belief system. This is a coherence approach because what makes a belief system justified, on this view, is precisely its coherence. A belief system is justified if it is coherent to a sufficiently high degree.
Of course, the key coherentist claim is that an entire belief system can be justified without individual beliefs being justified because the property of being justified is a property of belief systems that emerges from the coherence of multiple beliefs.