“If we take everything into account — not only what the ancients knew, but all of what we know today that they didn’t know — then I think that we must frankly admit that we do not know. But, in admitting this, we have probably found the open channel.”
Richard Feynman, “The Value of Science,” public address at the National Academy of Sciences (Autumn 1955); published in What Do You Care What Other People Think (1988); republished in The Pleasure of Finding Things Out: The Best Short Works of Richard P. Feynman (1999) edited by Jeffrey Robbins.
Long time lurker, first post.
Isn’t the rational choice on a True Prisoner’s Dilemma to defect if possible, and to seek a method to bind the opponent to cooperate even if that binding forces one to cooperate as well? An analogous situation is law enforcement-one may well desire to unilaterally break the law, yet favor the existance of police that force all parties concerned to obey it. Of course police that will never interfere with one’s own behavior would be even better, but this is usually impractical. Timeless Decision Theory adds that one should cooperate against a sufficiently simiilar agent, as such similar agents will presumably make the same decision, and (C,C) is obviously preferable to (D,D), but against a dissimilar opponent, I would think this would be the optimal strategy.
If you can’t bind the paperclip maximizer, defect. If you can, do so, and still defect if possible. If the binding affects you as well, you are now forced to cooperate. And of course, if the clipper is also using TDT, cooperate.