I assume by determinists you’ve meant the so called “boring view of reality” something in a cluster of causal determinism and reductive materialism. I seem to fit quite good in there, so here is my take:
Humans have free will in a sense of decision making, planning, achieving our goals and shaping the future the way we would like it to be. It (spoiler alert) requires causal determinism or, at least, quite a lot of it. It does not require indeterminism or the existence of conterfactual worlds outside of ones mind at all. Libertarian definition of free will doesn’t seem to make any sense.
All the philosophical groundwork for solving the hard problem of consciousness is already done. We can understand in principle how apparently-different-in-kind entities can be reducible to one thing. Now it’s a scientific problem to figure out the exact reduction. Qualia are phisical.
Humans have free will in a sense of decision making, planning, achieving our goals and shaping the future the way we would like it to be. It (spoiler alert) requires causal determinism or, at least, quite a lot of it. It does not require indeterminism or the existence of conterfactual worlds outside of ones mind at all. Libertarian definition of free will doesn’t seem to make any sense.
Libertarian free will, if possible, offers more than compatibilist free will.
Determinism doesn’t allow you to influence the future in a way that makes future A more likely than future B , as a result of some choice you make now. Under determinism, the probabilities of A and B are what they are, and always were—before you make a decision, after you make a decision , and before you were born.
(Note that this is still true of multiversal theories. In multiversal theories, future states have probabilities that differ from each other and change over time, but can’t be changed)
Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on dcisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. It allows “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”, but without the ability to have actually chosen b.That additional, non-redundant, sense of control is what would have been required to answer the concern that libertarians actually have about what determinism robs them of
All the philosophical groundwork for solving the hard problem of consciousness is already done. We can understand in principle how apparently-different-in-kind entities can be reducible to one thing. Now it’s a scientific problem to figure out the exact reduction. Qualia are phisical
The Hard Problem is the problem of finding a physical reduction of qualia, so saying “duh, find a physical reduction of qualia” isn’t some novel solution that no one thought of before.
I don’t see how what you explained is more than decision making. As soon as we understand that probabilities are part of the map, not the territory, it’s clear that causing the future is exactly the same thing as influencing it in a way that makes future A more likely than future B. I also do not understand why would anyone feel more free if their decision making algorithm existed outside of their mind and how it’s even possible in theory.
Another thing that I have troubles understanding, is how the objective existence of counterfactuals follows from, or even is compatible with indeterminism. When we model some event with multiple outcomes we can either perceive it as random in one world, or determinable in many worlds, where each world correspond to each outcome. But you claim that it won’t be enough for libertarians. For some reasons they need both at the same time?
The most confusing thing for me, is the whole idea of objectively indeterminable event. If it’s indeterminable even for the universe itself, how can it happen at all in this universe? I can think of some justification via our universe being an interventionist simulation, but this will just pass the buck to the universe from which the intervention is performed.
I can definitely determine what my decision is. I do it every time when I make one. And I do it via my decision making algorithm, which can be executed in this universe, specifically on my brain. This requires quite a lot of determinism. And I don’t see how it can make sense if my decisions can’t be determined. And if someones defenition of free will requires decisions to be undeterminable, I claim that such definition doesn’t make any sense.
The Hard Problem is the problem of fishing a physical reduction of qualia, so saying “duh, find a physical reduction of qualia” isn’t some novel solution that no one thought of before.
What does novelty have to do with anything here? Anyway understanding that we have already dealt with similar problems before, can give some valuable insights.
As soon as we understand that probabilities are part of the map, not the territory,
That’s equivalent to assuming determinism. If you assume determinism, then all the best things you have said are indeed the best you can do with regard to decision making. But I am not assuming determinism. The argument that probabilities are only in the map is invalid, because “only in the map” doesn’t follow from “in the map”.
I also do not understand why would anyone feel more free if their decision making algorithm existed outside of their mind
What? Where did I say that?
Another thing that I have troubles understanding, is how the objective existence of counterfactuals follows from, or even is compatible with indeterminism. When we model some event with multiple outcomes we can either perceive it as random in one world, or determinable in many worlds, where each world correspond to each outcome. But you claim that it won’t be enough for libertarians. For some reasons they need both at the same time?
I don’t know what you are referring to. Counterfactuals follow from indeterminism because indeterminism means an event could gave happened differently. It’s quite straightforward.
If it’s indeterminable even for the universe itself, how can it happen at all in this universe?
Why wouldn’t it happen? To me that looks like a circular argument: nothing can happen unless it is determined , so everything is determined. Determinism, therefore determinism.
I can think of some justification via our universe being an interventionist simulation
Why would it need to be a simulation? You are assuming that a law of physics must be a deterministic law. But it doesn’t say that anywhere.
