Quine is disputing the idea of definitons just as much as analyticity. Perhaps this is a good way to think about his argument: How would you find out whether a given belief is a definition or not? You could of course ask, but what if you don’t originally share a language? He then argues that there is no way to distinguish a word for “definition” from any other word designating a set of logically independent beliefs they hold, without making assumptions about how people use “definitions” we usually consider to be results of empirical psychology.
Quine is disputing the idea of definitons just as much as analyticity. Perhaps this is a good way to think about his argument: How would you find out whether a given belief is a definition or not? You could of course ask, but what if you don’t originally share a language? He then argues that there is no way to distinguish a word for “definition” from any other word designating a set of logically independent beliefs they hold, without making assumptions about how people use “definitions” we usually consider to be results of empirical psychology.