Suppose that the International Society of Sadists is holding its convention in Philadelphia and in order to keep things from getting boring the entertainment committee is considering staging the event it knows would make the group the happiest, randomly selecting someone off the street and then torturing that person before the whole convention. One member of the group, however, is taking Phil. 203 this term and in order to make sure that such an act would be morally okay insists that the committee consult what a moral philosopher would say about it. In Smart’s essay on utilitarianism they read that “the only reason for performing an action A rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make mankind (or, perhaps, all sentient beings) happier than will doing B.” (Smart, p. 30) This reassures them since they reason that the unhappiness which will be felt by the victim (and perhaps his or her friends and relatives) will be far outweighed by the happiness felt by the large crowd of sadists, especially since the whole thing will be kept strictly secret (as of course the whole convention has to be every year anyway). So they conclude that the best, indeed morally right, thing to do is go ahead and torture this person, and set off to do it.
Write a short paper in which you explain and critically evaluate what a defender of utilitarianism, for instance Smart’s version of act utilitarianism, could say about this example. Have the sadists misunderstood utilitarianism? Or will a defender of this view just have to accept the sadists’ conclusion (and if so, what, if anything, does that say about the theory itself)?
What is sometimes called “the 1000 Sadists problem” is a classic “problem” in utilitarianism; this post is another version of it.
Here’s another version, which apparently comes from this guy’s homework:
That’s a reverse version of the utility monster scenario.
Act utilitarianism always leads to these kind of paradoxes. I don’t think it can be salvaged.