And if someones defenition of free will requires decisions to be undeterminable, I claim that such definition doesn’t make any sense.
Whether indeterminism based freewill makes sense is a separate question from whether indeterminism makes sense.
What does novelty have to do with anything here?
Why haven’t we reduced qualia already, if reductionism is an old idea?
You said that some people would feel more free if counterfactuals and probability, which are part of our decision making algorithm, existed somewhere outside of our mind.
I don’t know what you are referring to. Counterfactuals follow from indeterminism because indeterminism means an event could gave happened differently. It’s quite straightforward.
There seem to be a huge gap between “something could have happened differently” and “there actually exist a parallel universe where this indeed happened differently”. If we consider probability and counterfactuals to exist only on the map, it’s easy to cross this gap via using different equivalent interpretations of our uncertainty. But otherwise I don’t see how one follows from the other.
Why wouldn’t it happen? To me that looks like a circular argument: nothing can happen unless it is determined , so everything is determined. Determinism, therefore determinism.
Because if the event happened I can now see the actual outcome. Therefore I can determine the outcome (by seeing it), therefore the event is not indeterminable. I agree that it’s an obvious tautology, that’s exactly the reason why I feel so confused trying to imagine an alternative.
Whether indeterminism based freewill makes sense is a separate question from whether indeterminism makes sense.
I agree. But that’s what my initial claim was about: libertarian free will not making sense.
Why haven’t we reduced qualia already, if reductionism is an old idea?
For the same reason why we haven’t yet developed means to be immortal. It requires lots of actual scientific work in the direction that philosophy’s showed us. Philosophical ground work may have been done, but scientific is not yet. That’s exactly what I’ve said in the first comment.
You said that some people would feel more free if counterfactuals and probability, which are part of our decision making algorithm, existed somewhere outside of our mind.
No I didn’t. For future reference, you should respond to that kind of question using direct quotation.
In particular, I had no intention to comment on the feeling of freedom as opposed to actual freedom. I think you have been mentally translating
“free will” into “feeling of freedom” because you believe in the doctrine that “free will just is the feeling of freedom” ….but I don’t believe in it, so it doesn’t represent my views.
Similarly, I don’t believe that counteractuals are only only logical or “in the mind”.
You are doing a thing where you misunderstand me because you are filtering my statements through your beliefs.
You are also doing a thing where you change the usual meanings of words to fit a certain worldview. That makes it impossible for to me express any other worldview …unless you accept that my usages differ from yours
There seem to be a huge gap between “something could have happened differently” and “there actually exist a parallel universe where this indeed happened differently”.
Yes. So what? I have never claimed that real counteractals are the same thing as parallel worlds. Nor have I claimed that they are the same thing as logical counterfactuals.
There are at least four possible stances
No counterfactuals
Logical but not real counteractals
Logical and real counteractals.
Multiple worlds.
If we consider probability and counterfactuals to exist only on the map,
I don’t. I have already stated that the argument is invalid.
But otherwise I don’t see how one follows from the other.
If “the one” is parallel worlds and “the other” is real counterfactuals, I never asserted that. But maybe you meant something else. Please read AND write carefully.
I agree. But that’s what my initial claim was about: libertarian free will not making sense
So why bring in counterfactuals?
For the same reason why we haven’t yet developed means to be immortal.
There is no reason to believe immortality is possible. Please understand that I don’t agree with most Rationalist doctrine.
You are doing a thing where you misunderstand me because you are filtering my statements through your beliefs.
Of course our inferential distance is huge. It’s no surprise. Neither do I feel that you are really trying to cross it. Also, considering that OP question was about determinism, it seems very appropriate that i talk from determinist position. However, as it happens, I’m indeed interested in better understanding indeterminism and libertarian free will. I accept that your usage is different but currently I don’t understand it so it doesn’t make any senjse to me. So I’m just trying to guess. I would be grateful if you explained it in great details.
Yes. So what? I have never claimed that real counteractals are the same thing as parallel worlds.
Then I don’t understand what you mean by real counterfactuals. In what sense are they real? If it’s just the fact that something could have happened differently, can you explain, what you mean by “could” here? Or by probability?
Actually as we are figuring out each-others definitions, what do you mean by logical counterfactuals? Their existence in the mind of the decision-maker or some kind of separate platonic realm of logic where they exist?
Do I understand correctly, that you claim that logical<real<many words regarding to freedom of will? How does this options affect my decision making algorithm?
I don’t. I have already stated that the argument is invalid.
I’m not thinking that you are. I’m giving the explanation why would I ask you such a question (as well as questions above). I have a detailed model how these things work out under determinism, but I lack such model for indeterminism. So I have to ask explanations for things which may look obvious for you, not in order to mess with you, but to improve my understanding.
