Applying the generalized anti zombie principle says that it would have the feeling of making a choice.
The GAZP still isn’t any kind of knowledge or understanding. A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t. So you can’t infer anything unambiguous from a report of a quale.
There might be branches where we make a different reasonable decision.
There will be branches where we commit crimes if it is not impossible.
I expect quantum ethics to have a utility function that is some measure of what computations are being done, and the quantum amplitude that they are done with.
The sticking point is the motion of making a difference.
A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t.
In that case, there’s no reason to think anyone has qualia. The fact that lots of people say they have qualia, doesn’t actually mean anything, because they’d say so either way; therefore, those people’s statements do not constitute valid evidence in favor of the existence of qualia. And if people’s statements don’t constitute evidence for qualia, then the sum total of evidence for qualia’s existence is… nothing: there is zero evidence that qualia exist.
So your interpretation is self-defeating: there is no longer a need to explain qualia, because there’s no reason to suppose that they exist in the first place. Why try and explain something that doesn’t exist?
On the other hand, it remains an empirical fact that people do actually talk about having “conscious experiences”. This talk has nothing to do with “qualia” as you’ve defined the term, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth investigating in its own right, as a scientific question: “What is the physical cause of people’s vocal cords emitting the sounds corresponding to the sentence ‘I’m conscious of my experience’?” What the generalized anti-zombie principle says is that the answer to this question, will in fact explain qualia—not the concept that you described or that David Chalmers endorses (which, again, we have literally zero reason to think exists), but the intuitive concept that led philosophers to coin the term “qualia” in the first place.
The GAZP still isn’t any kind of knowledge or understanding. A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t. So you can’t infer anything unambiguous from a report of a quale.
There will be branches where we commit crimes if it is not impossible.
The sticking point is the motion of making a difference.
In that case, there’s no reason to think anyone has qualia. The fact that lots of people say they have qualia, doesn’t actually mean anything, because they’d say so either way; therefore, those people’s statements do not constitute valid evidence in favor of the existence of qualia. And if people’s statements don’t constitute evidence for qualia, then the sum total of evidence for qualia’s existence is… nothing: there is zero evidence that qualia exist.
So your interpretation is self-defeating: there is no longer a need to explain qualia, because there’s no reason to suppose that they exist in the first place. Why try and explain something that doesn’t exist?
On the other hand, it remains an empirical fact that people do actually talk about having “conscious experiences”. This talk has nothing to do with “qualia” as you’ve defined the term, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth investigating in its own right, as a scientific question: “What is the physical cause of people’s vocal cords emitting the sounds corresponding to the sentence ‘I’m conscious of my experience’?” What the generalized anti-zombie principle says is that the answer to this question, will in fact explain qualia—not the concept that you described or that David Chalmers endorses (which, again, we have literally zero reason to think exists), but the intuitive concept that led philosophers to coin the term “qualia” in the first place.