I might be missing something here.
These seem to be application forms to lease or purchase land that the belongs to a railway-related organization?
Land that belongs to a railway-related organization isn’t necessarily part of a railway. The land could be disused office-space, parking lots, or warehouses.
Now I want to try having a watch that randomly speeds up, and slows down, within preset limits. So that at any point I could be as many as 5 minutes ahead, or 5 minutes behind.
That would probably get me used to showing up a few minutes early to everything.
I can’t speak for Eliezer’s intentions when he wrote this story, but I can see an incredibly simple moral to take away from this. And I can’t shake the feeling that most of the commenters have completely missed the point.
For me, the striking part of this story is that the Jester is shocked and confused when they drag him away. “How?!” He says “It’s logically impossible”. The Jester seems not to understand how it is possible for the dagger to be in the second box. My explanation goes as follows, and I think I’m just paraphrasing the king here.
1- If a king has two boxes and a means to write on them, then he can write any damn thing on them that he wants to. 2- If a king also has a dagger, then he can place that dagger inside one of the two boxes, and he can place it in whichever box he decides to place it in.
That’s it. That’s the entire explanation for how the dagger could “possibly” be inside the second box. It’s a very simple argument, that a five year old could understand, and no amount of detailed consideration by a logician is going to stop this simple argument from being true.
The jester, however, thought it was impossible for the dagger to be in the second box. Not just that it wasn’t there, but that it was IMPOSSIBLE. That’s how I read the story, anyway. He used significantly more complicated logic, and he thought that he’d proven it impossible. But it only takes a moment’s reflection to see that he’s wrong.
Some of the comments above have tried to work out what was wrong with Jester’s logic, and they’ve explained the detailed and subtle flaws in his reasoning. That’s great—if you want to develop a deep understanding of logic, self-referential statements, and mathematical truth values (and lets be fair, I suppose most of us do), but in the context of the sequences on rationality, I think there’s a much better lesson to learn.
Remember: rationalists are supposed to WIN. We’re supposed to develop reasoning skills that give us a better and more useful understanding of reality. So the lesson is this: don’t be seduced by complex and detailed logic, if that logic is taking you further and further away from an accurate description of reality. If something is already true, or already false, then no amount of reasoning will change it.
Reality is NOT required to conform to your understanding or your reasoning. It is your reasoning that should be required to conform to reality.
“I think it can be taken for granted that people on this site have an elevated sense of skepticism”
I disagree. Being a participant on this site implies that one has accepted some or all of the central premises of the community: that we can significantly improve our lives by thinking differently, that we should be willing to think and behave in ways that are very counter-intuitive to the average person, and that we can learn to do all of this by reading and talking on a website.
A great many ‘normal’ people would dismiss Less Wrong as a silly venture. Likewise, they’d be willing to dismiss something that looks like a scam immediately, without any thought at all. Those of us who pride ourselves on being clever, being willing to embrace an idea that other people would reject, and want to exploit loopholes and inefficiencies that other people have missed? I suspect we’re less skeptical than the average person.
Being on the site only signals that we want to be rational, and like to think that we are. It doesn’t necessarily mean that we’re good at it.
Suffice to say: There are many different methods for sending money. Some of them will involve paper forms, some will not. Some of them involve the internet, some will not. And each one has its own rules.
“Maybe the scammer wants the part of their money returned using a different method (one that does not allow cancelling, or has shorter deadlines)”
This is essentially correct. I’ve read about similar scams, and I believe this was how they worked.
“We have a pretty stupid banking system if you can...”
Yes, we do.
It’s a complicated system that developed slowly, piece by piece, influenced by legislation, commercial pressures, other (contradictory) commercial pressures, and customers’ needs. The need for backwards compatibility makes it impossible to rip up the old system and start again, and no one person is in charge of designing it. Naturally it’s messed up and has inconsistencies.
---Meta comment: At first I was writing this with the intention of saying, basically: “Duh! isn’t that obvious?”. Now I realize that that’s really unkind and unfair.
You’ve encountered something that you hadn’t known before, and you “noticed you were surprised”. That’s a good thing, and it’s good that you expressed it so that other people can realize the same thing.
I think you’re saying that all the cases described above, could be expressed as a mix of other fallacies, therefore it’s not distinct fallacy in its own right?
I think a better question is “If we think of class of mistake as a specific named fallacy, will it help us to spot errors of reasoning that we would otherwise have missed? Or alternatively, help us to talk about errors of reasoning that we’ve noticed.”