I think you have been mentally translating “free will” into “feeling of freedom” because you believe in the doctrine that “free will just is the feeling of freedom”
I’ve stated very clear that humans have free and even explained in what sense. Have you been mentally translating my messages into “free will is just a feeling” because you believe that determinists believe that “free will just is the feeling of freedom”? But I suppose, such guessing won’t lead us anywhere. So just nevermind. You may replace “feeling of freedom” with “being free”—the questin is still open: How will I be more free if counterfactuals are “real”, whatever that means.
And of course the most mysterious question is still open as well:
If the event happened I can now see the actual outcome. Therefore I can determine the outcome (by seeing it), therefore the event is not indeterminable. Then how can anything happen under indeterminism?
There is no reason to believe immortality is possible.
Then replace immortality with any other scientific breakthrough which isn’t achieved yet, despite science existing for so many years, but which you believe to be possible in future. The argument stays the same.
Of course our inferential distance is huge. It’s no surprise.
Part of that is inevitable, and part avoidable.
Also, considering that OP question was about determinism, it seems very appropriate that i talk from determinist position.
Believing in determinism is fine, but building it into your definitions is not. That makes the inferential gap worse
I have never claimed that real counteractals are the same thing as parallel worlds.
Then I don’t understand what you mean by real counterfactuals. In what sense are they real? If it’s just the fact that something could have happened differently, can you explain, what you mean by “could” here? Or by probability?
In order to define counterfactuals, I don’t need any fundamentally new resources. For instance:-
Indeterminism can easily be expressed in terms of probability: its the claim that an event B, and the conditional on an event A, can have an objective probability of less than 1.0. With the corollary that further alternatives, C and, and D can also happen since they have probability greater than 0.0. Given the premise, such alternatives have to exist, since the overall probability has to add up to one..
So a counterfactual is just a possible, but not actual, event, an event with a probability greater than 0, an event that could have happened, but didn’t. Under determinism, there are no such alternatives, because whatever event happened had probability 1.0 .. and therefore had all the probability mass
And of course, the point of real counterfactuals as opposed to logical counter factuals is that the probabilities it’s defined in terms of are real, objective probabilities,not subjective, ignorance-based probabilities.
Actually as we are figuring out each-others definitions, what do you mean by logical counterfactuals? Their existence in the mind of the decision-maker or some kind of separate platonic realm of logic where they exist?
What you are asking for is a full metaphysical account, not a definition. (And that might be part of the communication problem. There is no causal determinism without causal laws...but can you say exactly what a law is? Is it an idea on the mind of an observer, a platonic thingy, a material entity, an immaterial but physical entity, or what? I haven’t asked you before because it isn’t necessary to answer that kind of question to get a basic understanding of someone means by a term).
Do I understand correctly, that you claim that logical<real<many words regarding to freedom of will?
I would say that many worlds is less conducive to the accepted ideas of free will than indeterminism AKA real counterfactuals , because MW doesn’t allow refraining..one of your counterparts will perform any action that has more than zero probability.
How does this options affect my decision making algorithm?
Why ask that question? The concept of a counterfactual doesn’t become meaningless just because it doesn’t affect your DT. Nor does it become false. Nor have you said why DT is the only thing that matters.
The proposition that there are no real counterfactuals is equivalent to the proposition of determinism… which itself entails that your DT will be whatever it is determined to be.
The claim that (in)determinism doesn’t affect DT...you didn’t make it, but why else bring up DT...is a kind of wireheading. Determinism stops you freely choosing a DT and also stops your decisions making a difference, at least to the same.extent.
I’m not thinking that you are. I’m giving the explanation why would I ask you such a question (as well as questions above). I have a detailed model how these things work out under determinism, but I lack such model for indeterminism.
So I have to ask explanations for things which may look obvious for you, not in order to mess with you, but to improve my understanding.
I’ve stated very clear that humans have free and even explained in what sense.
You mean this passage:
Humans have free will in a sense of decision making, planning, achieving our goals and shaping the future the way we would like it to be. It (spoiler alert) requires causal determinism or, at least, quite a lot of it. It does not require indeterminism or the existence of conterfactual worlds outside of ones mind at all. Libertarian definition of free will doesn’t seem to make any sense.
You’ve stated that decision making is still possible given determinism. But everyone knows that already … It’s not what the fuss is about. The challenge posed to free will by determinism is about the “free” part .
If free choices requires complete determinism, so that decisions can be carried out, and also indeterminism, so that they can be free, then there are none. If they are free in some other way , you haven’t said how. If they only require partial determinism,then that is compatibke with partial indeterminism.
Have you been mentally translating my messages into “free will is just a feeling” because you believe that determinists believe that “free will just is the feeling of freedom”?
