It’s even harder to see when you ought to strategically vote in Condorcet systems than under STV.
The strategic voting style you’d aim for in Condorcet is to ‘bury’ a second-favorite candidate.
Case: A Blue. Thinks the Reds have some serious problems, but those problems are nowhere near as bad as the White party.
The honest vote here is to vote Blue—Red—White. The strategic vote is Blue—White—Red.
But that is a very risky move. It only helps if this vote-bury helps the White party beat the Red by direct preference, AND the Red beat the Blue, AND the Blue beat the White party by direct preference, - so we just helped make a cycle—AND the cycle-resolution system, whatever that is, ends up favoring the Blues.
If you get the first and the second but not both of the other two… congratulations, you just elected the White party (or you made a cycle, and though the Red won, you made the Whites gain reputation and power relative to where they’d be being eliminated).
Unless you can know a great deal about the ballots that have been cast, this is far more likely to backfire and get you something you really don’t want (White winning) than to get you something you want (Blue winning).
I just remembered another style of strategic offensive voting—this one involves burying your favorite candidate under the second favorite in order to induce a cycle and then win it.
This one is even more insane than the other one, for obvious reasons. I just wanted to point out that it exists.
It’s even harder to see when you ought to strategically vote in Condorcet systems than under STV. The strategic voting style you’d aim for in Condorcet is to ‘bury’ a second-favorite candidate.
Case: A Blue. Thinks the Reds have some serious problems, but those problems are nowhere near as bad as the White party.
The honest vote here is to vote Blue—Red—White. The strategic vote is Blue—White—Red.
But that is a very risky move. It only helps if this vote-bury helps the White party beat the Red by direct preference, AND the Red beat the Blue, AND the Blue beat the White party by direct preference, - so we just helped make a cycle—AND the cycle-resolution system, whatever that is, ends up favoring the Blues.
If you get the first and the second but not both of the other two… congratulations, you just elected the White party (or you made a cycle, and though the Red won, you made the Whites gain reputation and power relative to where they’d be being eliminated).
Unless you can know a great deal about the ballots that have been cast, this is far more likely to backfire and get you something you really don’t want (White winning) than to get you something you want (Blue winning).
I just remembered another style of strategic offensive voting—this one involves burying your favorite candidate under the second favorite in order to induce a cycle and then win it.
This one is even more insane than the other one, for obvious reasons. I just wanted to point out that it exists.