General point: I think keeping secrets is a lot more like lying than people generally consider it to be, and I thought the general consensus was that lying is bad. I would appreciate someone laying out in detail how they think the two are different.
So there’s version of keeping secrets that are literally lying (because the easiest way to keep the secret is to lie), and then there’s versions of secrecy that involve fairly active optimization to prevent someone from figuring something out (which I’d agree is kinda like lying)
But, I generally don’t think people are obligated to fully share all their information about everything with each other all the time. Most secrecy consists of just not bringing up stuff. There’s lots of stuff I don’t bring up with any given person.
I’d agree that some ways of not bringing stuff can systematically distort people’s perceptions. But that doesn’t tell me what to differently. I think “don’t lie” is a concrete schelling point to coordinate around because it’s simple to execute. “Proactively provide all possible relevant information” isn’t an action I even really know how to do. Meanwhile I think there’s a bunch of good reasons to keep secrets at least sometimes.
I don’t know if that answered your question. I’d be interested in you spelling out more why secrecy seems like lying, and why that seems bad. (“secrecy is kinda like lying” and “lying is bad” isn’t sufficient to equal “secrecy is bad in that particular way.”)
One way promises of secrecy can corrode dialogue is that they mean that if a certain topic comes up, you will either have to actively lie, actively manage things to not lie, or have obvious omissions that betray part of the secret. This puts a tax on discussion that can lead to it happening less often. This can be deliberately used by bad actors to inhibit discussion, but the dynamic is present even when the secret is noble.
E.g. friend A tells me they’re being abused, but to keep in quiet. Friend B notices some concerning but not obviously abusive behavior from friend A’s partner, and brings it to me as a mutual friend. I can either refuse to participate (which hints at the secret, or maybe friend B just thinks I’m a terrible person), or share what I know (breaks the promise), or try to have the conversation as if I don’t know the thing (which involves saying literal lies, although I think not polluting the epistemic environment). The last one is a skill you can develop and I think it’s useful, but it is dual use.
That’s assuming A really is being abused. An abuser could use this same technique to cast doubt on any concerns someone raises that they’re abusive, while not leaving me free to discuss the sources of my doubt.
General point: I think keeping secrets is a lot more like lying than people generally consider it to be, and I thought the general consensus was that lying is bad. I would appreciate someone laying out in detail how they think the two are different.
So there’s version of keeping secrets that are literally lying (because the easiest way to keep the secret is to lie), and then there’s versions of secrecy that involve fairly active optimization to prevent someone from figuring something out (which I’d agree is kinda like lying)
But, I generally don’t think people are obligated to fully share all their information about everything with each other all the time. Most secrecy consists of just not bringing up stuff. There’s lots of stuff I don’t bring up with any given person.
I’d agree that some ways of not bringing stuff can systematically distort people’s perceptions. But that doesn’t tell me what to differently. I think “don’t lie” is a concrete schelling point to coordinate around because it’s simple to execute. “Proactively provide all possible relevant information” isn’t an action I even really know how to do. Meanwhile I think there’s a bunch of good reasons to keep secrets at least sometimes.
I don’t know if that answered your question. I’d be interested in you spelling out more why secrecy seems like lying, and why that seems bad. (“secrecy is kinda like lying” and “lying is bad” isn’t sufficient to equal “secrecy is bad in that particular way.”)
One way promises of secrecy can corrode dialogue is that they mean that if a certain topic comes up, you will either have to actively lie, actively manage things to not lie, or have obvious omissions that betray part of the secret. This puts a tax on discussion that can lead to it happening less often. This can be deliberately used by bad actors to inhibit discussion, but the dynamic is present even when the secret is noble.
E.g. friend A tells me they’re being abused, but to keep in quiet. Friend B notices some concerning but not obviously abusive behavior from friend A’s partner, and brings it to me as a mutual friend. I can either refuse to participate (which hints at the secret, or maybe friend B just thinks I’m a terrible person), or share what I know (breaks the promise), or try to have the conversation as if I don’t know the thing (which involves saying literal lies, although I think not polluting the epistemic environment). The last one is a skill you can develop and I think it’s useful, but it is dual use.
That’s assuming A really is being abused. An abuser could use this same technique to cast doubt on any concerns someone raises that they’re abusive, while not leaving me free to discuss the sources of my doubt.