This [smart people having a greater ability to figure out high-status-signaling views and acquire them] carries all sorts of interesting implications.
Yes, especially when we couple it with the fact that smart people have not just more ability, but usually also stronger incentives to optimize their views for signaling value. The smarter you are, the greater is the relative contribution of the signaling value of your views and opinions to your overall status likely to be. On the very top of this scale are people whose primary identity in life is that of prestigious intellectuals. (Unsurprisingly, the views of such people tend to be extremely uniform and confined to a very narrow range of variation.)
One puzzle here however is that the level of status-driven intellectual uniformity has varied a lot historically. In the Western world it was certainly far lower, say, a 100 or 150 years ago than today. Reading books from that period, it’s clear that a lot of what people said and wrote was driven by signaling rather than matter-of-fact thinking, but the ratio was nothing like the overwhelming preponderance of the former that we see nowadays. It seems like back then, intellectual status-signaling was somehow successfully channeled outside of the main subjects of intellectual disputes, leaving enough room for an honest no-nonsense debate, which is practically nonexistent today in respectable venues outside of hard sciences and technical subjects.
I have only some vague and speculative hypotheses about the possible explanations for these historical differences, though.
There two seem to have some overlap.
I’m not sure about that. It seems to me that these might be completely independent mechanisms. The first, unlike the second, would stem from a failure of the general mechanisms for handling status and social norms, indicating a more generally dysfunctional personality, while the second one would result in a perfectly functional individual except for this particular quirk consisting of some odd and perhaps disreputable beliefs.
It may be that the gap between reality and signalling would actually be too great to rationalize for anyone who had practical use for it, you are just the one stuck with it. The effect of this might be in the long term sufficient to hurt the reputation and signalling value of certain professions, economic niches or even entire (sub)cultures.
Yes, this is indeed an interesting scenario. I can think of a few ongoing examples, although describing them explicitly would probably mean going too far into ideologically charged topics for this forum.
One puzzle here however is that the level of status-driven intellectual uniformity has varied a lot historically. In the Western world it was certainly far lower, say, a 100 or 150 years ago than today. Reading books from that period, it’s clear that a lot of what people said and wrote was driven by signaling rather than matter-of-fact thinking, but the ratio was nothing like the overwhelming preponderance of the former that we see nowadays.
This could just be the nostalgia filter (WARNING: tvtropes), i.e., there were also a lot of pure status signaling works back then, but they have since been forgotten.
I read enough old books to recognize nineteenth century political correctness when I see it (example: Enlightened Imperialism). It is markedly less obnoxious and omnipresent than twenty first century political correctness.
This could just be the nostalgia filter [...], i.e., there were also a lot of pure status signaling works back then, but they have since been forgotten.
Undoubtedly there were, but I think a fair assessment can be made by observing only people who were recognized as high-status intellectuals in their own day. When I look at books written a century or more ago by people for whom I know that they were recognized as such back then, I simply don’t see anything like the uniformity of opinion among practically all people who enjoy similar status today.
Moreover, on many topics, it’s impossible to find anything written by today’s high-status intellectuals that isn’t just awful cant with little or no value beyond signaling. (And it’s not like I haven’t looked for it.) At the same time, older literature on the same topics written by similarly prestigious people is also full of nonsense, but it’s also easy to find works that are quite reasonable and matter-of-fact.
Even if my conclusions are somehow biased, I don’t think they can be explained by a simple nostalgia filter.
Yes, especially when we couple it with the fact that smart people have not just more ability, but usually also stronger incentives to optimize their views for signaling value. The smarter you are, the greater is the relative contribution of the signaling value of your views and opinions to your overall status likely to be. On the very top of this scale are people whose primary identity in life is that of prestigious intellectuals. (Unsurprisingly, the views of such people tend to be extremely uniform and confined to a very narrow range of variation.)
One puzzle here however is that the level of status-driven intellectual uniformity has varied a lot historically. In the Western world it was certainly far lower, say, a 100 or 150 years ago than today. Reading books from that period, it’s clear that a lot of what people said and wrote was driven by signaling rather than matter-of-fact thinking, but the ratio was nothing like the overwhelming preponderance of the former that we see nowadays. It seems like back then, intellectual status-signaling was somehow successfully channeled outside of the main subjects of intellectual disputes, leaving enough room for an honest no-nonsense debate, which is practically nonexistent today in respectable venues outside of hard sciences and technical subjects.
I have only some vague and speculative hypotheses about the possible explanations for these historical differences, though.
This would make for a very interesting topic of discussion, in a different context I came to a similar surprising observation. But I think more specific examples, data and perhaps a few citations might prove vital for this. Potentially problematic because the 19th and 20th century are not without cause sometimes referred to in my corner of the world as “half passed history” since their interpretation carries direct political and ideological implications for the present day.
I need to think about whether to write down my reply here or PM you regarding this, just wanted to first make this public though, so anyone else interested and willing to risk it has a chance to jump in. :)
Your brain is wired in some non-standard manner, so that it doesn’t deal with status signaling and social conformity in the usual way. This clearly sends off bad signals, since it increases the probability that you might be weird, dysfunctional, or even dangerous in all sorts of ways.
Your brain is wired in a way that makes it hard to acquire those beliefs that happen to be respectable here and now. (But you would conform easily, perhaps exceptionally so, in a different society with different respectable beliefs.)
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I’m not sure about that. It seems to me that these might be completely independent mechanisms. The first, unlike the second, would stem from a failure of the general mechanisms for handling status and social norms, indicating a more generally dysfunctional personality, while the second one would result in a perfectly functional individual except for this particular quirk consisting of some odd and perhaps disreputable beliefs.
