Secondary preferences may as well not exist. The only time they have an effect on behavior is in the case of two or more possible optimal actions with identical expected utilities in terms of the primary good. How likely is that?
ETA: Douglas Knight said it first.
Yes (see above). It seems well agreed upon; I think I’ll ETA a note about this to the post proper.
ETA: “noise” in your expected utility calculations might constitute positive-likelihood occasions to treat two expectations as equal...
Secondary preferences may as well not exist. The only time they have an effect on behavior is in the case of two or more possible optimal actions with identical expected utilities in terms of the primary good. How likely is that?
ETA: Douglas Knight said it first.
Yes (see above). It seems well agreed upon; I think I’ll ETA a note about this to the post proper.
ETA: “noise” in your expected utility calculations might constitute positive-likelihood occasions to treat two expectations as equal...