in that the algorithmic complexity (or rather, some generalization of algorithmic complexity to possibly uncomputable universes/​mathematical objects) of Tegmark 4 as a whole is much lower than that of any specific universe within it like our apparent universe. (This is similar to the fact that the program tape for a UTM can be shorter than that of any non-UTM, as it can just be the empty string, or that you can print a history of all computable universes with a dovetailing program, which is very short.) Therefore it seems simpler to assume that all of Tegmark 4 exists rather than only some specific universe.
Shouldn’t it be about compressing my perceptual stream? And if there is really simple but very large universe with many copies of my perceptual stream embedded into it, then most complexity gets squeezed into pointing at them?
Shouldn’t it be about compressing my perceptual stream? And if there is really simple but very large universe with many copies of my perceptual stream embedded into it, then most complexity gets squeezed into pointing at them?