Yes, pretty much that’s a distinction I’d draw as meaningful, except I’d call the first one a ‘deliberative (optive) control procedure’, not an ‘optimizer’, because I think ‘optimizer’ has too many vague connotations.
The ‘world model’ doesn’t have to be separate from the deliberation, or even manifested at all: consider iterated natural selection, which deliberates over mutations, without having a separate ‘model’ of anything—because the evaluationis the promotion and the action (unless you count the world itself and the replication counts of various traits as the model). But in the bacterial case, there really is some (basic) world model in the form of internal chemical states.
P.s. plants also do the basic thing I’d call deliberative control (or iterated deliberation). In the cases I described in that link, the model state is represented in analogue by the physical growth of the plant.
(And yes, in all cases these are inner misaligned in some weak fashion.)
Yes, pretty much that’s a distinction I’d draw as meaningful, except I’d call the first one a ‘deliberative (optive) control procedure’, not an ‘optimizer’, because I think ‘optimizer’ has too many vague connotations.
The ‘world model’ doesn’t have to be separate from the deliberation, or even manifested at all: consider iterated natural selection, which deliberates over mutations, without having a separate ‘model’ of anything—because the evaluation is the promotion and the action (unless you count the world itself and the replication counts of various traits as the model). But in the bacterial case, there really is some (basic) world model in the form of internal chemical states.
P.s. plants also do the basic thing I’d call deliberative control (or iterated deliberation). In the cases I described in that link, the model state is represented in analogue by the physical growth of the plant.
(And yes, in all cases these are inner misaligned in some weak fashion.)