It’s in the article. If you’re not impressed by it then I’m indeed out of arguments.
Furthermore, while D and E seem plausible candidates for reasons against killing a being with these properties (E is in fact Peter Singer’s view on the matter), none of the criteria from A to E seem relevant to suffering, to whether a being can be harmed or benefitted. The case for these being bottom-up morally relevant criteria for the relevance of suffering (or happiness) is very weak, to say the least.
Maybe that’s the speciesist’s central confusion, that the rationality/sapience of a being is somehow relevant for whether its suffering matters morally. Clearly, for us ourselves, this does not seem to be the case. If I was told that some evil scientist would first operate on my brain to (temporarily) lower my IQ and cognitive abilities, and then torture me afterwards, it is not like I will be less afraid of the torture or care less about averting it!
There’s also a hyperlink in the first paragraph referring to section 6 of the linked paper.
Ok. Yeah, I don’t find any of those to be strong arguments. Again, I would like to urge you to consider and address the points brought up in this post.
It’s in the article. If you’re not impressed by it then I’m indeed out of arguments.
There’s also a hyperlink in the first paragraph referring to section 6 of the linked paper.
Ok. Yeah, I don’t find any of those to be strong arguments. Again, I would like to urge you to consider and address the points brought up in this post.