Yes, but some societal beliefs are about status distribution. Or to go for a more general argument societies have differing status distributions and emphasise different ways to distribute status. Its perfectly possible that not “dealing with status signalling” in a usual way might actually be an advantage in some societies or would have a workable niche or societal role that isn’t available in some other society. Thus basically the system wouldn’t really be a failure in such situations, the individual would be by definition functional.
Historically (and even today) mental illness seems to me to be an example a category where the status hit seems more or less proportional to societal dysfunction or rather how the person fails to live up to ideals, rather than making any clear distinction between the two.
Why would we have differing mechanisms for this? Isn’t it easier for the brain to cover both under a simple “avoid socially dysfunctional people” directive?
Why would we have differing mechanisms for this? Isn’t it easier for the brain to cover both under a simple “avoid socially dysfunctional people” directive?
The important practical distinction is that under the second scenario, the person in question would be perfectly functional until some specific issue came up where his views differ from the respectable consensus. Such a person could stay completely out of trouble by figuring out on what occasions it’s advisable to keep his mouth shut. In contrast, the first scenario would imply a personality that’s dysfunctional across the board due to his broken handling of status and social norms, with no easy fix.
Moreover, it seems to me that broken handling of status and social norms would imply dysfunction in any society.
Having problems with authority and being unable to find and maintain friends and allies is a recipe for disaster in any conceivable social order. It is true that some societies might have niche roles for some types of such individuals, but that’s an exception that proves the rule.
Yes, especially when we couple it with the fact that smart people have not just more ability, but usually also stronger incentives to optimize their views for signaling value. The smarter you are, the greater is the relative contribution of the signaling value of your views and opinions to your overall status likely to be. On the very top of this scale are people whose primary identity in life is that of prestigious intellectuals. (Unsurprisingly, the views of such people tend to be extremely uniform and confined to a very narrow range of variation.)
One puzzle here however is that the level of status-driven intellectual uniformity has varied a lot historically. In the Western world it was certainly far lower, say, a 100 or 150 years ago than today. Reading books from that period, it’s clear that a lot of what people said and wrote was driven by signaling rather than matter-of-fact thinking, but the ratio was nothing like the overwhelming preponderance of the former that we see nowadays. It seems like back then, intellectual status-signaling was somehow successfully channeled outside of the main subjects of intellectual disputes, leaving enough room for an honest no-nonsense debate, which is practically nonexistent today in respectable venues outside of hard sciences and technical subjects.
I have only some vague and speculative hypotheses about the possible explanations for these historical differences, though.
I’m not sure about that. It seems to me that these might be completely independent mechanisms. The first, unlike the second, would stem from a failure of the general mechanisms for handling status and social norms, indicating a more generally dysfunctional personality, while the second one would result in a perfectly functional individual except for this particular quirk consisting of some odd and perhaps disreputable beliefs.
Yes, this is indeed an interesting scenario. I can think of a few ongoing examples, although describing them explicitly would probably mean going too far into ideologically charged topics for this forum.
This could just be the nostalgia filter (WARNING: tvtropes), i.e., there were also a lot of pure status signaling works back then, but they have since been forgotten.
I read enough old books to recognize nineteenth century political correctness when I see it (example: Enlightened Imperialism). It is markedly less obnoxious and omnipresent than twenty first century political correctness.
Undoubtedly there were, but I think a fair assessment can be made by observing only people who were recognized as high-status intellectuals in their own day. When I look at books written a century or more ago by people for whom I know that they were recognized as such back then, I simply don’t see anything like the uniformity of opinion among practically all people who enjoy similar status today.
Moreover, on many topics, it’s impossible to find anything written by today’s high-status intellectuals that isn’t just awful cant with little or no value beyond signaling. (And it’s not like I haven’t looked for it.) At the same time, older literature on the same topics written by similarly prestigious people is also full of nonsense, but it’s also easy to find works that are quite reasonable and matter-of-fact.
Even if my conclusions are somehow biased, I don’t think they can be explained by a simple nostalgia filter.
This would make for a very interesting topic of discussion, in a different context I came to a similar surprising observation. But I think more specific examples, data and perhaps a few citations might prove vital for this. Potentially problematic because the 19th and 20th century are not without cause sometimes referred to in my corner of the world as “half passed history” since their interpretation carries direct political and ideological implications for the present day.
I need to think about whether to write down my reply here or PM you regarding this, just wanted to first make this public though, so anyone else interested and willing to risk it has a chance to jump in. :)
...
Yes, but some societal beliefs are about status distribution. Or to go for a more general argument societies have differing status distributions and emphasise different ways to distribute status. Its perfectly possible that not “dealing with status signalling” in a usual way might actually be an advantage in some societies or would have a workable niche or societal role that isn’t available in some other society. Thus basically the system wouldn’t really be a failure in such situations, the individual would be by definition functional.
Historically (and even today) mental illness seems to me to be an example a category where the status hit seems more or less proportional to societal dysfunction or rather how the person fails to live up to ideals, rather than making any clear distinction between the two.
Why would we have differing mechanisms for this? Isn’t it easier for the brain to cover both under a simple “avoid socially dysfunctional people” directive?
The important practical distinction is that under the second scenario, the person in question would be perfectly functional until some specific issue came up where his views differ from the respectable consensus. Such a person could stay completely out of trouble by figuring out on what occasions it’s advisable to keep his mouth shut. In contrast, the first scenario would imply a personality that’s dysfunctional across the board due to his broken handling of status and social norms, with no easy fix.
Moreover, it seems to me that broken handling of status and social norms would imply dysfunction in any society. Having problems with authority and being unable to find and maintain friends and allies is a recipe for disaster in any conceivable social order. It is true that some societies might have niche roles for some types of such individuals, but that’s an exception that proves the rule.