You used this phrase
You said that some people would feel more free
That’s how we got onto the topic.
But I suppose, such guessing won’t lead us anywhere. So just nevermind. You may replace “feeling of freedom” with “being free”—the questin is still open: How will I be more free if counterfactuals are “real”, whatever that means.
Real counterfactuals mean you actually could have made a different decision under the circumstances. Which means that the future depends on decisions in the present.
If the event happened I can now see the actual outcome. Therefore I can determine the outcome (by seeing it), therefore the event is not indeterminable. Then how can anything happen under indeterminism?
That’s conflating two meanings of “determined”. There’s an epistemic meaning by which you “determine” that something has happened, you gain positive or “determinate”.knowledge of it. And there’s causal determinism, the idea that a situation can only turn out out or evolve in one particular way. They are related , but not in such a way that you can infer causal determinism from epistemic determinism. You can have determinate knowledge of an indeterminate coin flip.
Then replace immortality with any other scientific breakthrough which isn’t achieved yet, despite science existing for so many years, but which you believe to be possible in future.
I don’t have certain knowledge that anything will be solved in the future.
What you’re saying, *promissory materialism”, isn’t proof of anything and isnt new.
You previously said that we now have the philosophical tools to to solve the hard problem. Are the two claims supposed to be the same?
Why ask that question? The concept of a counterfactual doesn’t become meaningless just because it doesn’t affect your DT. Nor does it become false. Nor have you said why DT is the only thing that matters.
I noticed that people often mean two completely different things by “free will”. One is the decision making ability and the other is some vague metaphysical freedom, which can include unpredictability, being the ultimate cause of ones action and existence of counterfactuals outside of ones mind. People usually claim that these two things are related or follows from one another: if there is no metaphysical freedom then we can’t decide anything or, at least our decisions do not have some special meaning.
Originally, I had somewhat similar intuition. But when I thought more about these matters I noticed that it’s not the case, that metaphysical freedom doesn’t affect my decision making at all. All the really interesting questions, related to the freedom of will, like agency or moral responsibility or futility of choice, require decision making and irrelevant to metaphysics. Whether or not my decisions are determined I still have to make them, it is them that affect the future and that’s what gives them meaning, not some metaphysics. You may call it “wireheading” in one case and “a real free choice” in the other but it changes nothing in the actuall desicion making process. It can affect the way people feel about their choice, though, and that’s why I originally started talking about the “feeling of freedom”.
People keep making this mistake, combining two different things into one concept. The way the original question of this thread is posted is a good example of it. With you I have some mixed reading. You seem to understand that decision making works under determinism, but still for some reason attribute the sense of meaning to metaphysical freedom. Occasionally you make some weird statements like claiming that the future depends on the decisions in the present only if there are “real counterfactuals”:
Real counterfactuals mean you actually could have made a different decision under the circumstances. Which means that the future depends on decisions in the present.
So I have two hypothesis. First one, is that you see some real connection between decision making and metaphysical freedom that I missed. In that case I’m interested to know what it is. The second one is that we have some boring disagreement about defenitions and how we are supposed to feel about them in which case you do you, this whole line of discussion is fruitless for me and I’d like not to spend our time on it. Therefore, my question. If decision making is not affected by indeterminist metaphysics lets just focus on the other stuff.
If free choices requires complete determinism, so that decisions can be carried out, and also indeterminism, so that they can be free, then there are none. If they are free in some other way , you haven’t said how. If they only require partial determinism,then that is compatibke with partial indeterminism.
Under determinism people are free in exactly the way we feel we are. When we make a decision/do something we can decide/do whatever we want. Our decisions and actions affect the future and without them the future wouldn’t be the way it will. Even more, if we metawant to do the thing that we do not want—we can do it. If we metawant to be unpredictable we can achieve it.
What you are asking for is a full metaphysical account, not a definition. (And that might be part of the communication problem. There is no causal determinism without causal laws...but can you say exactly what a law is? Is it an idea on the mind of an observer, a platonic thingy, a material entity, an immaterial but physical entity, or what? I haven’t asked you before because it isn’t necessary to answer that kind of question to get a basic understanding of someone means by a term).
Yes! Exactly! Sorry for not being clear enough about it. I need to have a “metaphysical account” of indeterminism as my current standards do not allow me to claim that I understand something unless I have a good enough transparent box model for it.
As for causal determinism it’s easy. We start from the idea of causality which is just stuff that makes other stuff happen. Then this happening gives us causal graphs and we are free to call some parts of these graphs “laws”. Such law is an idea in a mind of observer which corresponds to an actual causal graph of reality. We can distinguish between “laws as we understand them” and “the way universe actually is”—a map-territory distinction in a nutshell. And we understand this model good enough to build computers working on these principles of inputs causing outputs. We use them to work, communicate about this exact matter and play games. I’ll call this “gamer gateway to metaphisical understanding”: if you can play packman on your model of methaphisics then it’s satisfactory.
