I am an ethics grad student, and I will say that this largely accords with my understanding of these terms (though tbh the terminology in this field is so convoluted that I expect that I still have some misunderstandings and gaps).
Re epistemic rationality, I think at least some people will want to say that it’s not just instrumental rationality with the goal of truth (though I am largely inclined to that view). I don’t have a good sense of what those other people do say, but I get the feeling that the “epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality with the goal of truth” view is not the only game in town.
Re decision theory, I would characterize it as closely related to instrumental rationality. How I would think about it is like this: CDT or EDT are to instrumental rationality as utilitarianism or Kantianism are to morality. CDT is one theory of instrumental rationality, just as utilitarianism is one theory of morality. But this is my own idiosyncratic understanding, not derived from the philosophical literature, so the mainstream might understand it differently.
Re metaethics: thank you for getting this one correct. Round these parts it’s often misused to refer to highly general theories of first order normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism), or something in that vicinity. The confusion is understandable, especially given that utilitarianism (and probably other similarly general moral views) can be interpreted as a view about the metaphysics of reasons, which would be a metaethical view. But it’s important to get this right. Here’s a less example-driven explanation due to Tristram McPherson:
“Metaethics is that theoretical activity which aims to explain how actual ethical thought and talk—and what (if anything) that thought and talk is distinctively about—fits into reality” (McPherson and Plunkett, “The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics,” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, p. 3).
Anyway, thank you for writing this post, I expect it will clear up a lot of confusions and be useful as a reference.
Glad to hear this roughly matches your understandings!
And that way of fitting decision theory into the picture sounds reasonable to me. I’d guess there’s a few different ways one could slice this sort of stuff up, and it’s not yet clear to me which is best (and I’d guess there probably isn’t a single clear winner).
I am an ethics grad student, and I will say that this largely accords with my understanding of these terms (though tbh the terminology in this field is so convoluted that I expect that I still have some misunderstandings and gaps).
Re epistemic rationality, I think at least some people will want to say that it’s not just instrumental rationality with the goal of truth (though I am largely inclined to that view). I don’t have a good sense of what those other people do say, but I get the feeling that the “epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality with the goal of truth” view is not the only game in town.
Re decision theory, I would characterize it as closely related to instrumental rationality. How I would think about it is like this: CDT or EDT are to instrumental rationality as utilitarianism or Kantianism are to morality. CDT is one theory of instrumental rationality, just as utilitarianism is one theory of morality. But this is my own idiosyncratic understanding, not derived from the philosophical literature, so the mainstream might understand it differently.
Re metaethics: thank you for getting this one correct. Round these parts it’s often misused to refer to highly general theories of first order normative ethics (e.g. utilitarianism), or something in that vicinity. The confusion is understandable, especially given that utilitarianism (and probably other similarly general moral views) can be interpreted as a view about the metaphysics of reasons, which would be a metaethical view. But it’s important to get this right. Here’s a less example-driven explanation due to Tristram McPherson:
“Metaethics is that theoretical activity which aims to explain how actual ethical thought and talk—and what (if anything) that thought and talk is distinctively about—fits into reality” (McPherson and Plunkett, “The Nature and Explanatory Ambitions of Metaethics,” in The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, p. 3).
Anyway, thank you for writing this post, I expect it will clear up a lot of confusions and be useful as a reference.
Glad to hear this roughly matches your understandings!
And that way of fitting decision theory into the picture sounds reasonable to me. I’d guess there’s a few different ways one could slice this sort of stuff up, and it’s not yet clear to me which is best (and I’d guess there probably isn’t a single clear winner).