In the paragraph beginning “The most obvious thing”. But it is worth reading the paragraphs that follow. He says it’s “perfectly reasonable” to reject that argument on the basis that the “hard problem” (as Chalmers calls it) is mere sophistry—that being roughly what I think most people here on LW would be inclined to do. But he objects to the combination of (1) doing that with (2) saying that some theory in neuroscience will solve the “hard problem”.
That seems to me like a reasonable objection, but I’m not sure his diagnosis is correct; I suspect at least some of the people he’s objecting to actually (1) say that the “hard problem” is mere sophistry but (2) say that some theory in neuroscience gives an answer to the question “what is consciousness?” that doesn’t involve that sort of sophistry; an answer not to the question “what is this further extra thing that constitutes consciousness, above and beyond people’s behaviour and how their brains work?” but to “what exactly is it about people’s behaviour and how their brains work that constitutes this thing we call consciousness?”.
He goes on to accept that this sort of question is reasonable, and in fact that’s the question he focuses on in the rest of what he writes.
Where in that (long) post does he say that?
In the paragraph beginning “The most obvious thing”. But it is worth reading the paragraphs that follow. He says it’s “perfectly reasonable” to reject that argument on the basis that the “hard problem” (as Chalmers calls it) is mere sophistry—that being roughly what I think most people here on LW would be inclined to do. But he objects to the combination of (1) doing that with (2) saying that some theory in neuroscience will solve the “hard problem”.
That seems to me like a reasonable objection, but I’m not sure his diagnosis is correct; I suspect at least some of the people he’s objecting to actually (1) say that the “hard problem” is mere sophistry but (2) say that some theory in neuroscience gives an answer to the question “what is consciousness?” that doesn’t involve that sort of sophistry; an answer not to the question “what is this further extra thing that constitutes consciousness, above and beyond people’s behaviour and how their brains work?” but to “what exactly is it about people’s behaviour and how their brains work that constitutes this thing we call consciousness?”.
He goes on to accept that this sort of question is reasonable, and in fact that’s the question he focuses on in the rest of what he writes.