Simpler: A consequentialist agent predicts the effects of alternative actions upon the world, assigns quantities over those consequences, and chooses an action whose predicted effects have high value of this quantity, therefore operating to steer the external world into states corresponding to higher values of this quantity.
I like seeing a concise description that doesn’t strictly imply that consequentialists must necessarily seek expected value. (I probably want to seek that as far as I can evaluate my preferences but it doesn’t seem to be the only consequentialist option.)
You are attempting to distinguish between “quantity” and “value”? Or “prediction” and “expectation”? Either way, it doesn’t seem to make very much sense.
I like seeing a concise description that doesn’t strictly imply that consequentialists must necessarily seek expected value. (I probably want to seek that as far as I can evaluate my preferences but it doesn’t seem to be the only consequentialist option.)
I’m curious, what other options are you thinking of?
You are attempting to distinguish between “quantity” and “value”? Or “prediction” and “expectation”? Either way, it doesn’t seem to make very much sense.
No.