But why do things happen and change at all? Why everything isn’t constantly the same? Why causality? This one I don’t know, yet. It just seems that it’s the way the universe is. And while not a really satisfying answer it at least makes sense. If the universe allows causality—no surprise that we have causality. Compare to this: universe doesn’t allow some things to be determinable but we still somehow are able to determine them. - This seems as an obvious contradiction to me and is the reason I can’t grasp an understanding of indeterminism on a gut level
That’s conflating two meanings of “determined”. There’s an epistemic meaning by which you “determine” that something has happened, you gain positive or “determinate”.knowledge of it. And there’s causal determinism, the idea that a situation can only turn out out or evolve in one particular way. They are related , but not in such a way that you can infer causal determinism from epistemic determinism. You can have determinate knowledge of an indeterminate coin flip
I understand how my epistemical position is an approximation of reality, so it can be less accurate. But what would it even mean to have a map that is more accurate than the territory itself? It can make sense in many worlds, if all the outcomes do actually happen, than my knowledge of the result of the coin toss in this world is an approximation of the general distribution among all the worlds. But if it’s not the case, than I’m lost. How is it possible to acquire such knowledge? To determine the undeterminable? It seems not only contradict the second law of thermodynamics but logic itself. If laws of the universe doesn’t allow to determine something and my epistemical process is part of this universe...
We can suppose that laws of the universe actually allow to determine every event, but there are events that can be determined only when and after they actually happened. Is it what you mean? This would make more sense to me, yet the mystery wouldn’t be solved. It would be passed to the moment where future become present. Something really strange would be happening then, when previously indeterminable becomes determined. What happens to all the other futures? I think we need a much better metaphysical account before we can reasonably agree that such position is coherent.
I don’t have certain knowledge that anything will be solved in the future. What you’re saying, *promissory materialism”, isn’t proof of anything and isnt new.
I’m really confused now. Seems that we are arguing past each other. What point exactly are you trying to make here?
My point is that the fact that science haven’t produced some knowledge doesn’t mean that it won’t do it, or that it requires to incorporate some radically different philosophical approach to do it. We are neither scientifically nor logically omniscient. The process of discovery just takes time to develop all the necessary scientific insights and do the search.
Neither certainty, nor novelty has anything to do with it and I don’t understand why do you keep pressing this point. You don’t need to be certain that something will happen to understand the general idea of it happening. If your model includes significant probability of science continuing to produce new knowledge, than you already understand why is it possible that this knowledge will be produced despite it had not been produced, say 10 years ago, even though science didn’t become less materialistic.
I assume by determinists you’ve meant the so called “boring view of reality” something in a cluster of causal determinism and reductive materialism. I seem to fit quite good in there, so here is my take:
Humans have free will in a sense of decision making, planning, achieving our goals and shaping the future the way we would like it to be. It (spoiler alert) requires causal determinism or, at least, quite a lot of it. It does not require indeterminism or the existence of conterfactual worlds outside of ones mind at all. Libertarian definition of free will doesn’t seem to make any sense.
All the philosophical groundwork for solving the hard problem of consciousness is already done. We can understand in principle how apparently-different-in-kind entities can be reducible to one thing. Now it’s a scientific problem to figure out the exact reduction. Qualia are phisical.
Libertarian free will, if possible, offers more than compatibilist free will.
Determinism doesn’t allow you to influence the future in a way that makes future A more likely than future B , as a result of some choice you make now. Under determinism, the probabilities of A and B are what they are, and always were—before you make a decision, after you make a decision , and before you were born. (Note that this is still true of multiversal theories. In multiversal theories, future states have probabilities that differ from each other and change over time, but can’t be changed)
Libertarian free will allows the future to depend on dcisions which are not themselves determined. That means there are valid statements of the form “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”. Moreover, these are real possibilities, not merely conceptual or logical ones.
Under determinism, events still need to be caused,and your (determined) actions can be part of the cause of a future state that is itself determined, that has probability 1.0. Determinism allows you to cause the future ,but it doesn’t allow you to control the future in any sense other than causing it. It allows “if I had made choice b instead of choice a, then future B would have happened instead of future A”, but without the ability to have actually chosen b.That additional, non-redundant, sense of control is what would have been required to answer the concern that libertarians actually have about what determinism robs them of
The Hard Problem is the problem of finding a physical reduction of qualia, so saying “duh, find a physical reduction of qualia” isn’t some novel solution that no one thought of before.
