Also, our expenditures on safety and disaster preparedness would probably increase exponentially, and our risk-taking would also decrease dramatically.
This depends to an extent on the nature of the immortalizing technology. I agree with you if the technology doesn’t permit backups, but I disagree with you if backups can be done (at least with respect to the risk of local death). In particular an uploading-based technology, with an easy way to make backups, might result in the average person taking more risks (at least risks of one copy being killed—but not the whole ensemble of backups) than they do now.
I’m not yet sold on the perfect substitutability of backups, but the point, while interesting, is quite irrelevant in this context. If backups aren’t perfect substitutes, they won’t affect people’s behaviour. If they are, then increased risk is essentially immaterial. If I don’t care about my mortality because I can be easily resurrected, then the fundamental value of me taking risks changes, thus, the fact that I take more risks is not a bad thing.
Now, there may be a problem that people are less concerned with other people’s lives, because, since those people are backed up, they are expendable. The implications there are a bit more complex, and that issue may result in problems, though such is not necessarily the case.
This depends to an extent on the nature of the immortalizing technology. I agree with you if the technology doesn’t permit backups, but I disagree with you if backups can be done (at least with respect to the risk of local death). In particular an uploading-based technology, with an easy way to make backups, might result in the average person taking more risks (at least risks of one copy being killed—but not the whole ensemble of backups) than they do now.
I’m not yet sold on the perfect substitutability of backups, but the point, while interesting, is quite irrelevant in this context. If backups aren’t perfect substitutes, they won’t affect people’s behaviour. If they are, then increased risk is essentially immaterial. If I don’t care about my mortality because I can be easily resurrected, then the fundamental value of me taking risks changes, thus, the fact that I take more risks is not a bad thing.
Now, there may be a problem that people are less concerned with other people’s lives, because, since those people are backed up, they are expendable. The implications there are a bit more complex, and that issue may result in problems, though such is not necessarily the case.
Richard Morgan’s sci-fi trilogy, Altered Carbon, Broken Angels and Woken Furies have an entertaining take on the implications of universal backups.
Many thanks!