Instead of the deletion or killing of uploads that want to live but can’t cut it economically, why not slow them down? (Perhaps to the point where they are only as “quick” and “clever” as an average human being is today.) Given that the cost of computation keeps decreasing, this should impose a minimal burden on society going forward. This could also be an inducement to find better employment, especially if employers can temporarily grant increased computation resources for the purposes of the job.
If you assume resources will be spent on the happiness/continued life/etc. of uploads, you might as well stipulate they’ll have simulated off-hours at home instead of being actually Malthusian.
This discussion is about whether, as Hanson suggests, natural economic evolution—with no extra protection provided by law—might result in not-entirely-awful lives for futures ems.
Given that the cost of computation keeps decreasing, this should impose a minimal burden on society going forward.
In a computation-intensive society, demand is almost certainly infinite. If the cost of computation decreases, the amount of computation done increases. More em (upload) copies are created, or existing ones run faster; either way, carrying out more work. Society grows.
Computation market prices can and do go down. But since society can grow almost infinitely quickly (by copying ems), from an em’s POV it’s more relevant to say that everything else’s price goes up.
This relies on the crucial assumption that there’s a limit to how much you can speed up an em relative to the physical universe. If not a hard limit, some other reason speeding them up has diminishing returns. Otherwise we might as well talk about a society of <10 planet-sized Jupiter brains, each owning its physical computing substrate and so immortal short of violent death.
Computation market prices can and do go down. But since society can grow almost infinitely quickly (by copying ems), from an em’s POV it’s more relevant to say that everything else’s price goes up.
A society of super-optimizers better have a darn good reason for allowing resource use to outstrip N^3. (And no doubt, they often will.)
A society of super-optimizers that regulates itself in a way resulting in mass death either isn’t so much super-optimized, or has a rather (to me) unsavory set of values.
Otherwise we might as well talk about a society of <10 planet-sized Jupiter brains, each owning its physical computing substrate and so immortal short of violent death.
Past a certain point of optimization power, all deaths become either violent or voluntary.
A society of super-optimizers that regulates itself in a way resulting in mass death either isn’t so much super-optimized, or has a rather (to me) unsavory set of values.
Instead of the deletion or killing of uploads that want to live but can’t cut it economically, why not slow them down? (Perhaps to the point where they are only as “quick” and “clever” as an average human being is today.) Given that the cost of computation keeps decreasing, this should impose a minimal burden on society going forward. This could also be an inducement to find better employment, especially if employers can temporarily grant increased computation resources for the purposes of the job.
This is close to the me-now immorality that I have said can be possible: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2011/12/the-immortality-of-me-now.html
If you assume resources will be spent on the happiness/continued life/etc. of uploads, you might as well stipulate they’ll have simulated off-hours at home instead of being actually Malthusian.
This discussion is about whether, as Hanson suggests, natural economic evolution—with no extra protection provided by law—might result in not-entirely-awful lives for futures ems.
In a computation-intensive society, demand is almost certainly infinite. If the cost of computation decreases, the amount of computation done increases. More em (upload) copies are created, or existing ones run faster; either way, carrying out more work. Society grows.
Computation market prices can and do go down. But since society can grow almost infinitely quickly (by copying ems), from an em’s POV it’s more relevant to say that everything else’s price goes up.
This relies on the crucial assumption that there’s a limit to how much you can speed up an em relative to the physical universe. If not a hard limit, some other reason speeding them up has diminishing returns. Otherwise we might as well talk about a society of <10 planet-sized Jupiter brains, each owning its physical computing substrate and so immortal short of violent death.
A society of super-optimizers better have a darn good reason for allowing resource use to outstrip N^3. (And no doubt, they often will.)
A society of super-optimizers that regulates itself in a way resulting in mass death either isn’t so much super-optimized, or has a rather (to me) unsavory set of values.
Past a certain point of optimization power, all deaths become either violent or voluntary.
Yes, that’s exactly the point of this discussion.