The ability to change probability of future events in favor of your wishes is not a proof of simulation, because there is an non-simulation alternative where it is also possible.
Imagine that natural selection in quantum multiverse worked in the direction that helped to survive beings which are capable to influence probabilities in favorable way. Even a slightest ability to affect probabilities will give an enormous increase of measure, so the anthropics favor you to be in such world, and such anthropic shift may be even stronger than the shift in the simulation direction.
In that case, it perfectly reasonable to expect that your wishes (in your subjective timeline) will have a higher probability to be fulfilled. A technological example of such probability shift was discussed in The Anthropic Trilemma by EY.
It is exactly the point that there should be no proof of simulation unless simulators want it. Namely, there should be no observable (for us) difference between universe controlled simply by laws of Nature and between one with intervention from simulators. We can’t look at any effect and say—this happens, therefore, we are in the simulation. The point was the opposite. Assume we are in simulation with benevolent simulators (what, according to what I wrote in the theoretical part of the post, is highly likely). What they can do so that we still was not able to classify this intervention as something outside of laws of nature, but so that our well-being would be improved? What are the practical results of it for us? By the way, we even do not have to require the ability to change probability. Just the placebo effect is good enough. Consider the person who was suffering from depression, or addiction, or akrasia—and now he is much better. Can a strong placebo (like a very strong religious experience) do it? Well, yes, there were multiple cases. Does it improve well-being? Certainly yes. So the practical point is that if such intervention masquerading under placebo can help, it is certainly worth trying. Of course one can say that I just tricking myself into believing it and then placebo just works, but the point is that I have reasons to believe in it (see theoretical part), and this makes placebo work.
Thank you for directing my attention to the post, I will certainly read it.
Placebo could work because it has some evolutionary fitness, like the ability to stop pain in case of the need of activity.
Benevolent simulators could create an upper limit of subjectively perceived pain, like turning off qualia but continue screaming. This will be unobservable scientifically.
Of course, placebo is useful from the evolutionary point of view, and it is a subject of quite a lot of research. (Main idea—it is energetically costly to have your immune system always at high alert, so you boost it in particular moments, correlating with pleasure, usually from eating/drinking/sex, which is when germs usually get to the body. If interested, I will find the link to the research paper where it is discussed. ).
I am afraid I still fail to explain what I mean. I do not try to deduce from the observation that we are in a simulation, I don’t think it is possible (unless simulators decide to allow it). I am trying to see how the belief that we are in simulation with benevolent simulators can change my subjective experience. Notice, I can’t just trick myself to believe only because it is healthy to believe. This is why I needed all this theory above—to show that benevolent simulators are indeed highly likely. Then, and only then, I can hope for the placebo effect (or for real intervention masquerading under placebo effect), because now I believe that it may work. If I could just make myself to believe in whatever I needed, of course I would not need all these shenanigans—but, after being faithful LW reader for a while, it is really hard, if possible at all.
Ok. But what if there are other more effective methods to start believe in things which are known to be false? For example, hypnosis is effective for some.
Hmmm, but I am not saying that the benevolent simulators hypothesis is false and that I just choose to believe in it because it brings a positive effect. Rather opposite—I think that benevolent simulators are highly likely (more than 50% chance). So it is not a method “to believe in things which are known to be false”. It is rather an argument why they are likely to be true (of course, I may be wrong somewhere in this argument, so if you find an error, I will appreciate it).
In general, I don’t think people here want to believe false things.
The ability to change probability of future events in favor of your wishes is not a proof of simulation, because there is an non-simulation alternative where it is also possible.
Imagine that natural selection in quantum multiverse worked in the direction that helped to survive beings which are capable to influence probabilities in favorable way. Even a slightest ability to affect probabilities will give an enormous increase of measure, so the anthropics favor you to be in such world, and such anthropic shift may be even stronger than the shift in the simulation direction.
In that case, it perfectly reasonable to expect that your wishes (in your subjective timeline) will have a higher probability to be fulfilled. A technological example of such probability shift was discussed in The Anthropic Trilemma by EY.
It is exactly the point that there should be no proof of simulation unless simulators want it. Namely, there should be no observable (for us) difference between universe controlled simply by laws of Nature and between one with intervention from simulators. We can’t look at any effect and say—this happens, therefore, we are in the simulation.
The point was the opposite. Assume we are in simulation with benevolent simulators (what, according to what I wrote in the theoretical part of the post, is highly likely). What they can do so that we still was not able to classify this intervention as something outside of laws of nature, but so that our well-being would be improved? What are the practical results of it for us?
By the way, we even do not have to require the ability to change probability. Just the placebo effect is good enough. Consider the person who was suffering from depression, or addiction, or akrasia—and now he is much better. Can a strong placebo (like a very strong religious experience) do it? Well, yes, there were multiple cases. Does it improve well-being? Certainly yes. So the practical point is that if such intervention masquerading under placebo can help, it is certainly worth trying. Of course one can say that I just tricking myself into believing it and then placebo just works, but the point is that I have reasons to believe in it (see theoretical part), and this makes placebo work.
Thank you for directing my attention to the post, I will certainly read it.
Placebo could work because it has some evolutionary fitness, like the ability to stop pain in case of the need of activity.
Benevolent simulators could create an upper limit of subjectively perceived pain, like turning off qualia but continue screaming. This will be unobservable scientifically.
Of course, placebo is useful from the evolutionary point of view, and it is a subject of quite a lot of research. (Main idea—it is energetically costly to have your immune system always at high alert, so you boost it in particular moments, correlating with pleasure, usually from eating/drinking/sex, which is when germs usually get to the body. If interested, I will find the link to the research paper where it is discussed. ).
I am afraid I still fail to explain what I mean. I do not try to deduce from the observation that we are in a simulation, I don’t think it is possible (unless simulators decide to allow it).
I am trying to see how the belief that we are in simulation with benevolent simulators can change my subjective experience. Notice, I can’t just trick myself to believe only because it is healthy to believe. This is why I needed all this theory above—to show that benevolent simulators are indeed highly likely. Then, and only then, I can hope for the placebo effect (or for real intervention masquerading under placebo effect), because now I believe that it may work. If I could just make myself to believe in whatever I needed, of course I would not need all these shenanigans—but, after being faithful LW reader for a while, it is really hard, if possible at all.
Ok. But what if there are other more effective methods to start believe in things which are known to be false? For example, hypnosis is effective for some.
Hmmm, but I am not saying that the benevolent simulators hypothesis is false and that I just choose to believe in it because it brings a positive effect. Rather opposite—I think that benevolent simulators are highly likely (more than 50% chance). So it is not a method “to believe in things which are known to be false”. It is rather an argument why they are likely to be true (of course, I may be wrong somewhere in this argument, so if you find an error, I will appreciate it).
In general, I don’t think people here want to believe false things.