If it can be expressed in terms of other fallacies, but these mistakes aren’t immediately obvious as examples of those fallacies, then it can be worth giving them their own label as philh suggests.
Ultimately, different people will find that different tools and explanations work well for them. While two explanations might be logically equivalent, some people will find that one makes more sense to them, and some people will find that the other makes more sense.
It seems like a useful fallacy to me (so to speak), and I intend to keep an eye out for it.
I think it would be great to start with a theory that sounds very scientific, but is unfalsifiable, and therefore useless. Then we modify the theory to include an element that is falisfiable, and the theory becomes much more useful.
For example, we have a new kind of medicine, and it is very good for some people, but when other people take the medicine it kills them. Naturally, we want to know who would be killed by the medicine, and who would be helped by it.
A scientist has a theory. He believes there is a gene that he calls the “Spottiswood gene”. Anyone who has the proper form of the Spottiswood gene will be safe, they can take the medicine freely. But some people have a broken version of the Spottiswood gene, and they die when then they take the medicine. Unfortunately the scientist has no way of detecting the Spottiswood gene, so he can’t tell you whether you have the gene or not.
Now this theory sounds very scientific and it’s got lots of scientific words in it, but it isn’t very useful. The scientist doesn’t know how to detect the gene, so he can’t tell you whether you are going to live or whether you are going to die. He can’t tell you whether it is safe to take the medicine. If you take the pill and you survive, then the scientist will say that you had the working version of the gene. If you take the pill and you die, the scientist will say that you have the broken version of the gene. But he cannot say what will happen to you until after it has already happened, so his theory is useless. He can explain anything, but he can’t make predictions in advance.
Now another scientist has a different theory. She thinks that the medicine is related to eye color. She thinks anyone with blue eyes will die if they take the medicine, and she thinks that anyone with brown eyes will be okay. She’s not sure why this happens, but she plans to do more research and find out. Even if she doesn’t do any more research, her theory is much more useful than than the first scientist’s theory. If she’s right, then blue-eyed people will know that they should avoid the medicine, and brown eyed people will know that they can take the medicine safely. She has made predictions. She predicts that no brown eyed person will die after taking the medicine, and she predicts that no blue eyed person will live.
Of course, the second scientist might be wrong. But the interesting thing is that if she’s wrong, then we can prove that she’s wrong. She predicted that no one with brown eyes will die after taking the medicine, so if lots of people with brown eyes die, then we will know that she’s wrong.
If her theory is wrong, then we should be able to prove that it’s wrong. And then if the results don’t prove that she’s wrong, we accept that she’s probably right. That’s called falsifiability.
But the first scientist doesn’t have falsifiability. We know that even If he’s wrong, we’ll never be able to prove it—and that means we’ll never know if he’s wrong or right. More importantly, even he is right, his theory still wouldn’t do anybody any good.
Absolutely.
If the first scientist can come up with a way to test his theory, then it would probably make his theory more useful. It would also make it more falsifiable.
Incidentally, i think that you’re proposing a test for susceptibility to the medicine. The relevant theory here is that any person who would be killed by a full dose, would be also be harmed but not killed, by a much smaller dose. That’s a perfectly testable, falsifiable theory, but i don’t think it would directly test the claim that the cause is genetic.
A better test for genetic causes, is to look at family relationships. If we believe the cause is genetic, then we predict that people who are more closely related to each other, are more likely to have the same reaction to the medicine. And we predict that identical twins would always have the exact same reaction to the medicine.
The original poster was looking for a very easy example that children could follow, without needing to understand any maths or probability theory, so I wanted to keep it simple. That’s why i didn’t mention the idea of improving the original scientist’s theory.
I don’t really recommend talking to a bunch of children and deliberately spreading the message “some of you just suck at most things”.
There are positive and valuable ways to teach the lesson that people aren’t all equally “good at stuff”, but it’s a tough one to communicate well. It’s not a good thing to bring up casually as an example when you’re talking about something else.
There’s a lot of value in that. Sometimes it’s best not to go down the rabbit hole.
Whatever the technicalities might be, the jester definitely followed the normal, reasonable rules of this kind of puzzle, and by those rules he got the right answer. The king set it up that way, and set the jester up to fail.
If he’d done it to teach the jester a valuable lesson about the difference between abstract logic and real life, then it might have been justified. But he’s going to have the jester executed, so that argument disappears.
I think we can all agree, The King is definitely a dick.
It’s an appealing notion, but i think the logic doesn’t hold up.
