I agree that the specification of which state of knowledge we’re under is critical to the solution. Another way to put it is what I’m seeing over and over again as I go through Jaynes’ Probability Theory book: different prior information leading to different probability estimates is not paradoxical. That’s why specifying prior information with clarity is so important. Under one set of prior information, the probability is 1⁄3; under another, it’s 1⁄2.
I agree that the specification of which state of knowledge we’re under is critical to the solution. Another way to put it is what I’m seeing over and over again as I go through Jaynes’ Probability Theory book: different prior information leading to different probability estimates is not paradoxical. That’s why specifying prior information with clarity is so important. Under one set of prior information, the probability is 1⁄3; under another, it’s 1⁄2.