Only works if UDT agents make a significant proportion of agents in the setting. 10 UDT agents plus 1000 CDT agents, say, and the UDT agents are still vulnerable.
This requires not only that the UDT agents can reliably signal their UDT-ness to the blackmailers, but that the blackmailers can reliably signal to the non-UDTers that they can tell the difference. That is, letting the UDTers off might make the non-UDTers think that if they refuse the blackmail they’ll also be let off.
So the ability of UDTers to resist blackmail depends not just on the properties of the UDTers and the blackmailers but also on those of the non-UDTers.
Right, the condition ‘UDT agents can credibly distinguish themselves’ sounds like a property of UDT agents but is actually a joint property of UDT agents and blackmailers.
That said, prosecutors ultimately follow that script because it works. I say ‘ultimately’ because it might be mediated by effects like ‘they follow the script because they are rewarded for following it, and their bosses reward them for following it because it works’. The justice system is far from a rational agent, but it’s also not an unincentivisable rock.
That said, prosecutors ultimately follow that script because it works
Yes, but note that here we are treating “works” as a binary variable and the presence of a minority of UDT agents in the target population is not going to switch “works” from true to false. In order for the prosecutors to care about signals, either a majority of the target population needs to credibly signal, or the throw_book() branch needs to have noticeable costs for prosecutors associated with it.
Courts are generally heavily booked, trials take forever, it’s a perennial news issue that courts are underfunded (this seems to be a major factor behind the incredibly nasty and abusive rise in ‘offender-funded’ court systems & treating traffic violations & civil asset seizures as normal funding sources to be maximized) and I’ve seen estimates that as much as 90%+ of all cases resolve as plea bargains. There’s no way the court system could handle a sudden 10-20x increase in workload, which is what would happen if prosecutors stopped settling for somewhat reasonable plea bargains and tried to throw the book at suspects who would then have little choice but to take it to trial.
(I recall reading about an attempt to organize defendants in one US court district to agree to not plea bargain, overloading the system so badly that most of the cases would have to be dropped; but I don’t recall what happened and can’t seem to refind it. I’m guessing it didn’t work out, given that this is almost literally the prisoner’s dilemma.)
Oh, sorry, I think I was unclear or probably even confusing. I didn’t mean prosecutors actually just ship off all suspects to the courts with a long list of charges. I meant that they threaten everyone.
Obviously, a plea bargain makes things much easier for prosecutors so their usual goal is to obtain one. However if the accused is sufficiently stubborn, their choice is (a) to assemble a case and prosecute for a few charges; or (b) to assemble a case and prosecute for many charges. I don’t think there is a major cost-to-prosecutors difference between (a) and (b) so they go for (b).
You mean because prosecutors’ incentives are mediated by the justice system, and the justice system has friction such that it won’t react to a small change? Makes sense.
The extent to which this is actually true is a complicated factual question about the US justice system.
Only works if UDT agents make a significant proportion of agents in the setting. 10 UDT agents plus 1000 CDT agents, say, and the UDT agents are still vulnerable.
It also works if UDT agents can credibly distinguish themselves from non-UDT agents, whatever the proportions.
This requires not only that the UDT agents can reliably signal their UDT-ness to the blackmailers, but that the blackmailers can reliably signal to the non-UDTers that they can tell the difference. That is, letting the UDTers off might make the non-UDTers think that if they refuse the blackmail they’ll also be let off.
So the ability of UDTers to resist blackmail depends not just on the properties of the UDTers and the blackmailers but also on those of the non-UDTers.
All y’all are assuming smart blackmailers.
The original example is of US prosecutors, right? I bet a standard prosecutor functions equivalently to a simple script:
threaten_multiple_charges();
if (pleads_guilty) { convict_reasonably() } else { throw_book() }
You can signal whatever you want to an agent executing this script, it’s not going to care.
Right, the condition ‘UDT agents can credibly distinguish themselves’ sounds like a property of UDT agents but is actually a joint property of UDT agents and blackmailers.
That said, prosecutors ultimately follow that script because it works. I say ‘ultimately’ because it might be mediated by effects like ‘they follow the script because they are rewarded for following it, and their bosses reward them for following it because it works’. The justice system is far from a rational agent, but it’s also not an unincentivisable rock.
Yes, but note that here we are treating “works” as a binary variable and the presence of a minority of UDT agents in the target population is not going to switch “works” from true to false. In order for the prosecutors to care about signals, either a majority of the target population needs to credibly signal, or the throw_book() branch needs to have noticeable costs for prosecutors associated with it.
It does, otherwise they would simply do it to all suspects.
What makes you think they don’t?
Courts are generally heavily booked, trials take forever, it’s a perennial news issue that courts are underfunded (this seems to be a major factor behind the incredibly nasty and abusive rise in ‘offender-funded’ court systems & treating traffic violations & civil asset seizures as normal funding sources to be maximized) and I’ve seen estimates that as much as 90%+ of all cases resolve as plea bargains. There’s no way the court system could handle a sudden 10-20x increase in workload, which is what would happen if prosecutors stopped settling for somewhat reasonable plea bargains and tried to throw the book at suspects who would then have little choice but to take it to trial.
(I recall reading about an attempt to organize defendants in one US court district to agree to not plea bargain, overloading the system so badly that most of the cases would have to be dropped; but I don’t recall what happened and can’t seem to refind it. I’m guessing it didn’t work out, given that this is almost literally the prisoner’s dilemma.)
Oh, sorry, I think I was unclear or probably even confusing. I didn’t mean prosecutors actually just ship off all suspects to the courts with a long list of charges. I meant that they threaten everyone.
Obviously, a plea bargain makes things much easier for prosecutors so their usual goal is to obtain one. However if the accused is sufficiently stubborn, their choice is (a) to assemble a case and prosecute for a few charges; or (b) to assemble a case and prosecute for many charges. I don’t think there is a major cost-to-prosecutors difference between (a) and (b) so they go for (b).
In that case, the argument you made here makes no sense.
Why is that?
You mean because prosecutors’ incentives are mediated by the justice system, and the justice system has friction such that it won’t react to a small change? Makes sense.
The extent to which this is actually true is a complicated factual question about the US justice system.
Agreed. But still less so than before.