The hypothesis that when a human makes a choice, the universe splits and every possible choice is made with equal measure is coherent, falsifiable and clearly wrong
Maybe, but MWI doesn’t imply equal measure.
They would still have the feeling of making a choice
We don’t know that because we don’t know anything about qualia.
To the extent that you are optimizing, not outputting random noise, you aren’t creating multiple universes. It all adds up to normality
There is not always a single optimal solution to a problem even for a perfect rationalist, and humans aren’t perfect rationalists.
A complete quantum ethics will be better than any classical ethics (almost identical in everyday circumstances) , but one little mistake and you get nonsense.
I know MWI doesn’t imply equal measure, I was taking equal measure as an aditional hypothesis within the MWI framework.
We don’t know that because we don’t know anything about qualia.
Consider a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human mind, say full Quantum, except whenever there are multiple blobs of amplitude sufficiently detached from each other, one is picked pseudorandomly and the rest are deleted. Because it is a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human mind, it will say the same things a human would, for much the same reasons. Applying the generalized anti zombie principle says that it would have the feeling of making a choice.
There is not always a single optimal solution to a problem even for a perfect rationalist, and humans aren’t perfect rationalists.
My point is that when we show optimization pressure, that isn’t just a fluke, then there is no branch in which we do something totally stupid. There might be branches where we make a different reasonable decision.
I expect quantum ethics to have a utility function that is some measure of what computations are being done, and the quantum amplitude that they are done with.
Applying the generalized anti zombie principle says that it would have the feeling of making a choice.
The GAZP still isn’t any kind of knowledge or understanding. A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t. So you can’t infer anything unambiguous from a report of a quale.
There might be branches where we make a different reasonable decision.
There will be branches where we commit crimes if it is not impossible.
I expect quantum ethics to have a utility function that is some measure of what computations are being done, and the quantum amplitude that they are done with.
The sticking point is the motion of making a difference.
A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t.
In that case, there’s no reason to think anyone has qualia. The fact that lots of people say they have qualia, doesn’t actually mean anything, because they’d say so either way; therefore, those people’s statements do not constitute valid evidence in favor of the existence of qualia. And if people’s statements don’t constitute evidence for qualia, then the sum total of evidence for qualia’s existence is… nothing: there is zero evidence that qualia exist.
So your interpretation is self-defeating: there is no longer a need to explain qualia, because there’s no reason to suppose that they exist in the first place. Why try and explain something that doesn’t exist?
On the other hand, it remains an empirical fact that people do actually talk about having “conscious experiences”. This talk has nothing to do with “qualia” as you’ve defined the term, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth investigating in its own right, as a scientific question: “What is the physical cause of people’s vocal cords emitting the sounds corresponding to the sentence ‘I’m conscious of my experience’?” What the generalized anti-zombie principle says is that the answer to this question, will in fact explain qualia—not the concept that you described or that David Chalmers endorses (which, again, we have literally zero reason to think exists), but the intuitive concept that led philosophers to coin the term “qualia” in the first place.
Maybe, but MWI doesn’t imply equal measure.
We don’t know that because we don’t know anything about qualia.
There is not always a single optimal solution to a problem even for a perfect rationalist, and humans aren’t perfect rationalists.
What do you think quantum ethics would look like?
I know MWI doesn’t imply equal measure, I was taking equal measure as an aditional hypothesis within the MWI framework.
Consider a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human mind, say full Quantum, except whenever there are multiple blobs of amplitude sufficiently detached from each other, one is picked pseudorandomly and the rest are deleted. Because it is a sufficiently detailed simulation of a human mind, it will say the same things a human would, for much the same reasons. Applying the generalized anti zombie principle says that it would have the feeling of making a choice.
My point is that when we show optimization pressure, that isn’t just a fluke, then there is no branch in which we do something totally stupid. There might be branches where we make a different reasonable decision.
I expect quantum ethics to have a utility function that is some measure of what computations are being done, and the quantum amplitude that they are done with.
The GAZP still isn’t any kind of knowledge or understanding. A functional duplicate of an entity that reports having such-and-such a quale will report having it even if doesn’t. So you can’t infer anything unambiguous from a report of a quale.
There will be branches where we commit crimes if it is not impossible.
The sticking point is the motion of making a difference.
In that case, there’s no reason to think anyone has qualia. The fact that lots of people say they have qualia, doesn’t actually mean anything, because they’d say so either way; therefore, those people’s statements do not constitute valid evidence in favor of the existence of qualia. And if people’s statements don’t constitute evidence for qualia, then the sum total of evidence for qualia’s existence is… nothing: there is zero evidence that qualia exist.
So your interpretation is self-defeating: there is no longer a need to explain qualia, because there’s no reason to suppose that they exist in the first place. Why try and explain something that doesn’t exist?
On the other hand, it remains an empirical fact that people do actually talk about having “conscious experiences”. This talk has nothing to do with “qualia” as you’ve defined the term, but that doesn’t mean it’s not worth investigating in its own right, as a scientific question: “What is the physical cause of people’s vocal cords emitting the sounds corresponding to the sentence ‘I’m conscious of my experience’?” What the generalized anti-zombie principle says is that the answer to this question, will in fact explain qualia—not the concept that you described or that David Chalmers endorses (which, again, we have literally zero reason to think exists), but the intuitive concept that led philosophers to coin the term “qualia” in the first place.