While it’s technically possible to have a preference that doesn’t value things that can be made out of galaxies, it would be shocking if there is a statistically significant number of humans whose correct idealization has that property.
I have pretty broad uncertainty on whether “people’s correct idealization” is a useful concept in this kind of a context, and assuming that it is, what those idealizations would value—seems to me like they might incorporate a fair amount of path dependence, with different equally correct idealizations arriving at completely different ultimate outcomes.
which makes habryka’s appeal to values relevant, where it would be a much weaker argument if we were only discussing aesthetic preference.
I have pretty broad uncertainty on whether “people’s correct idealization” is a useful concept in this kind of a context, and assuming that it is, what those idealizations would value [...]
Understanding of a concept shouldn’t directly depend on whether it’s useful, so I think it’s an error to entertain the assumption of usefulness. (What use were you considering? Maybe it is relevant in a way I don’t see?)
Here, it doesn’t matter what stuff people would value (so it isn’t relevant that different people value different things or that there is a lot of uncertainty about what people value). The question is whether the total value of the-most-valuable-to-a-given-person stuff, whatever that is, made out of reachable matter is significant (compared to what can be made out of Earth). Do you mean that it’s plausible that for a lot of people it isn’t actually significant?
That’s the question I implicitly posed in the grandparent. It’s not clear from your response what you think about it. A point I would agree with is that the question is too vague to have a robust understanding of it, so heuristically it makes sense to only entertain some related considerations while holding off on articulating an answer (in the same spirit as for most stuff pundits are wont to irresponsibly opine about).
I have pretty broad uncertainty on whether “people’s correct idealization” is a useful concept in this kind of a context, and assuming that it is, what those idealizations would value—seems to me like they might incorporate a fair amount of path dependence, with different equally correct idealizations arriving at completely different ultimate outcomes.
I tend to think that (like identities) aesthetics are something like cached judgements which combine values and strategies for achieving those values.
Understanding of a concept shouldn’t directly depend on whether it’s useful, so I think it’s an error to entertain the assumption of usefulness. (What use were you considering? Maybe it is relevant in a way I don’t see?)
Here, it doesn’t matter what stuff people would value (so it isn’t relevant that different people value different things or that there is a lot of uncertainty about what people value). The question is whether the total value of the-most-valuable-to-a-given-person stuff, whatever that is, made out of reachable matter is significant (compared to what can be made out of Earth). Do you mean that it’s plausible that for a lot of people it isn’t actually significant?
That’s the question I implicitly posed in the grandparent. It’s not clear from your response what you think about it. A point I would agree with is that the question is too vague to have a robust understanding of it, so heuristically it makes sense to only entertain some related considerations while holding off on articulating an answer (in the same spirit as for most stuff pundits are wont to irresponsibly opine about).