I don’t see how what you explained is more than decision making. As soon as we understand that probabilities are part of the map, not the territory, it’s clear that causing the future is exactly the same thing as influencing it in a way that makes future A more likely than future B. I also do not understand why would anyone feel more free if their decision making algorithm existed outside of their mind and how it’s even possible in theory.
Another thing that I have troubles understanding, is how the objective existence of counterfactuals follows from, or even is compatible with indeterminism. When we model some event with multiple outcomes we can either perceive it as random in one world, or determinable in many worlds, where each world correspond to each outcome. But you claim that it won’t be enough for libertarians. For some reasons they need both at the same time?
The most confusing thing for me, is the whole idea of objectively indeterminable event. If it’s indeterminable even for the universe itself, how can it happen at all in this universe? I can think of some justification via our universe being an interventionist simulation, but this will just pass the buck to the universe from which the intervention is performed.
I can definitely determine what my decision is. I do it every time when I make one. And I do it via my decision making algorithm, which can be executed in this universe, specifically on my brain. This requires quite a lot of determinism. And I don’t see how it can make sense if my decisions can’t be determined. And if someones defenition of free will requires decisions to be undeterminable, I claim that such definition doesn’t make any sense.
What does novelty have to do with anything here? Anyway understanding that we have already dealt with similar problems before, can give some valuable insights.
That’s equivalent to assuming determinism. If you assume determinism, then all the best things you have said are indeed the best you can do with regard to decision making. But I am not assuming determinism. The argument that probabilities are only in the map is invalid, because “only in the map” doesn’t follow from “in the map”.
What? Where did I say that?
I don’t know what you are referring to. Counterfactuals follow from indeterminism because indeterminism means an event could gave happened differently. It’s quite straightforward.
Why wouldn’t it happen? To me that looks like a circular argument: nothing can happen unless it is determined , so everything is determined. Determinism, therefore determinism.
Why would it need to be a simulation? You are assuming that a law of physics must be a deterministic law. But it doesn’t say that anywhere.
Whether indeterminism based freewill makes sense is a separate question from whether indeterminism makes sense.
Why haven’t we reduced qualia already, if reductionism is an old idea?
You said that some people would feel more free if counterfactuals and probability, which are part of our decision making algorithm, existed somewhere outside of our mind.
There seem to be a huge gap between “something could have happened differently” and “there actually exist a parallel universe where this indeed happened differently”. If we consider probability and counterfactuals to exist only on the map, it’s easy to cross this gap via using different equivalent interpretations of our uncertainty. But otherwise I don’t see how one follows from the other.
Because if the event happened I can now see the actual outcome. Therefore I can determine the outcome (by seeing it), therefore the event is not indeterminable. I agree that it’s an obvious tautology, that’s exactly the reason why I feel so confused trying to imagine an alternative.
I agree. But that’s what my initial claim was about: libertarian free will not making sense.
For the same reason why we haven’t yet developed means to be immortal. It requires lots of actual scientific work in the direction that philosophy’s showed us. Philosophical ground work may have been done, but scientific is not yet. That’s exactly what I’ve said in the first comment.
No I didn’t. For future reference, you should respond to that kind of question using direct quotation.
In particular, I had no intention to comment on the feeling of freedom as opposed to actual freedom. I think you have been mentally translating “free will” into “feeling of freedom” because you believe in the doctrine that “free will just is the feeling of freedom” ….but I don’t believe in it, so it doesn’t represent my views.
Similarly, I don’t believe that counteractuals are only only logical or “in the mind”.
You are doing a thing where you misunderstand me because you are filtering my statements through your beliefs.
You are also doing a thing where you change the usual meanings of words to fit a certain worldview. That makes it impossible for to me express any other worldview …unless you accept that my usages differ from yours
Yes. So what? I have never claimed that real counteractals are the same thing as parallel worlds. Nor have I claimed that they are the same thing as logical counterfactuals.
There are at least four possible stances
No counterfactuals
Logical but not real counteractals
Logical and real counteractals.
Multiple worlds.
I don’t. I have already stated that the argument is invalid.
If “the one” is parallel worlds and “the other” is real counterfactuals, I never asserted that. But maybe you meant something else. Please read AND write carefully.
So why bring in counterfactuals?
There is no reason to believe immortality is possible. Please understand that I don’t agree with most Rationalist doctrine.
Of course our inferential distance is huge. It’s no surprise. Neither do I feel that you are really trying to cross it. Also, considering that OP question was about determinism, it seems very appropriate that i talk from determinist position. However, as it happens, I’m indeed interested in better understanding indeterminism and libertarian free will. I accept that your usage is different but currently I don’t understand it so it doesn’t make any senjse to me. So I’m just trying to guess. I would be grateful if you explained it in great details.
