The proper way to prove that pain is bad is proof by induction: specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
Is it morally questionable to run a piece of control software for a cleaning robot, that has a “const bool in_pain = true;”?
This is getting into the subject of qualia, which I freely admit to not understanding. But I’m pretty sure I have some, and I’m pretty sure they’re harder to produce than a variable with the label “pain”.
With his intelligence intact, he can still be valuable to us, and depending on what he did in the past, we may be in moral debt to him.
I’d guess from this statement that you’re either not a consequentialist, or you’re some exotic type of consequentialist straight out of Alicorn’s syllabus. If you clarify exactly what your moral theory is, I can give you a better estimate on how likely we are to be talking past each other because we have completely different premises.
specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
Hmm. Methinks this strategy could make debating female creationists somewhat problematic.
I already agree that (involuntary) pain for humans is bad, but I don’t think it’s bad in general, i.e. applied to any entity. For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole. They don’t have my sympathy, although I am grateful.
I am a consequentialist. However, if I see someone returning good favors with torture, I would not have any dealings with that person, since it would seem like a really bad investment.
For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole.
I don’t think it’s obvious that individual cells meaningfully experience pain, in the qualia-type sense we seem to be talking about. Qualia are a function of minds, not brains, or brain-pieces.
The proper way to prove that pain is bad is proof by induction: specifically, hook an electric wire to the testicles of the person who doesn’t think pain is bad, induce a current, and continue it until the person admits that pain is bad (this is also the proper way to prove that creationism is false, or at least the most fun).
This is getting into the subject of qualia, which I freely admit to not understanding. But I’m pretty sure I have some, and I’m pretty sure they’re harder to produce than a variable with the label “pain”.
I’d guess from this statement that you’re either not a consequentialist, or you’re some exotic type of consequentialist straight out of Alicorn’s syllabus. If you clarify exactly what your moral theory is, I can give you a better estimate on how likely we are to be talking past each other because we have completely different premises.
Hmm. Methinks this strategy could make debating female creationists somewhat problematic.
I already agree that (involuntary) pain for humans is bad, but I don’t think it’s bad in general, i.e. applied to any entity. For example, the cells in my brain registering pain will experience lots of pain in their lives, and probably little else, for the benefit of the body as a whole. They don’t have my sympathy, although I am grateful.
I am a consequentialist. However, if I see someone returning good favors with torture, I would not have any dealings with that person, since it would seem like a really bad investment.
I don’t think it’s obvious that individual cells meaningfully experience pain, in the qualia-type sense we seem to be talking about. Qualia are a function of minds, not brains, or brain-pieces.