In any case, I don’t value equality separate from total utility. I do value it separate from total harm, which I also (negatively) value, and both values factor into my calculations of total utility.
In that case, you can replace “maximize total utility” with “minimize total harm” and the gist of my comment is unchanged (under mild assumptions, such as that increasing harm never yields an increase in utility).
some group(s) might end up worse off than they’d have ended up if we’d instead maximized that group’s net aggregate utility. Yes?
Not just worse off than maximizing that group’s aggregate U, or minimizing its aggregate harm (which is obvious), but also worse off than if we took equity into account and traded one group’s aggregate U against the given group’s.
This assumes a framework where inequality can be conflated with the difference in total harm done to each group (or with the difference in aggregate utility, again under plausible assumptions).
But, on the other hand, the assumption that “inequality is a separate Bad Thing” in the sense that instances of misandry create something called “inequality”, and instances of misogyny create inequality, and the two instances of inequality add up instead of canceling out, seems redundant. It’s just saying that “inequality” is a kind of harm, so there’s no reason to have it as a separate concept.
It’s just saying that “inequality” is a kind of harm, so there’s no reason to have it as a separate concept.
I agree that with a sufficiently robust shared understanding of harm, there’s no reason to call out other related concepts separately. That said, it’s not been my experience that the English word “harm” conveys anything like such an understanding in ordinary conversation, so sometimes using other words is helpful for communication.
In that case, you can replace “maximize total utility” with “minimize total harm” and the gist of my comment is unchanged (under mild assumptions, such as that increasing harm never yields an increase in utility).
Not just worse off than maximizing that group’s aggregate U, or minimizing its aggregate harm (which is obvious), but also worse off than if we took equity into account and traded one group’s aggregate U against the given group’s.
This assumes a framework where inequality can be conflated with the difference in total harm done to each group (or with the difference in aggregate utility, again under plausible assumptions).
But, on the other hand, the assumption that “inequality is a separate Bad Thing” in the sense that instances of misandry create something called “inequality”, and instances of misogyny create inequality, and the two instances of inequality add up instead of canceling out, seems redundant. It’s just saying that “inequality” is a kind of harm, so there’s no reason to have it as a separate concept.
I agree that with a sufficiently robust shared understanding of harm, there’s no reason to call out other related concepts separately. That said, it’s not been my experience that the English word “harm” conveys anything like such an understanding in ordinary conversation, so sometimes using other words is helpful for communication.