Then I don’t understand what you mean by real counterfactuals. In what sense are they real? If it’s just the fact that something could have happened differently, can you explain, what you mean by “could” here? Or by probability?
Actually as we are figuring out each-others definitions, what do you mean by logical counterfactuals? Their existence in the mind of the decision-maker or some kind of separate platonic realm of logic where they exist?
Do I understand correctly, that you claim that logical<real<many words regarding to freedom of will? How does this options affect my decision making algorithm?
I’m not thinking that you are. I’m giving the explanation why would I ask you such a question (as well as questions above). I have a detailed model how these things work out under determinism, but I lack such model for indeterminism. So I have to ask explanations for things which may look obvious for you, not in order to mess with you, but to improve my understanding.
I’ve stated very clear that humans have free and even explained in what sense. Have you been mentally translating my messages into “free will is just a feeling” because you believe that determinists believe that “free will just is the feeling of freedom”? But I suppose, such guessing won’t lead us anywhere. So just nevermind. You may replace “feeling of freedom” with “being free”—the questin is still open: How will I be more free if counterfactuals are “real”, whatever that means.
And of course the most mysterious question is still open as well:
If the event happened I can now see the actual outcome. Therefore I can determine the outcome (by seeing it), therefore the event is not indeterminable. Then how can anything happen under indeterminism?
Then replace immortality with any other scientific breakthrough which isn’t achieved yet, despite science existing for so many years, but which you believe to be possible in future. The argument stays the same.
Part of that is inevitable, and part avoidable.
Believing in determinism is fine, but building it into your definitions is not. That makes the inferential gap worse
In order to define counterfactuals, I don’t need any fundamentally new resources. For instance:-
Indeterminism can easily be expressed in terms of probability: its the claim that an event B, and the conditional on an event A, can have an objective probability of less than 1.0. With the corollary that further alternatives, C and, and D can also happen since they have probability greater than 0.0. Given the premise, such alternatives have to exist, since the overall probability has to add up to one..
So a counterfactual is just a possible, but not actual, event, an event with a probability greater than 0, an event that could have happened, but didn’t. Under determinism, there are no such alternatives, because whatever event happened had probability 1.0 .. and therefore had all the probability mass
And of course, the point of real counterfactuals as opposed to logical counter factuals is that the probabilities it’s defined in terms of are real, objective probabilities,not subjective, ignorance-based probabilities.
What you are asking for is a full metaphysical account, not a definition. (And that might be part of the communication problem. There is no causal determinism without causal laws...but can you say exactly what a law is? Is it an idea on the mind of an observer, a platonic thingy, a material entity, an immaterial but physical entity, or what? I haven’t asked you before because it isn’t necessary to answer that kind of question to get a basic understanding of someone means by a term).
I would say that many worlds is less conducive to the accepted ideas of free will than indeterminism AKA real counterfactuals , because MW doesn’t allow refraining..one of your counterparts will perform any action that has more than zero probability.
Why ask that question? The concept of a counterfactual doesn’t become meaningless just because it doesn’t affect your DT. Nor does it become false. Nor have you said why DT is the only thing that matters.
The proposition that there are no real counterfactuals is equivalent to the proposition of determinism… which itself entails that your DT will be whatever it is determined to be.
The claim that (in)determinism doesn’t affect DT...you didn’t make it, but why else bring up DT...is a kind of wireheading. Determinism stops you freely choosing a DT and also stops your decisions making a difference, at least to the same.extent.
You mean this passage:
You’ve stated that decision making is still possible given determinism. But everyone knows that already … It’s not what the fuss is about. The challenge posed to free will by determinism is about the “free” part .
If free choices requires complete determinism, so that decisions can be carried out, and also indeterminism, so that they can be free, then there are none. If they are free in some other way , you haven’t said how. If they only require partial determinism,then that is compatibke with partial indeterminism.
You used this phrase
That’s how we got onto the topic.
Real counterfactuals mean you actually could have made a different decision under the circumstances. Which means that the future depends on decisions in the present.
That’s conflating two meanings of “determined”. There’s an epistemic meaning by which you “determine” that something has happened, you gain positive or “determinate”.knowledge of it. And there’s causal determinism, the idea that a situation can only turn out out or evolve in one particular way. They are related , but not in such a way that you can infer causal determinism from epistemic determinism. You can have determinate knowledge of an indeterminate coin flip.
I don’t have certain knowledge that anything will be solved in the future. What you’re saying, *promissory materialism”, isn’t proof of anything and isnt new.
You previously said that we now have the philosophical tools to to solve the hard problem. Are the two claims supposed to be the same?
