I propose the following solution as the most optimal. It is based on two assumptions.
We’ll call the two sides Agent 1 (Humanity) and Agent 2 (Clippy).
Assumption 1: Agent 1 knows that Agent 2 is logical and will use logic to decide how to act and vise-versa.
This assumption simply means that we do not expect Clippy to be extremely stupid or randomly pick a choice every time. If that were the case, a better strategy would be to “outsmart” him or find a statistical solution.
Assumption 2: Both agents know each other’s ultimate goal/optimization target (i.e. Agent 1 - saving as many people as possible, Agent 2 - making as many paperclips as possible).
This is included in the definition of the dilemma.
Solution: “Cooperate on the first round, and on succeeding rounds do whatever your opponent did last time, with the exception of the last (100th) round. Evaluate these conditions at the beginning of each round.”
Any other solution will not be as optimal. Let’s consider a few examples (worst-case scenarios):
So, in the worst case you “lose” 1 round. You can try to switch between cooperating and defecting several times, in the end one side will end up with only 1 “loss”, as else will be equal.
Note that the solution says nothing about the 100th round (where the question of what to do only arises if both sides cooperated on the 99th round).
I propose the following solution as the most optimal. It is based on two assumptions.
We’ll call the two sides Agent 1 (Humanity) and Agent 2 (Clippy).
Assumption 1: Agent 1 knows that Agent 2 is logical and will use logic to decide how to act and vise-versa.
This assumption simply means that we do not expect Clippy to be extremely stupid or randomly pick a choice every time. If that were the case, a better strategy would be to “outsmart” him or find a statistical solution.
Assumption 2: Both agents know each other’s ultimate goal/optimization target (i.e. Agent 1 - saving as many people as possible, Agent 2 - making as many paperclips as possible).
This is included in the definition of the dilemma.
Solution: “Cooperate on the first round, and on succeeding rounds do whatever your opponent did last time, with the exception of the last (100th) round. Evaluate these conditions at the beginning of each round.”
Any other solution will not be as optimal. Let’s consider a few examples (worst-case scenarios):
1. Agent 1 cooperates. Agent 2 defects.
2..100 Agent 1 defects. Agent 2 defects.
1. Agent 1 cooperates. Agent 2 cooperates.
2..X Agent 1 cooperates. Agent 2 defects.
X..100 Agent 1 defects. Agent 2 defects.
1..99 Agent 1 cooperates. Agent 2 cooperates.
100. Agent 1 cooperates. Agent 2 defects.
So, in the worst case you “lose” 1 round. You can try to switch between cooperating and defecting several times, in the end one side will end up with only 1 “loss”, as else will be equal.
Note that the solution says nothing about the 100th round (where the question of what to do only arises if both sides cooperated on the 99th round).