Assuming that an agent who doesn’t have the lesion gains no utility from smoking OR from having cancer changes the problem.
But apart from that, this post is pretty good at explaining how to approach these problems from the perspective of Timeless Decision Theory. Worth reading about it if you aren’t familiar.
Also, is generally agreed that in a deterministic world we don’t really make decisions as per libertarian free will. The question is then how to construct the counterfactuals for the decision problem. I’m in agreement with you TDT is much more consistent as the counterfactuals tend to describe actually consistent worlds.
Assuming that an agent who doesn’t have the lesion gains no utility from smoking OR from having cancer changes the problem.
But apart from that, this post is pretty good at explaining how to approach these problems from the perspective of Timeless Decision Theory. Worth reading about it if you aren’t familiar.
Also, is generally agreed that in a deterministic world we don’t really make decisions as per libertarian free will. The question is then how to construct the counterfactuals for the decision problem. I’m in agreement with you TDT is much more consistent as the counterfactuals tend to describe actually consistent worlds.