Once phrased more rigorously, the problem becomes easier, transforming into some combination of:
“Why do people dislike pain?”, to which the answer is that it’s hard-wired into the brain in some way a neurologist could probably explain, probably similar to how it’s hard-wired to dislike things that taste bitter.
“Why do people call pain bad?”, to which the answer is that most people think as emotivists, and call pain bad because they dislike it.
“Why is pain bad in Moral System Y?”, to which the answer is that you’d have to ask the people in moral system Y, and they’ll give you their moral system’s answer. I think a lot of the better moral system would have it as an axiom. They probably make it an axiom because most moral systems are linked in some way or another to what people do or don’t like, whether they admit it or not.
“Why is there a strong negative qualia for pain instead of it just feeling like a little voice at the back of your head saying ‘that’s painful’?”, to which the answer will remain mysterious until we understand qualia, but no more mysterious than any other sensation.
As a side note, I do suspect that there’s a big functional difference between an entity that feels a small voice in the back of the head and an entity that feels pain like we do.
This is a form of the general question “What’s so bad about X?” with pain as X.
For any X, we can ask “What’s so bad about X”, receive an answer X2, and ask “What’s so bad about X2″, ad infinitum. The three most common responses are semantic stopsigns, moral nihilism, and admitting you need to ask the question more rigorously.
Once phrased more rigorously, the problem becomes easier, transforming into some combination of:
“Why do people dislike pain?”, to which the answer is that it’s hard-wired into the brain in some way a neurologist could probably explain, probably similar to how it’s hard-wired to dislike things that taste bitter.
“Why do people call pain bad?”, to which the answer is that most people think as emotivists, and call pain bad because they dislike it.
“Why is pain bad in Moral System Y?”, to which the answer is that you’d have to ask the people in moral system Y, and they’ll give you their moral system’s answer. I think a lot of the better moral system would have it as an axiom. They probably make it an axiom because most moral systems are linked in some way or another to what people do or don’t like, whether they admit it or not.
“Why is there a strong negative qualia for pain instead of it just feeling like a little voice at the back of your head saying ‘that’s painful’?”, to which the answer will remain mysterious until we understand qualia, but no more mysterious than any other sensation.
Excellent response.
As a side note, I do suspect that there’s a big functional difference between an entity that feels a small voice in the back of the head and an entity that feels pain like we do.
Agreed, pain overwhelming your entire thoughts is too extreme, though understandable how it evolved this way.
G.E. Moore managed to ask the question about X2, dubbed it the “naturalistic fallacy”, and stopped investigating. I prefer the method you advocate.