We obviously have a different view on the subjectivity of morals, no doubt an argument that’s been had many times before. The sequences claim to have resolved it or something, but in such a way that we both still seem to see our views as consistent with them.
To me, subjective morals like you talk about clearly exist, but I don’t see them as interesting in their own right. They’re just preferences people have about other people’s business. Interesting for the reasons any preference is interesting but no different.
The fundamental requirement for objective morals is simply that one (potential future) state of the world can be objectively better or worse than another. What constitutes “better” and “worse” being an important and difficult question of course, but still an objective one. I would call the negation, the idea that every possible state of the world is equally as good as any other, moral nihilism.
I accept that it’s used for the subjective type as well, but personally I save the use of the word “moral” for the objective type. The actual pursuit of a better state of the world irrespective our own personal preferences. I see objectivity as what separates morals from preferences in the first place—the core of taking a moral action is that your purpose is the good of others, or more generally the world around you, rather than yourself. I don’t agree that people having moral debates are simply comparing their subjective views (which sounds to me like “Gosh, you like fish? I like fish too!”), they’re arguing because they think there is actually an objective answer to which of them is right and they want to find out who it is (well, actually usually they just want to show everyone that it’s them, but you know what I mean).
This whole argument is actually off topic though. I think the point where things went wrong is where I answered the wrong question (though in my defence it was the one you asked). You asked how I determine what the number N is, but I never really even claimed to be able to do that in the first place. What I think you really wanted to know is how I define it. So I’ll give you that. This isn’t quite the perfect definition but it’s a start.
Imagine you’re outside space and time, and can see two worlds. One in which J is left alone, the other in which they’re eradicated. Now, imagine you’re going to chose one of these worlds in which you’ll live the life of a then randomly-chosen person. Once you make the decision, your current preferences, personality, and so on will cease to exist and you’ll just become that new random person. So, the question then becomes “Which world would you chose?”. Or more to the point “For what value of N would you decide it’s worth the risk of being eradicated as a J for the much higher chance of being a slightly happier N?”.
The one that’s “better” is the one that you would choose. Actually, more specifically it’s the one that’s the correct choice to make. I’d argue this correctness is objective, since the consequences of your choice are completely independent of anything about you. Note that although the connection to my view on morality is probably pretty clear, this definition doesn’t use the word “moral” anywhere. The main post posits an objective question of which is better, and this is simply my attempt to give a reasonable definition of what they’re asking.
We obviously have a different view on the subjectivity of morals, no doubt an argument that’s been had many times before. The sequences claim to have resolved it or something, but in such a way that we both still seem to see our views as consistent with them.
To me, subjective morals like you talk about clearly exist, but I don’t see them as interesting in their own right. They’re just preferences people have about other people’s business. Interesting for the reasons any preference is interesting but no different.
The fundamental requirement for objective morals is simply that one (potential future) state of the world can be objectively better or worse than another. What constitutes “better” and “worse” being an important and difficult question of course, but still an objective one. I would call the negation, the idea that every possible state of the world is equally as good as any other, moral nihilism.
I accept that it’s used for the subjective type as well, but personally I save the use of the word “moral” for the objective type. The actual pursuit of a better state of the world irrespective our own personal preferences. I see objectivity as what separates morals from preferences in the first place—the core of taking a moral action is that your purpose is the good of others, or more generally the world around you, rather than yourself. I don’t agree that people having moral debates are simply comparing their subjective views (which sounds to me like “Gosh, you like fish? I like fish too!”), they’re arguing because they think there is actually an objective answer to which of them is right and they want to find out who it is (well, actually usually they just want to show everyone that it’s them, but you know what I mean).
This whole argument is actually off topic though. I think the point where things went wrong is where I answered the wrong question (though in my defence it was the one you asked). You asked how I determine what the number N is, but I never really even claimed to be able to do that in the first place. What I think you really wanted to know is how I define it. So I’ll give you that. This isn’t quite the perfect definition but it’s a start.
Imagine you’re outside space and time, and can see two worlds. One in which J is left alone, the other in which they’re eradicated. Now, imagine you’re going to chose one of these worlds in which you’ll live the life of a then randomly-chosen person. Once you make the decision, your current preferences, personality, and so on will cease to exist and you’ll just become that new random person. So, the question then becomes “Which world would you chose?”. Or more to the point “For what value of N would you decide it’s worth the risk of being eradicated as a J for the much higher chance of being a slightly happier N?”.
The one that’s “better” is the one that you would choose. Actually, more specifically it’s the one that’s the correct choice to make. I’d argue this correctness is objective, since the consequences of your choice are completely independent of anything about you. Note that although the connection to my view on morality is probably pretty clear, this definition doesn’t use the word “moral” anywhere. The main post posits an objective question of which is better, and this is simply my attempt to give a reasonable definition of what they’re asking.