Therefore, we should expect there to be a lot of moral anti-epistemology.
Um. Epistemology, generally speaking, assumes that there is something stable and objective to be known—reality. Do you assume moral realism? We don’t speak of epistemology (or anti-epistemology) of artistic preferences, do we?
Did you read my third paragraph? I’m not assuming moral realism and I’m well aware of the issue you mention. I do think ithere is a meaningful way a person’s reasoning about moral issues can be wrong, even under the assumption of anti-realism. Namely, if people use an argument of form f to argue for their desired conclusion, and yet they would reject other conclusions that follow from the argument of form f, it seems like they’re deluding themselves. I’m not entirely sure the parallels to epistemology are strong enough to justify the analogy, but it seems worth thinking about it.
Um. Epistemology, generally speaking, assumes that there is something stable and objective to be known—reality. Do you assume moral realism? We don’t speak of epistemology (or anti-epistemology) of artistic preferences, do we?
Did you read my third paragraph? I’m not assuming moral realism and I’m well aware of the issue you mention. I do think ithere is a meaningful way a person’s reasoning about moral issues can be wrong, even under the assumption of anti-realism. Namely, if people use an argument of form f to argue for their desired conclusion, and yet they would reject other conclusions that follow from the argument of form f, it seems like they’re deluding themselves. I’m not entirely sure the parallels to epistemology are strong enough to justify the analogy, but it seems worth thinking about it.
I am drawing a distinction between epistemology and correct reasoning. They are not synonyms.
Mistakes (deliberate or not) in logic, refusals to draw an obvious conclusion, etc. are not epistemology problems.