For example, suppose the predictor used observations of the agent to make probabilistic inferences about its source code. These could even be observations about how the agent acts in other Newcombian situations. Then the predictor could, without knowing what function the agent computes, make better-than-random guesses about its behavior. This falls outside of Yudkowsky and Soares’ definition of subjunctive dependence, but it has the same effect.
No, it doesn’t fall outside Yudkowsky and Soares’ definition of subjunctive dependence. The observations about how the agent acts in other Newcombian situations still depend on the agent’s decision procedure. The connection with the predictor is less direct, but the original subjunctive dependence is still there. I wrote a full post on this here.
No, it doesn’t fall outside Yudkowsky and Soares’ definition of subjunctive dependence. The observations about how the agent acts in other Newcombian situations still depend on the agent’s decision procedure. The connection with the predictor is less direct, but the original subjunctive dependence is still there. I wrote a full post on this here.
Nice post. I’m leaving a reply there instead of here. :)