For the last few days, I argued a lot over some theoretical questions where no difference of anticipation emerged.
Your belief in solipsism had a consequence: refusing to attend EA. That illustrates a problem with EY’s idea. A belief can still have an impact, through shaping behaviour, even if it does not constrain experience.
I feel that what shapes the behaviour is not the belief in itself, but what this belief implies.
It’s more an empiric law like “This guy believes in A, so it’s improbable that he also believes in B, given that he is smart enough to not have contradicting views” (e.g. Solipsism and Utilitarianism).
Your belief in solipsism had a consequence: refusing to attend EA. That illustrates a problem with EY’s idea. A belief can still have an impact, through shaping behaviour, even if it does not constrain experience.
Interesting comment.
I feel that what shapes the behaviour is not the belief in itself, but what this belief implies.
It’s more an empiric law like “This guy believes in A, so it’s improbable that he also believes in B, given that he is smart enough to not have contradicting views” (e.g. Solipsism and Utilitarianism).
I am not seeing much of a distinction … you would have to draw implications to anticipate experience, in most cases.