First, timing … If US or Chinese leadership believes ASI is 2-5 years out, they’ll absorb enormous economic costs for a shot at decisive advantage
I think this is reasonable, which is why we include the more extreme measures including recognition of the right to self-defense. I personally would be surprised if we could throw this together so quickly that none of the conditional deterrence measures ever need to be activated...
In darker timelines, I think the more extreme economic measures could slow down the superpower AI programs and give time for middle powers to get more serious with their military deterrence, which has a good chance of being effective imo.
The US has extensive tools for pressuring middle powers to defect. The proposal assumes coalition members absorb retaliation costs collectively, but the US can apply pressure bilaterally in ways that make early defection attractive. China has its own methods, but I can only speak confidently about America.
This is a good point. We didn’t have time to address this in the first version of the proposal, but there are potentially some mitigations that can be implemented here, like very heavy penalties for defecting from the agreement.
At the end of the day though… you just must get deep buy in about the x-risks of ASI among middle powers (including softer ones like the possibility of a permanent US and China singleton).
More superficial motivations could be easy to break, but I think it would be difficult to tempt a country where the relevant decision makers think the best case scenario for ASI is for one’s state to be completely dismantled by a US singleton (effectively if not literally).
I think this is reasonable, which is why we include the more extreme measures including recognition of the right to self-defense. I personally would be surprised if we could throw this together so quickly that none of the conditional deterrence measures ever need to be activated...
In darker timelines, I think the more extreme economic measures could slow down the superpower AI programs and give time for middle powers to get more serious with their military deterrence, which has a good chance of being effective imo.
This is a good point. We didn’t have time to address this in the first version of the proposal, but there are potentially some mitigations that can be implemented here, like very heavy penalties for defecting from the agreement.
At the end of the day though… you just must get deep buy in about the x-risks of ASI among middle powers (including softer ones like the possibility of a permanent US and China singleton).
More superficial motivations could be easy to break, but I think it would be difficult to tempt a country where the relevant decision makers think the best case scenario for ASI is for one’s state to be completely dismantled by a US singleton (effectively if not literally).