can be satisfied with “Omega punches A in the face, thus causing A to end up with lower utility than B, who remains un-punched”.
It seems to be a good summary of what dxu and Dacyn were suggesting! I think it preserves the salient features without all the fluff of copying and destroying, or having multiple agents. Which makes it clear why the counterexample does not work: I said “the worlds seen as possible by every agent, no matter what their decision theory is,” and the unpunched world is not a possible one for the world enumerator in this setup.
My point was that CDT makes a suboptimal decision in Newcomb, and FDT struggles to pick the best decision in some of the problems, as well, because it is lost in the forest of causal trees, or at least this is my impression from the EYNS paper. Once you stop worrying about causality and the agent’s ability to change the world by their actions, you end up with a simper question “what possible world does this agent live in and with what probability?”
It seems to be a good summary of what dxu and Dacyn were suggesting! I think it preserves the salient features without all the fluff of copying and destroying, or having multiple agents. Which makes it clear why the counterexample does not work: I said “the worlds seen as possible by every agent, no matter what their decision theory is,” and the unpunched world is not a possible one for the world enumerator in this setup.
My point was that CDT makes a suboptimal decision in Newcomb, and FDT struggles to pick the best decision in some of the problems, as well, because it is lost in the forest of causal trees, or at least this is my impression from the EYNS paper. Once you stop worrying about causality and the agent’s ability to change the world by their actions, you end up with a simper question “what possible world does this agent live in and with what probability?”