The first half of this post will cover up until Winter 1903, focusing on the East. I will have the rest up by tomorrow night.
As Alex Mennen has noted, he and I know each other in real life. The major effect that this had on the game was the exchange of information early game and my late-game switch to mainly telephone based communication to reduce the credibility of French leaks. We have played Diplomacy against each other among our high school friends, so we both had a good estimate of each others’ strengths and weaknesses. We had no meta-game commitment.
The opening impressions I got of each country greatly influenced my decision to open North. Turkey was pragmatic and polite, and was obviously very familiar with the normal sensitivities that surrounded the Black Sea. He immediately stuck out among the players as someone who had previous experience playing Diplomacy. He took the time to explain his points thoroughly, both before and after he knew that I had Diplomacy experience.
Austria’s first press was a single but beefy paragraph, proposing that we establish a DMZ in Galicia. I had not planned on this, instead expecting to arrange a bounce, so I made a counter-proposal that he accepted that we bounce in Galicia. I later changed my mind when I decided to go North and he agreed to a DMZ again.
My communications with Italy in Spring 1901 were politely stilted, although we hit it off in the Fall. I learned (importantly) that he was opening to Tyrolia, so I figured that Austria would be properly pre-occupied in the South and West and allow me free access to Rumania.
Germany was the most conversational in 1901, and made allusions to Richard Sharp’s “The Game of Diplomacy.” Her decision not to move to Denmark in the Spring earned her major kudos points from a grateful Russia, guaranteeing at least one build (or so I thought).
I initiated communication with Britain, proposing mutual non-aggression. He replied politely, but given what I had heard from France about his ambitions in Belgium, I was a bit worried that an unchecked leviathan would be descending on my in 1902. I decided that the move to St Petersburg would be the most bang for my buck because I anticipated that Italy and Turkey would keep Austria tied up.
Then, out of the blue, Austria moved to Galicia. This put me in a bind because I had to choose between supporting an attack on Rumania and defending Warsaw. I supported myself to Rumania. The gamble did not pay off.
My moves for the rest of 1901 and 1902 were mostly dictated the necessity of recovering Warsaw. This forced me to withdraw from the North and halt any action in the South. During this period Italy and I began cooperating closely.
It was here that our differing strategies became more apparent, with me wanting to offer Austria a position as a puppet/buffer state in the Russia-Italy alliance and Italy wanting to eliminate him and move on to Turkey. My gambit fell through, though, when WrongBot didn’t reply until late on the day of the update. Deciding that WrongBot was unreliable and wouldn’t be useful as an ally, I let Italy take Budapest.
I was also slightly disappointed with the proposed division of centers proposed by Italy. Italy had just picked up all of Austria and wanted to take the easy pickings of Serbia and Greece while promising me the unappetizing prospect of cracking into Turkey for my next build. This made me uneasy about our alliance because I was worried about a Parfit’s Hitchhiker scenario in which I never got my builds.
Despite my military weakness in the South, though, I was negotiating from a position of strength. With Italy and Turkey both maneuvering their fleets in the Mediterranean, their chances of both allying against me plummeted. I had continued to negotiate with Turkey, telling him (correctly) that I was worried about Italy’s size. Turkey responded favorably to my hints that I was interested in building a Juggernaut (R-T alliance).
Here is where I made two mistakes that severely complicated the rest of the game. The first was not articulating clearly enough with Turkey that I was not allying with him in the spring. I had made this decision to delay allying with Turkey until after Serbia fell because I felt his position was so superior to mine that if I allied with him I would be a junior partner. The omission of this fact was a mistake that only made Turkey mad and did nothing else. It was not a ploy to open him up to attack; I did not expect Italy to take Greece.
The second mistake occurred shortly after the spring turn was resolved showing Italy with two extra supply centers. This sudden, unexpected gain by Italy did not fit with the slow, even advance that I had been hoping for against Turkey. I decided that Italy was too big and needed to be stopped. However, I chose to wait for Turkey to contact me that season instead of contacting him early. By the time I was able to convince Turkey that I wasn’t going to stab him again, he had already sent out an e-mail to the West decrying me as untrustworthy.
Amusingly, I heard about this e-mail from multiple sources in the West before I heard from Hugh, tipping me off that I had made a major misstep and needed to mend my fences. As far as I can tell, his e-mails had little effect in the West until 1906, three years later when Britain was dying and I had actually become the dominant player in the North. The only person who I didn’t hear from concerning his e-mail from Turkey was Britain. This was definitely a factor in my final decision to cooperate in his downfall.
In the West I was wary of England’s power in Norway, but without an ally I had no way of stopping him, so I maintained my “good fences, good neighbors” policy of keeping a militarized frontier. Contrary to a rumor I heard, I did not ask Britain to take Denmark. I actually preferred a German Denmark as it made any operation to take Sweden more complicated for my enemies.
That’s the game up until and including my stab of Italy. My next post will cover Italy vs the Juggernaut, the fall of Britain, and the three-way draw.
