If you value those norms there no reason to say “But even if there hadn’t been, anyone saying that those people were not human would deservedly get called a racist” and defend that notion.
If someone says that Jews are not human, he would deservedly be called a racist. That has nothing to do with attacking truthseeking norms, because the claim about Jews is utterly false. The same thing applies to the situation discussed.
That feels to me like a strawman. Who made such an assertion?
I did not know you were talking about the discussion of racism. I thought you were talking about the fact that I said that other terms in your utility function besides truth should affect what you do (including what you treat as a fact, since that is something that you do.) That seems to me a reasonable interpretation of what you said, given that your main criticism seemed to be about this.
If someone says that Jews are not human, he would deservedly be called a racist.
Communication always focuses on a subset of the available facts. You can make a choice to focus on influencing other people to believe certain things by appealing to rational argument.
Here you made the choice to influence other people by appealing to the social desirability of holding certain beliefs.
Making that choice damages truth-seeking norms.
Whether someone “deserve” something is also a moral judgement and not just a statement of objective facts.
I think it might be more obvious to someone that saying that Jews are not human deserves moral opprobrium, than that Jews are human. If you are not a moral realist, you might think this is impossible, but I am a moral realist, and I don’t see any reason why the moral statement might not be more obvious. In particular, I think it would be likely be true for many people in the case discussed. In that case, there is no reason not to bring it up in a discussion of this kind, since it is normal to lead people from what is more obvious to what is less obvious. And there is nothing against truthseeking norms in doing that.
I suspect that you will disagree, but your disagreement would be like a conservative economist saying “minimum wages are harmful, so if you propose minimum wages you are hurting people.” The person proposing minimum wages might in fact be hurting people, but this is definitely not what they are trying to do. And as I said originally, I was not attacking truthseeking or truthseeking norms in any way. (And I am not saying that I am wrong in fact in this way either—I am just saying that you should not be attacking my motives in that way.)
If someone says that Jews are not human, he would deservedly be called a racist. That has nothing to do with attacking truthseeking norms, because the claim about Jews is utterly false. The same thing applies to the situation discussed.
I did not know you were talking about the discussion of racism. I thought you were talking about the fact that I said that other terms in your utility function besides truth should affect what you do (including what you treat as a fact, since that is something that you do.) That seems to me a reasonable interpretation of what you said, given that your main criticism seemed to be about this.
Communication always focuses on a subset of the available facts. You can make a choice to focus on influencing other people to believe certain things by appealing to rational argument. Here you made the choice to influence other people by appealing to the social desirability of holding certain beliefs.
Making that choice damages truth-seeking norms.
Whether someone “deserve” something is also a moral judgement and not just a statement of objective facts.
I think it might be more obvious to someone that saying that Jews are not human deserves moral opprobrium, than that Jews are human. If you are not a moral realist, you might think this is impossible, but I am a moral realist, and I don’t see any reason why the moral statement might not be more obvious. In particular, I think it would be likely be true for many people in the case discussed. In that case, there is no reason not to bring it up in a discussion of this kind, since it is normal to lead people from what is more obvious to what is less obvious. And there is nothing against truthseeking norms in doing that.
I suspect that you will disagree, but your disagreement would be like a conservative economist saying “minimum wages are harmful, so if you propose minimum wages you are hurting people.” The person proposing minimum wages might in fact be hurting people, but this is definitely not what they are trying to do. And as I said originally, I was not attacking truthseeking or truthseeking norms in any way. (And I am not saying that I am wrong in fact in this way either—I am just saying that you should not be attacking my motives in that way.)
My charge isn’t about motives but about effects.
Fine. I disagree with your assessment.