Steven, I call the little continuous dials the “amount of reality-fluid” to remind myself of how confused I am.
“Unpleasant possibility” isn’t an argument but I didn’t feel like going into the rather complex issues involved (probability of UnFriendly AI running ancestor simulations, how many of them, versus probability of Friendly AI, versus probability of hitting the Unhappy Valley with a near-miss FAI or a meddling-dabbler AGI trained on smiling faces, versus probability of inhuman aliens creating minds that we care about, plus going into the issues of QTI).
Nazgul, you can act swiftly to capture all resources in your immediate vicinity regardless of whether you plan to share them out among few or many individuals.
Robin, spatial infinity would definitely be large relative to the volume of physical possibilities (infinite versus finite). With many-worlds and a mangling cutoff… then not every physical possibility would be realized, but I would expect most possible babies would be. All the babies worth making could be duplicated many times over among the Everett branches of all moral civilizations, even if any given branch kept their populations low and living standards high. Does it look different to you?
Steven, I call the little continuous dials the “amount of reality-fluid” to remind myself of how confused I am.
“Unpleasant possibility” isn’t an argument but I didn’t feel like going into the rather complex issues involved (probability of UnFriendly AI running ancestor simulations, how many of them, versus probability of Friendly AI, versus probability of hitting the Unhappy Valley with a near-miss FAI or a meddling-dabbler AGI trained on smiling faces, versus probability of inhuman aliens creating minds that we care about, plus going into the issues of QTI).
Nazgul, you can act swiftly to capture all resources in your immediate vicinity regardless of whether you plan to share them out among few or many individuals.
Robin, spatial infinity would definitely be large relative to the volume of physical possibilities (infinite versus finite). With many-worlds and a mangling cutoff… then not every physical possibility would be realized, but I would expect most possible babies would be. All the babies worth making could be duplicated many times over among the Everett branches of all moral civilizations, even if any given branch kept their populations low and living standards high. Does it look different to you?