The first was not articulating clearly enough with Turkey that I was not allying with him in the spring. I had made this decision to delay allying with Turkey until after Serbia fell because I felt his position was so superior to mine that if I allied with him I would be a junior partner.
Interesting. Though I’m not sure I agree that you would have been terribly far behind me. You could have moved into Galicia in Spring 1903 and gotten Budapest in 1904.
The omission of this fact was a mistake that only made Turkey mad and did nothing else. It was not a ploy to open him up to attack; I did not expect Italy to take Greece.
It’s not just that you didn’t articulate that you weren’t allying me, it’s that you blatantly stabbed me. Supporting Italy into Serbia was a stab. Furthermore, letting Italy think he might get somewhere from attacking me was what caused him to gain centers. Otherwise, he would have played Vienna supports Budapest, and moved Vienna to Trieste. To me, your moves only made sense if you were declaring war on me with Italy, which is why I made such a big deal of it.
If you’d warned me that you were supporting Italy into Serbia to sow confusion, then I wouldn’t have been so bothered. But even so, I think you needed to pick sides between Italy and me that season. You looked like you had picked Italy, so I was correct to warn the West about IR.
With Italy and Turkey both maneuvering their fleets in the Mediterranean, their chances of both allying against me plummeted.
I deliberately created this situation by preemptively striking Italy in the Ionian, which would have only succeeded if he went for two Austrian builds without telling me. I deliberately burned diplomatic capital with Italy to make it easier for you to work with me without worrying that I would stab you with Italy.
As far as I can tell, his e-mails had little effect in the West until 1906, three years later when Britain was dying and I had actually become the dominant player in the North.
That’s right. I was a bit confused about why my emails didn’t move the West. Did they think that I would stab you myself to get revenge, even though I made it very clear that I wouldn’t act alone against you? Did I manage to annoy them with my messages? Did they fail to understand the significance of a strong IR (which switched to an RT in 1904)? Or both: they failed to understand the significance of the growing alliance in the East, which led them to interpret me as being a big windbag?
If you’d warned me that you were supporting Italy into Serbia to sow confusion, then I wouldn’t have been so bothered. But even so, I think you needed to pick sides between Italy and me that season. You looked like you had picked Italy, so I was correct to warn the West about IR.> quoted text
This sums up my mistake pretty well. My deception had no purpose and I gained nothing from it. I attribute this to the way that I was compartmentalizing negotiations at the time. The agent in charge of Turkish negotiations considered us as already allied, and wanted to signal accordingly. Self-deception is a wonderful signalling tool sometimes, except when you actually succeed in deceiving yourself.
That’s right. I was a bit confused about why my emails didn’t move the West. Did they think that I would stab you myself to get revenge, even though I made it very clear that I wouldn’t act alone against you? Did I manage to annoy them with my messages? Did they fail to understand the significance of a strong IR (which switched to an RT in 1904)? Or both: they failed to understand the significance of the growing alliance in the East, which led them to interpret me as being a big windbag?
I know France and I were pretty closely allied until England resigned, and Germany has talked about her take on your e-mails, but I don’t know why England didn’t take you up on the offer.
Part I
The first half of this post will cover up until Winter 1903, focusing on the East. I will have the rest up by tomorrow night.
As Alex Mennen has noted, he and I know each other in real life. The major effect that this had on the game was the exchange of information early game and my late-game switch to mainly telephone based communication to reduce the credibility of French leaks. We have played Diplomacy against each other among our high school friends, so we both had a good estimate of each others’ strengths and weaknesses. We had no meta-game commitment.
The opening impressions I got of each country greatly influenced my decision to open North. Turkey was pragmatic and polite, and was obviously very familiar with the normal sensitivities that surrounded the Black Sea. He immediately stuck out among the players as someone who had previous experience playing Diplomacy. He took the time to explain his points thoroughly, both before and after he knew that I had Diplomacy experience.
Austria’s first press was a single but beefy paragraph, proposing that we establish a DMZ in Galicia. I had not planned on this, instead expecting to arrange a bounce, so I made a counter-proposal that he accepted that we bounce in Galicia. I later changed my mind when I decided to go North and he agreed to a DMZ again.
My communications with Italy in Spring 1901 were politely stilted, although we hit it off in the Fall. I learned (importantly) that he was opening to Tyrolia, so I figured that Austria would be properly pre-occupied in the South and West and allow me free access to Rumania.
Germany was the most conversational in 1901, and made allusions to Richard Sharp’s “The Game of Diplomacy.” Her decision not to move to Denmark in the Spring earned her major kudos points from a grateful Russia, guaranteeing at least one build (or so I thought).
I initiated communication with Britain, proposing mutual non-aggression. He replied politely, but given what I had heard from France about his ambitions in Belgium, I was a bit worried that an unchecked leviathan would be descending on my in 1902. I decided that the move to St Petersburg would be the most bang for my buck because I anticipated that Italy and Turkey would keep Austria tied up.
