Just because they are evolved, doesn’t mean they are optimal. An evolved adaptation can be just as “dirty” as a fast cognitive heuristic; the architectural constraints of learning through genes can be just as constraining as those of coming up with something to do fast.
Yes, and let me add to that, just because something was adaptive when humans evolved doesn’t mean it is at all adaptive now. To use a concrete example, the weight humans put on anecdotes is likely connected to the fact that in our ancestral environment, that was the primary source of data about what the risks around us were. However, now this leads to silly things like people being terribly scared of shark attacks precisely due to the rarity of such attacks making them get a lot of news coverage.
You know, you’re right. I was responding to peripheral aspects of your proposal rather than central ones, which is a waste of everyone’s time. My apologies.
So, OK… rolling back: if I’m understanding you, you’re hypothesizing that our biases are not design flaws, but rather adaptations to obtain the group-level benefit of having individuals be more irrational and therefore predictable.
(Is that right? I’m trying to infer a positive claim out of a series of questions, which is always tricky; if I’ve misunderstood your hypothetical it might be helpful to restate it more explicitly.)
Perhaps irrationality does provide a group-level benefit, as you suggest. For example, maybe it’s easier to get valuable group behaviors by manipulating irrational people than by cooperating with rational ones. That doesn’t strike me as too plausible, but it’s possible.
Even granting that, though, I have trouble with the idea that the benefit to individual breeders exceeds the costs to the individual of being more easily manipulated by others.
Just because they are evolved, doesn’t mean they are optimal. An evolved adaptation can be just as “dirty” as a fast cognitive heuristic; the architectural constraints of learning through genes can be just as constraining as those of coming up with something to do fast.
Yes, and let me add to that, just because something was adaptive when humans evolved doesn’t mean it is at all adaptive now. To use a concrete example, the weight humans put on anecdotes is likely connected to the fact that in our ancestral environment, that was the primary source of data about what the risks around us were. However, now this leads to silly things like people being terribly scared of shark attacks precisely due to the rarity of such attacks making them get a lot of news coverage.
I’ve put forward a hypothetical, not claimed a proof. What’s the point of responding, “But that isn’t necessarily the case”?
You know, you’re right. I was responding to peripheral aspects of your proposal rather than central ones, which is a waste of everyone’s time. My apologies.
So, OK… rolling back: if I’m understanding you, you’re hypothesizing that our biases are not design flaws, but rather adaptations to obtain the group-level benefit of having individuals be more irrational and therefore predictable.
(Is that right? I’m trying to infer a positive claim out of a series of questions, which is always tricky; if I’ve misunderstood your hypothetical it might be helpful to restate it more explicitly.)
Perhaps irrationality does provide a group-level benefit, as you suggest. For example, maybe it’s easier to get valuable group behaviors by manipulating irrational people than by cooperating with rational ones. That doesn’t strike me as too plausible, but it’s possible.
Even granting that, though, I have trouble with the idea that the benefit to individual breeders exceeds the costs to the individual of being more easily manipulated by others.