In simplest terms: if you apply this logic and choose to cooperate, then the machine can still defect. That will net more paperclips for the machine, so it’s hard to claim that the machine’s actions are irrational.
Although your logic is appealing, it doesn’t explain why the machine can’t defect while you co-operate.
You said that if both agents are rational, then option (C,D) isn’t possible. The corollary is that if option (C,D) is selected, then one of the agents isn’t being rational. If this happens, then the machine hasn’t been irrational (it receives its best possible result). The conclusion is that when you choose to cooperate, you were being irrational.
You’ve successfully explained that (C, D) and (D, C) arw impossible for rational agents, but you seem to have implicitly assumed that (C, C) was possible for rational agents. That’s actually the point that we’re hoping to prove, so it’s a case of circular logic.
Yes, that’s definitely true. If you know a little, or a lot, about genetics, then the theory is falsifiable.
I think it still works just fine as an example though. The goal was to explain the meaning and the importance of falsifiability. Spotiswood’s theory, as presented and as it was being used, wasn’t making any useful predictions. No one was looking at familial comparisons, and i implied that Spotiswood wasn’t making any effort to identify the gene, so the only observations that were coming in were “person lives”, or “person dies”. Within that context, Spotiswood’s theory can explain any observation, and makes no useful predictions.
If that’s not an example of an unfalsifiable theory, then it’s still an example that helps explain the key elements of unfalsifiability, and helps explain why they’re important.
If an audience member should then point out what you pointed out? Then that’s brilliant. We can agree with the audience member, and talk about how this new consideration shows that the theory can be falsifiable after all.
But then we also get to point out how this falsifiability is what makes a theory much more useful… and the example still works because (QED) that’s exactly the point we were trying to demonstrate.
Okay, well let’s apply exactly the technique discussed above:
If the hypothetical Omega tells you that they’re is indeed a maximum value for happiness, and you will certainly be maximally happy inside the box: do you step into the box then?
Note: I’m asking that in order to give another example of the technique in action. But still feel free to give a real answer if you’d choose to.
Side you didn’t answer the question one way or another, I can’t apply the second technique here. I can’t ask what would have to change in order for you to change your answer.
This is fair, because you’re using the technique to redirect us back to the original morality issue.
But i also don’t think that MBlume was completely evading the question either. The question was about ethical principles, and his response does represent an exploration of ethical principles. MBlume suggests that it’s more ethical to sacrifice one of the lives that was already in danger, than to sacrifice an uninvolved stranger. (remember, from a strict utilitarian view, both solutions leave one person dead, so this is definitely a different moral principle.)
This technique is good for stopping people from evading the question. But some evasions are more appropriate than others.
Yes, of course there are many good reasons why writers do this. Reasons why, for a writer, it can be good to do this, in addition to just being difficult to avoid.
But i don’t think that’s really the point. We’re not here to critique science fiction. We’re not tv critics. We’re trying to learn rationality techniques to help us “win” whatever we’re trying to win. And this is a fairly good description of a certain kind of bias.
You’re right though. Sci-fi is a good example to demonstrate what the bias is, but not a great example to demonstrate why it’s important.
TV tropes calls that the “planet of hats”. (visit tv tropes at your own peril, it’s a notorious time sink).
I think it represents a different fallacy: to assume that am unfamiliar group of things (or people) are much more homogenous than they really are. And more specifically: to assume that a culture or group of things is entirely defined by the things that make them different from us.
I think this might be the bias in action yet again.
Our idea of an alien experience is to taste with a different part of our bodies? That’s certainly more different-from-human than most rubber-forehead aliens, but “taste” is still a pretty human-familiar experience. There are species with senses that we don’t have at all, like a sensitivity to magnetism or electric fields.
Completely Ad-Hoc proposal:
Ethics are very very heavily influenced by one consideration: other people’s opinions. It may not be consciously admitted, but when people faced with an ethical conundrum, I think they make a decision that’s based on the question “What will people think of me?”. (The internalized version is: “What will I think of myself?” / “Will I be able to look at myself in the mirror?”).
The question here relates to letting 5 people die (by inaction) or killing one person (by taking action). If you pick the second one, then you’re actively responsible for that death. You were the killer. And that’s the sort of action that will get you judged by other people. That’s the sort of action that will make other people label you as a killer, as a betrayer, as an untreatable person. Therefore, we’re very heavily biased against certain things, and those biases don’t allow for utilitarian ethics.
It’s very often true that drunk people care less than sober people about what others think of them.