Then, out of the blue, Austria moved to Galicia. This put me in a bind because I had to choose between supporting an attack on Rumania and defending Warsaw. I supported myself to Rumania. The gamble did not pay off.
My moves for the rest of 1901 and 1902 were mostly dictated the necessity of recovering Warsaw. This forced me to withdraw from the North and halt any action in the South. During this period Italy and I began cooperating closely.
It was here that our differing strategies became more apparent, with me wanting to offer Austria a position as a puppet/buffer state in the Russia-Italy alliance and Italy wanting to eliminate him and move on to Turkey. My gambit fell through, though, when WrongBot didn’t reply until late on the day of the update. Deciding that WrongBot was unreliable and wouldn’t be useful as an ally, I let Italy take Budapest.
I was also slightly disappointed with the proposed division of centers proposed by Italy. Italy had just picked up all of Austria and wanted to take the easy pickings of Serbia and Greece while promising me the unappetizing prospect of cracking into Turkey for my next build. This made me uneasy about our alliance because I was worried about a Parfit’s Hitchhiker scenario in which I never got my builds.
Despite my military weakness in the South, though, I was negotiating from a position of strength. With Italy and Turkey both maneuvering their fleets in the Mediterranean, their chances of both allying against me plummeted. I had continued to negotiate with Turkey, telling him (correctly) that I was worried about Italy’s size. Turkey responded favorably to my hints that I was interested in building a Juggernaut (R-T alliance).
Here is where I made two mistakes that severely complicated the rest of the game. The first was not articulating clearly enough with Turkey that I was not allying with him in the spring. I had made this decision to delay allying with Turkey until after Serbia fell because I felt his position was so superior to mine that if I allied with him I would be a junior partner. The omission of this fact was a mistake that only made Turkey mad and did nothing else. It was not a ploy to open him up to attack; I did not expect Italy to take Greece.
The second mistake occurred shortly after the spring turn was resolved showing Italy with two extra supply centers. This sudden, unexpected gain by Italy did not fit with the slow, even advance that I had been hoping for against Turkey. I decided that Italy was too big and needed to be stopped. However, I chose to wait for Turkey to contact me that season instead of contacting him early. By the time I was able to convince Turkey that I wasn’t going to stab him again, he had already sent out an e-mail to the West decrying me as untrustworthy.
Amusingly, I heard about this e-mail from multiple sources in the West before I heard from Hugh, tipping me off that I had made a major misstep and needed to mend my fences. As far as I can tell, his e-mails had little effect in the West until 1906, three years later when Britain was dying and I had actually become the dominant player in the North. The only person who I didn’t hear from concerning his e-mail from Turkey was Britain. This was definitely a factor in my final decision to cooperate in his downfall.
In the West I was wary of England’s power in Norway, but without an ally I had no way of stopping him, so I maintained my “good fences, good neighbors” policy of keeping a militarized frontier. Contrary to a rumor I heard, I did not ask Britain to take Denmark. I actually preferred a German Denmark as it made any operation to take Sweden more complicated for my enemies.
That’s the game up until and including my stab of Italy. My next post will cover Italy vs the Juggernaut, the fall of Britain, and the three-way draw.
Part II coming soon.
Interesting. Though I’m not sure I agree that you would have been terribly far behind me. You could have moved into Galicia in Spring 1903 and gotten Budapest in 1904.
It’s not just that you didn’t articulate that you weren’t allying me, it’s that you blatantly stabbed me. Supporting Italy into Serbia was a stab. Furthermore, letting Italy think he might get somewhere from attacking me was what caused him to gain centers. Otherwise, he would have played Vienna supports Budapest, and moved Vienna to Trieste. To me, your moves only made sense if you were declaring war on me with Italy, which is why I made such a big deal of it.
If you’d warned me that you were supporting Italy into Serbia to sow confusion, then I wouldn’t have been so bothered. But even so, I think you needed to pick sides between Italy and me that season. You looked like you had picked Italy, so I was correct to warn the West about IR.
I deliberately created this situation by preemptively striking Italy in the Ionian, which would have only succeeded if he went for two Austrian builds without telling me. I deliberately burned diplomatic capital with Italy to make it easier for you to work with me without worrying that I would stab you with Italy.
That’s right. I was a bit confused about why my emails didn’t move the West. Did they think that I would stab you myself to get revenge, even though I made it very clear that I wouldn’t act alone against you? Did I manage to annoy them with my messages? Did they fail to understand the significance of a strong IR (which switched to an RT in 1904)? Or both: they failed to understand the significance of the growing alliance in the East, which led them to interpret me as being a big windbag?
This sums up my mistake pretty well. My deception had no purpose and I gained nothing from it. I attribute this to the way that I was compartmentalizing negotiations at the time. The agent in charge of Turkish negotiations considered us as already allied, and wanted to signal accordingly. Self-deception is a wonderful signalling tool sometimes, except when you actually succeed in deceiving yourself.
I know France and I were pretty closely allied until England resigned, and Germany has talked about her take on your e-mails, but I don’t know why England didn’t take you up on the offer.