As of about 10 years ago MAD conditions no longer apply. I don’t have a source for this because it was related to me directly by someone who was present at the briefing, but around 2006-07 our advanced simulations concluded that the United States had something like a ~60% chance of completely eliminating Russia’s second strike capacity if they had no warning, and still a ~20% chance if they did.
I was able to find a Foreign Affairs article that discusses some of the reasons for this disparity here. The short version is that we were much more successful in maintaining our nuclear forces than Russia.
I feel the need to add an important caveat: MAD as a strategic situation may not apply, but MAD as a defense policy still does. Moving away from the defense policy is what the Foreign Affairs article warns against, and it is what the book I am reading right now concludes is the right course. In historical terms, it argues in favor of Herman Kahn over Schelling.
I’m curious what type of nuclear advantage you think America has. It is is still bound by MAD due to nukes on submersibles.
I think that US didn’t have a sufficient intelligence capability to know where to inspect. Take Israel as an example.
CIA were saying in 1968 ”...Israel might undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years”. When Israel had already built a bomb in 1966.
As of about 10 years ago MAD conditions no longer apply. I don’t have a source for this because it was related to me directly by someone who was present at the briefing, but around 2006-07 our advanced simulations concluded that the United States had something like a ~60% chance of completely eliminating Russia’s second strike capacity if they had no warning, and still a ~20% chance if they did.
I was able to find a Foreign Affairs article that discusses some of the reasons for this disparity here. The short version is that we were much more successful in maintaining our nuclear forces than Russia.
I am not certain how the intervening years have affected this calculus, but based on the reaction to Russia’s recent claims of nuclear innovation, I suspect they are not changed much. I am reading a book called The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century, by Keith B. Payne, which I expect will shed considerably more light on the subject.
Interesting. I didn’t know Russia’s defences had degraded so much.
I feel the need to add an important caveat: MAD as a strategic situation may not apply, but MAD as a defense policy still does. Moving away from the defense policy is what the Foreign Affairs article warns against, and it is what the book I am reading right now concludes is the right course. In historical terms, it argues in favor of Herman Kahn over Schelling.