Your post has only one instance of naming a probability and that’s not 100%.
I meant when philosophers themselves claim they aren’t looking at things in a probabilistic way. I actually had this conversation with my philosophy professor. He claimed that although he’s comfortable talking about credences and probabilities, he’s also comfortable talking about the world in a non-probabilistic way. This was one of those discussions where he didn’t understand why I was so confused.
In a similar way you can argue that you don’t have any evidence that you aren’t a Bolzmann brain and therefore shouldn’t act as if you are sure that you aren’t. You always have to use thinking tools that aren’t perfect.
Understood (I think). My intuitive (!) position is that I’m aware I can’t prove (even probabilistically) that I’m not a Boltzmann brain, and I can’t prove a bunch of other things. Which either leads me to accept certain very basic things without justification (along the lines of EY’s where recursive justification hits bottom, or to just go with a pragmatic view of truth. Personally I’m fine with both of those.
I understand that you have to start somewhere (or else accept that you can’t get anywhere in finding objective non-pragmatic truth), but what I have a hard time understanding is when people continue using intuitions far beyond the starting point to make grand metaphysical assertions.
I meant when philosophers themselves claim they aren’t looking at things in a probabilistic way. [...] This was one of those discussions where he didn’t understand why I was so confused.
The point isn’t that you don’t do either.
He claimed that although he’s comfortable talking about credences and probabilities, he’s also comfortable talking about the world in a non-probabilistic way.
Your post is mainly talking about world in a non-probabilistic way. Given that’s the case the professor with whom you are talking get’s confused.
To me it looks like the problem is belief in belief of logical positivism.
My intuitive (!) position is that I’m aware I can’t prove (even probabilistically) that I’m not a Boltzmann brain
The fact that you intuition is that you can’t prove that you are not a Boltzmann brain, doesn’t change that your intuition is that you aren’t a Boltzmann brain.
I intuition is that P!=NP but at the same time I’m certain that I don’t have the mathetical skills to prove P!=NP.
The fact that you don’t have an intuitive mental distinction between “X is true” and “I can prove X is true” is a problem.
Sorry, don’t know what you mean to say here. Could you rephrase?
Your post is mainly talking about world in a non-probabilistic way.
Could you elaborate on what you mean?
To me it looks like the problem is belief in belief of logical positivism.
Again, could you elaborate? I don’t see any reason to associate anything I’ve said with logical positivism.
The fact that you intuition is that you can’t prove that you are not a Boltzmann brain, doesn’t change that your intuition is that you aren’t a Boltzmann brain.
Of course I intuit that I’m not a Boltzmann brain, and of course I act as if I’m not. Not sure where I indicated otherwise. Again, my issue is with taking intuitions far beyond these fundamental we-need-to-start-somewhere levels and using them as strong evidence of truth.
Let’s start with Specifically, I keep getting the impression that most (all?) of the arguments for the ontology issues boil down to trusting philosophical intuitions and/or the way people use words. Something along the following lines.
I keep getting the impression almost directly translates to My intuition tells me. You still base your chain of reasoning on it.
Almost none of the reasoning in your post can be expressed by predicate logic and/or probability theory.
I don’t see any reason to associate anything I’ve said with logical positivism.
You don’t see how the claim that everything is explainable with logic and probability theory relates to logical positivism?
Again, my issue is with taking intuitions far beyond these fundamental we-need-to-start-somewhere levels and using them as strong evidence of truth.
You choose a particular set of where to start that’s highly culturally charged. Anna Wierzbicka argues for example in “Imprisoned in English” that it makes sense to start with fundamentals that nearly all human cultures agree on such as there being mothers and fathers but for example not brothers as some cultures have that concept while others don’t.
You start with the idea that complex concepts like mean, intuition, reason, associate, indicate, issue and evidence as all being fairly straightforward basics while Anna Wierzbicka would take neither of those as fundamentally basic.
All of them are heavily charged with a lot of cultural associations that you likely hold unquestioned because you learned them as a child and never questioned them.
I meant when philosophers themselves claim they aren’t looking at things in a probabilistic way. I actually had this conversation with my philosophy professor. He claimed that although he’s comfortable talking about credences and probabilities, he’s also comfortable talking about the world in a non-probabilistic way. This was one of those discussions where he didn’t understand why I was so confused.
Understood (I think). My intuitive (!) position is that I’m aware I can’t prove (even probabilistically) that I’m not a Boltzmann brain, and I can’t prove a bunch of other things. Which either leads me to accept certain very basic things without justification (along the lines of EY’s where recursive justification hits bottom, or to just go with a pragmatic view of truth. Personally I’m fine with both of those.
I understand that you have to start somewhere (or else accept that you can’t get anywhere in finding objective non-pragmatic truth), but what I have a hard time understanding is when people continue using intuitions far beyond the starting point to make grand metaphysical assertions.
The point isn’t that you don’t do either.
Your post is mainly talking about world in a non-probabilistic way. Given that’s the case the professor with whom you are talking get’s confused.
To me it looks like the problem is belief in belief of logical positivism.
The fact that you intuition is that you can’t prove that you are not a Boltzmann brain, doesn’t change that your intuition is that you aren’t a Boltzmann brain.
I intuition is that P!=NP but at the same time I’m certain that I don’t have the mathetical skills to prove P!=NP.
The fact that you don’t have an intuitive mental distinction between “X is true” and “I can prove X is true” is a problem.
Sorry, don’t know what you mean to say here. Could you rephrase?
Could you elaborate on what you mean?
Again, could you elaborate? I don’t see any reason to associate anything I’ve said with logical positivism.
Of course I intuit that I’m not a Boltzmann brain, and of course I act as if I’m not. Not sure where I indicated otherwise. Again, my issue is with taking intuitions far beyond these fundamental we-need-to-start-somewhere levels and using them as strong evidence of truth.
Let’s start with
Specifically, I keep getting the impression that most (all?) of the arguments for the ontology issues boil down to trusting philosophical intuitions and/or the way people use words. Something along the following lines.I keep getting the impressionalmost directly translates toMy intuition tells me. You still base your chain of reasoning on it.Almost none of the reasoning in your post can be expressed by predicate logic and/or probability theory.
While we are at it, it’s worth noting that the intuition that probability obviously extends logic is doubtful.
You don’t see how the claim that everything is explainable with logic and probability theory relates to logical positivism?
You choose a particular set of where to start that’s highly culturally charged. Anna Wierzbicka argues for example in “Imprisoned in English” that it makes sense to start with fundamentals that nearly all human cultures agree on such as there being
mothersandfathersbut for example notbrothersas some cultures have that concept while others don’t.You start with the idea that complex concepts like
mean,intuition,reason,associate,indicate,issueandevidenceas all being fairly straightforward basics while Anna Wierzbicka would take neither of those as fundamentally basic.All of them are heavily charged with a lot of cultural associations that you likely hold unquestioned because you learned them as a child and never questioned them.
Hear, hear!