The arguments about conciousness not being physical seem circular. If conciousness and experiences are physical, then you can’t make an exact copy of brain without it experiencing conciousness, and you can in-principle transfer experiences between brains (worst case, using nanotech).
It’s true that a physicalist would say that zombies are impossible. But that’s the point of the argument! It’s showing how one of the implications of physicalism is false—zombies are possible.
You might have independent reasons for thinking that zombies are impossible. But the mere fact that the argument is premised on the possibility of zombies doesn’t make it circular.
But that’s the point of the argument! It’s showing how one of the implications of physicalism is false—zombies are possible.
But where did you prove that zombies are possible? The only evidence you provide is that you can imagine them existing in a non-physicalist world-view.
You might not think that zombies are possible. But then that would be the problem with the argument. It’s not that the argument is circular. It’s that one of the premises is false (or unjustified).
Here how the argument works in a nutshell (or rather, doesn’t):
I can imagine that physicalism is wrong without noticing any contradiction → Physicalism is wrong
This doesn’t work, unless there actually is no contradiction. So we have to either implicitly assume that our inability to notice a contradiction is in general a true signal of there being no contradiction (which is false), or smuggle the whole assumption that in this specific case, our intuition is correct. But this would be begging the whole question, namely, we have to assume that physicalism is wrong in order to conclude that it’s wrong. Thus it’s circular reasoning
It’s the physicalist who’s begging the question. The physicalist is saying zombies are impossible. But what’s their reason for thinking zombies are impossible? To argue that zombies are impossible, they have to implicitly assume non-physicalism is wrong in order to conclude that it’s wrong. Thus, it’s circular reasoning.
I reject that either physicalist or non-physicalist is necessarily making a circular argument. They just have different intuitions about whether zombies are possible. You might in fact think that zombies are impossible but then that’s the reason to reject the argument, not that it’s circular.
If there was anti-zombie argument that clamed to prove physicalism true, the same way zombie argument claims to prove physicalism false, such argument would be circular! But the difference is that physicalsts make no such claim, while non-physicalists indeed do.
As long as you are non-physicalist who simply believes that zombies are possible, you are not making a circular argument. You are just being self-consistent, or even tautological, because “zombies are possible” is exactly the same statement as “physicalism is wrong”. But as soon as you claim that the fact that you believe zombies to be possible proves physicalism wrong—then you are making a circular argument.
There is an ambiguity here, depending on what exactly is meant by “it seems”.
If we are talking about seeing some evidence of birds existing, then the argument is not circular, it is pointing to this evidence in the reality, which may or may not be enough to conclude that non-mammals exist. But neither this argument truly has the same structure as zombie argument.
If we are talking about being able to imagine that birds are possible, without any evidence, and thus concluding that birds are possible, then it would be structured as a zombie argument and be circular as you would have to smuggle in the assumption that your imagination correspond to reality in this specific case, namely that birds are indeed possible.
Let’s suppose that the zombie argument smuggles in the assumption that what you’re imagining is evidence of reality. Then the argument would look like this:
I can imagine zombies as possible.
My imagination is evidence of reality.
So I have evidence that zombies are possible.
The possibility of zombies is inconsistent with physicalism.
Therefore, I have evidence physicalism is false.
This still isn’t a circular argument. It’s just an argument with a false premise, namely premise 2.
More generally, if you think an argument lacks support, that doesn’t mean it’s circular.
Yes, you can remade a zombie argument so that it will not be circular and just be wrong or very weak. This isn’t the zombie argument in question, though.
The arguments about conciousness not being physical seem circular. If conciousness and experiences are physical, then you can’t make an exact copy of brain without it experiencing conciousness, and you can in-principle transfer experiences between brains (worst case, using nanotech).
It’s true that a physicalist would say that zombies are impossible. But that’s the point of the argument! It’s showing how one of the implications of physicalism is false—zombies are possible.
You might have independent reasons for thinking that zombies are impossible. But the mere fact that the argument is premised on the possibility of zombies doesn’t make it circular.
But where did you prove that zombies are possible? The only evidence you provide is that you can imagine them existing in a non-physicalist world-view.
You might not think that zombies are possible. But then that would be the problem with the argument. It’s not that the argument is circular. It’s that one of the premises is false (or unjustified).
Here how the argument works in a nutshell (or rather, doesn’t):
I can imagine that physicalism is wrong without noticing any contradiction → Physicalism is wrong
This doesn’t work, unless there actually is no contradiction. So we have to either implicitly assume that our inability to notice a contradiction is in general a true signal of there being no contradiction (which is false), or smuggle the whole assumption that in this specific case, our intuition is correct. But this would be begging the whole question, namely, we have to assume that physicalism is wrong in order to conclude that it’s wrong. Thus it’s circular reasoning
Here’s a kind of parody that one might run:
I reject that either physicalist or non-physicalist is necessarily making a circular argument. They just have different intuitions about whether zombies are possible. You might in fact think that zombies are impossible but then that’s the reason to reject the argument, not that it’s circular.
I completely agree!
If there was anti-zombie argument that clamed to prove physicalism true, the same way zombie argument claims to prove physicalism false, such argument would be circular! But the difference is that physicalsts make no such claim, while non-physicalists indeed do.
As long as you are non-physicalist who simply believes that zombies are possible, you are not making a circular argument. You are just being self-consistent, or even tautological, because “zombies are possible” is exactly the same statement as “physicalism is wrong”. But as soon as you claim that the fact that you believe zombies to be possible proves physicalism wrong—then you are making a circular argument.
Here’s another parody argument:
Is this argument circular? I assume not. But it seems to have the same structure as the zombie argument.
There is an ambiguity here, depending on what exactly is meant by “it seems”.
If we are talking about seeing some evidence of birds existing, then the argument is not circular, it is pointing to this evidence in the reality, which may or may not be enough to conclude that non-mammals exist. But neither this argument truly has the same structure as zombie argument.
If we are talking about being able to imagine that birds are possible, without any evidence, and thus concluding that birds are possible, then it would be structured as a zombie argument and be circular as you would have to smuggle in the assumption that your imagination correspond to reality in this specific case, namely that birds are indeed possible.
Let’s suppose that the zombie argument smuggles in the assumption that what you’re imagining is evidence of reality. Then the argument would look like this:
I can imagine zombies as possible.
My imagination is evidence of reality.
So I have evidence that zombies are possible.
The possibility of zombies is inconsistent with physicalism.
Therefore, I have evidence physicalism is false.
This still isn’t a circular argument. It’s just an argument with a false premise, namely premise 2.
More generally, if you think an argument lacks support, that doesn’t mean it’s circular.
Yes, you can remade a zombie argument so that it will not be circular and just be wrong or very weak. This isn’t the zombie argument in question, though.
How would you interpret the zombie argument so that it’s circular? Can you lay it out explicitly like above?
Intuition versus intuition isn’t much better than circular versus circular.