Note that if someone assigns probabilities to these models, and conditional outcomes based on what they say publically, materialism is far more beneficial to express than solipsism, even if one finds solipsism more likely.
In the case where materialism and some form of causality is true, then you have some impact by publicly supporting it and pushing other people toward it. If instead, solipsism is true, and you push these hallucinations you call “other people” toward it, you get no benefit.
Much like other questions of free will and causality, as long as I assign some chance that it’s real and I have choices that matter, I should behave as if that’s certain. Even if I privately am not convinced, there’s no benefit to acting that way.
I agree—thanks for the comment. When writing this post, my goal was to share a reflection on solipsism in a vacuum rather than in context of decision theory. I acknowledge that solipsism doesn’t really tend to drive someone toward caring much about others and such. In that sense, it’s not very productive if someone is altruistically/externally motivated.
I don’t want to give any impression that this is a particularly important decision theoretic question. :)
Mostly my comment was a response to the word “underrated” in the title. We wouldn’t know how it’s rated, because, by it’s nature, it’s going to be less proselytized. A quibble, to be sure, but “underrepresented” is probably more accurate.
Note that if someone assigns probabilities to these models, and conditional outcomes based on what they say publically, materialism is far more beneficial to express than solipsism, even if one finds solipsism more likely.
In the case where materialism and some form of causality is true, then you have some impact by publicly supporting it and pushing other people toward it. If instead, solipsism is true, and you push these hallucinations you call “other people” toward it, you get no benefit.
Much like other questions of free will and causality, as long as I assign some chance that it’s real and I have choices that matter, I should behave as if that’s certain. Even if I privately am not convinced, there’s no benefit to acting that way.
I agree—thanks for the comment. When writing this post, my goal was to share a reflection on solipsism in a vacuum rather than in context of decision theory. I acknowledge that solipsism doesn’t really tend to drive someone toward caring much about others and such. In that sense, it’s not very productive if someone is altruistically/externally motivated.
I don’t want to give any impression that this is a particularly important decision theoretic question. :)
Mostly my comment was a response to the word “underrated” in the title. We wouldn’t know how it’s rated, because, by it’s nature, it’s going to be less proselytized. A quibble, to be sure, but “underrepresented” is probably more accurate.