I noticed that people often mean two completely different things by “free will”. One is the decision making ability and the other is some vague metaphysical freedom, which can include unpredictability, being the ultimate cause of ones action and existence of counterfactuals outside of ones mind. People usually claim that these two things are related or follows from one another: if there is no metaphysical freedom then we can’t decide anything or, at least our decisions do not have some special meaning.
Originally, I had somewhat similar intuition. But when I thought more about these matters I noticed that it’s not the case, that metaphysical freedom doesn’t affect my decision making at all. All the really interesting questions, related to the freedom of will, like agency or moral responsibility or futility of choice, require decision making and irrelevant to metaphysics. Whether or not my decisions are determined I still have to make them, it is them that affect the future and that’s what gives them meaning, not some metaphysics. You may call it “wireheading” in one case and “a real free choice” in the other but it changes nothing in the actuall desicion making process. It can affect the way people feel about their choice, though, and that’s why I originally started talking about the “feeling of freedom”.
People keep making this mistake, combining two different things into one concept. The way the original question of this thread is posted is a good example of it. With you I have some mixed reading. You seem to understand that decision making works under determinism, but still for some reason attribute the sense of meaning to metaphysical freedom. Occasionally you make some weird statements like claiming that the future depends on the decisions in the present only if there are “real counterfactuals”:
So I have two hypothesis. First one, is that you see some real connection between decision making and metaphysical freedom that I missed. In that case I’m interested to know what it is. The second one is that we have some boring disagreement about defenitions and how we are supposed to feel about them in which case you do you, this whole line of discussion is fruitless for me and I’d like not to spend our time on it. Therefore, my question. If decision making is not affected by indeterminist metaphysics lets just focus on the other stuff.
Under determinism people are free in exactly the way we feel we are. When we make a decision/do something we can decide/do whatever we want. Our decisions and actions affect the future and without them the future wouldn’t be the way it will. Even more, if we metawant to do the thing that we do not want—we can do it. If we metawant to be unpredictable we can achieve it.
Yes! Exactly! Sorry for not being clear enough about it. I need to have a “metaphysical account” of indeterminism as my current standards do not allow me to claim that I understand something unless I have a good enough transparent box model for it.
As for causal determinism it’s easy. We start from the idea of causality which is just stuff that makes other stuff happen. Then this happening gives us causal graphs and we are free to call some parts of these graphs “laws”. Such law is an idea in a mind of observer which corresponds to an actual causal graph of reality. We can distinguish between “laws as we understand them” and “the way universe actually is”—a map-territory distinction in a nutshell. And we understand this model good enough to build computers working on these principles of inputs causing outputs. We use them to work, communicate about this exact matter and play games. I’ll call this “gamer gateway to metaphisical understanding”: if you can play packman on your model of methaphisics then it’s satisfactory.
But why do things happen and change at all? Why everything isn’t constantly the same? Why causality? This one I don’t know, yet. It just seems that it’s the way the universe is. And while not a really satisfying answer it at least makes sense. If the universe allows causality—no surprise that we have causality. Compare to this: universe doesn’t allow some things to be determinable but we still somehow are able to determine them. - This seems as an obvious contradiction to me and is the reason I can’t grasp an understanding of indeterminism on a gut level
I understand how my epistemical position is an approximation of reality, so it can be less accurate. But what would it even mean to have a map that is more accurate than the territory itself? It can make sense in many worlds, if all the outcomes do actually happen, than my knowledge of the result of the coin toss in this world is an approximation of the general distribution among all the worlds. But if it’s not the case, than I’m lost. How is it possible to acquire such knowledge? To determine the undeterminable? It seems not only contradict the second law of thermodynamics but logic itself. If laws of the universe doesn’t allow to determine something and my epistemical process is part of this universe...
We can suppose that laws of the universe actually allow to determine every event, but there are events that can be determined only when and after they actually happened. Is it what you mean? This would make more sense to me, yet the mystery wouldn’t be solved. It would be passed to the moment where future become present. Something really strange would be happening then, when previously indeterminable becomes determined. What happens to all the other futures? I think we need a much better metaphysical account before we can reasonably agree that such position is coherent.
I’m really confused now. Seems that we are arguing past each other. What point exactly are you trying to make here?
My point is that the fact that science haven’t produced some knowledge doesn’t mean that it won’t do it, or that it requires to incorporate some radically different philosophical approach to do it. We are neither scientifically nor logically omniscient. The process of discovery just takes time to develop all the necessary scientific insights and do the search.
Neither certainty, nor novelty has anything to do with it and I don’t understand why do you keep pressing this point. You don’t need to be certain that something will happen to understand the general idea of it happening. If your model includes significant probability of science continuing to produce new knowledge, than you already understand why is it possible that this knowledge will be produced despite it had not been produced, say 10 years ago, even though science didn’t become less materialistic.