I agree that saying anything is, technically, Bayesian evidence about their character, but some statements are much more relevant to someone’s character than others. When you say someone’s response doesn’t look like what you’d expect to hear from someone trying to figure out what’s true, that’s not very different from just saying that you suspect they’re not trying to figure out what’s true. Why not cut out the indirection? (That was a rhetorical question; the answer is, “Because it’s polite.”)
Maybe I’m wrong, but this looks to me less like the response I’d expect from someone not making a character assessment, and more like the response I’d expect from someone who’s trying to make a character assessment (which could be construed as a social attack, by the sort of people who do that thing) while maintaining plausible deniability that they’re not making a character assessment (in order to avoid being socially attacked on grounds of having made a social attack, by the sort of people who do that thing).
Your answer to your own rhetorical question is wrong, for two reasons. First, because you are confusing likelihoods with posteriors. Second, because you are confusing one-off actions with dispositions.
Likelihoods and posteriors
Yes, it’s impolite to say “I think Ben isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”, and more polite to say “What Ben says is more like what someone says who isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”.
But it’s also wrong to say “I think Ben isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”, if your actual epistemic state matches mine. Without reading the linked post, I would strongly expect that Ben is really trying to figure out what’s true. On the other hand, if I had only the linked post and no other information about Ben, I would (as you obviously think I do) think that Ben is almost certainly arguing with an anti-EA bottom line already written.
But, in fact, I have both that post and other evidence that Ben is generally, let’s say, truth-aligned. So what’s actually going on? I don’t know. So I followed the generally excellent procedure of reporting likelihood rather than posterior, and described how that post seems to me.
(I do also generally prefer to be polite, so probably the threshold for how confident I am that someone’s being intellectually dishonest before saying so explicitly is higher than if my only concern was maximum-bandwidth communication. In this case, I don’t believe my opinion is over where the threshold would be without concerns for politeness.)
One-off actions and dispositions
But, to be clear, I did intend to communicate that I think it genuinely possible (maybe even likely? Not sure) that on this particular occasion Ben has been arguing in bad faith.
But this is not a statement about Ben’s character, it’s a statement about his actions on one occasion. It is extremely common for people to do out-of-character things from time to time.
As you said above, of course “X acted in bad faith on this occasion” is evidence for “X is generally a bad-faith actor”, which is a character judgement; but, as I said above, almost everything is evidence for or against almost everything, and furthermore almost everything is non-negligible evidence for or against almost everything related, and that is not good enough reason to abandon the distinctions between them.
Acting in bad faith on one occasion is not good enough evidence of a general disposition to act in bad faith for “X acted in bad faith here” to be in any way equivalent to “X is the sort of person who commonly acts in bad faith”.
Clear thinking requires that we distinguish between likelihoods and posteriors. Clear thinking requires that we distinguish between one-off actions and general dispositions. Your comment about “your character assessment of Ben” ignored both distinctions. I don’t think you should do that.
Oh, thanks for this explanation (strong-upvoted); you’re right that distinguishing likelihoods and posteriors is really important. I also agree that single occasions only make for a very small update on character. (If this sort of thing comes up again, maybe consider explicitly making the likelihood/posterior point up front? It wasn’t clear to me that that’s what you were getting at with the great-great-great-grandparent.)
I agree that saying anything is, technically, Bayesian evidence about their character, but some statements are much more relevant to someone’s character than others. When you say someone’s response doesn’t look like what you’d expect to hear from someone trying to figure out what’s true, that’s not very different from just saying that you suspect they’re not trying to figure out what’s true. Why not cut out the indirection? (That was a rhetorical question; the answer is, “Because it’s polite.”)
Maybe I’m wrong, but this looks to me less like the response I’d expect from someone not making a character assessment, and more like the response I’d expect from someone who’s trying to make a character assessment (which could be construed as a social attack, by the sort of people who do that thing) while maintaining plausible deniability that they’re not making a character assessment (in order to avoid being socially attacked on grounds of having made a social attack, by the sort of people who do that thing).
Your answer to your own rhetorical question is wrong, for two reasons. First, because you are confusing likelihoods with posteriors. Second, because you are confusing one-off actions with dispositions.
Likelihoods and posteriors
Yes, it’s impolite to say “I think Ben isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”, and more polite to say “What Ben says is more like what someone says who isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”.
But it’s also wrong to say “I think Ben isn’t really trying to figure out what’s true”, if your actual epistemic state matches mine. Without reading the linked post, I would strongly expect that Ben is really trying to figure out what’s true. On the other hand, if I had only the linked post and no other information about Ben, I would (as you obviously think I do) think that Ben is almost certainly arguing with an anti-EA bottom line already written.
But, in fact, I have both that post and other evidence that Ben is generally, let’s say, truth-aligned. So what’s actually going on? I don’t know. So I followed the generally excellent procedure of reporting likelihood rather than posterior, and described how that post seems to me.
(I do also generally prefer to be polite, so probably the threshold for how confident I am that someone’s being intellectually dishonest before saying so explicitly is higher than if my only concern was maximum-bandwidth communication. In this case, I don’t believe my opinion is over where the threshold would be without concerns for politeness.)
One-off actions and dispositions
But, to be clear, I did intend to communicate that I think it genuinely possible (maybe even likely? Not sure) that on this particular occasion Ben has been arguing in bad faith.
But this is not a statement about Ben’s character, it’s a statement about his actions on one occasion. It is extremely common for people to do out-of-character things from time to time.
As you said above, of course “X acted in bad faith on this occasion” is evidence for “X is generally a bad-faith actor”, which is a character judgement; but, as I said above, almost everything is evidence for or against almost everything, and furthermore almost everything is non-negligible evidence for or against almost everything related, and that is not good enough reason to abandon the distinctions between them.
Acting in bad faith on one occasion is not good enough evidence of a general disposition to act in bad faith for “X acted in bad faith here” to be in any way equivalent to “X is the sort of person who commonly acts in bad faith”.
Clear thinking requires that we distinguish between likelihoods and posteriors. Clear thinking requires that we distinguish between one-off actions and general dispositions. Your comment about “your character assessment of Ben” ignored both distinctions. I don’t think you should do that.
Oh, thanks for this explanation (strong-upvoted); you’re right that distinguishing likelihoods and posteriors is really important. I also agree that single occasions only make for a very small update on character. (If this sort of thing comes up again, maybe consider explicitly making the likelihood/posterior point up front? It wasn’t clear to me that that’s what you were getting at with the great-great-great-grandparent.)