Apple(X) <==> [ Green(X) or Red(X) ] and Edible(X) and Size(X, medium), etc.
The criteria for ordinary language making something count, or fit the case, are ordinary
language criteria, not mathematical criteria, of counting or fitting.
That is, ordinary language rules the operation of ordinary language, using the ordinary
meanings of count and fit, not the mathematical ones.
Ordinary concepts (nice red apple) are not less precise than mathematical concepts ; but
they give precision a certain shape.
The philosopher (not the mathematician!) wants to say that ordinary langauge
lacks something that mathematics has. The philosopher however is not curious about why he thinks this.
Apple(X) <==> [ Green(X) or Red(X) ] and Edible(X) and Size(X, medium), etc.
The criteria for ordinary language making something count, or fit the case, are ordinary language criteria, not mathematical criteria, of counting or fitting.
That is, ordinary language rules the operation of ordinary language, using the ordinary meanings of count and fit, not the mathematical ones.
Ordinary concepts (nice red apple) are not less precise than mathematical concepts ; but they give precision a certain shape.
The philosopher (not the mathematician!) wants to say that ordinary langauge lacks something that mathematics has. The philosopher however is not curious about why he thinks this.