Yes, qualia are physical. But what does physical mean??
Physical means ‘interacting with us in the simulation’.
To us, the simulated Jupiters are not physical—they do not exert a real gravitational force—because we are not there with them in the simulation. However, if you add a moon to your simulation, and simulate its motion towards the spheres, the simulated moon would experience the real, physical gravity of the moons.
For a moment, my intuition argued that it isn’t ‘real’ gravity because the steps of the algorithm are so arbitrary—there are so many ways to model the motion of the moon towards the spheres why should any one chosen way be privileged as ‘real’? But then, think of it from the point of view of the moon. However the moon’s position is encoded, it must move toward the spheres. Because this is hard-coded into the algorithm. From the point of view of the moon (and the spheres, incidentally) this path and this interaction is entirely immutable. This is what ‘real’, and what ‘physical’, feels like.
But then, think of it from the point of view of the moon.
That would be to grant the assumption that the moon does have a point of view. That’s the issue being debated, so we can’t prove it by just assuming it.
To “simulate” (i.e. compute everything about) a really really simple Newtonian solar system, all we really need is knowledge of a few numbers (e.g. mass, position) and a few equations.
Does writing those numbers and equations down on a paper mean that I’ve now created a simulated universe that has “its own point of view”? I certainly don’t need a computer to simulate that system, one would be able to do the calculations of it in one’s head. And the moon wouldn’t even need the head doing the calculations, it would be perfectly defined by the equations and the numbers—that would ofcourse not even need to be written down on a paper.
This is then Tegmark IV: once you grant that a simulation of a thing has by necessity its own point of view, then that simulation doesn’t need any physical component, it’s sustained by the math alone.
That would be to grant the assumption that the moon does have a point of view. That’s the issue being debated, so we can’t prove it by just assuming it.
Oops, I didn’t mean that the moon should have a point of view. I find it natural to use anthropomorphisms such as these, but don’t intend them literally.
I certainly don’t need a computer to simulate that system, one would be able to do the calculations of it in one’s head.
Yes, this made me pause. Even while simulating the motion of a moon towards the spheres, there are so many abstract ways to model the moon’s position, could they all be equally real? (In which case, each time you simulate something quite concretely, how many abstract things have you unintentionally made real?) But then I decided that even if ‘position’ and ‘motion’ are quite abstract, it is real … though now I have trouble describing why without using a concept like, “from the moon’s point of view” or “if the moon observes” which means I was packing something into that. I should think about this more.
This is then Tegmark IV: once you grant that a simulation of a thing has by necessity its own point of view, then that simulation doesn’t need any physical component, it’s sustained by the math alone.
Perhaps. I’m not sure. The idea that all mathematical possibilities are real is intriguing (I saw this with the Ultimate Ensemble) theory here, but I have a doubt that I will describe here.
It seems to be the case, in this universe anyway, that things need to be causally entangled in order to be real. So setting up a simulation in which a moon is a position on a lattice that moves toward another position on a lattice would model ‘real’ motion because the motion is the causal result of the lines of code you wrote. However, there are cases when things are not causally entangled and then they are not real.
Consider the case of mental thoughts. I can imagine something that is not real: A leprechaun throws a ball up in the air and it stays up. Of course, my thought are real, and are causally entangled with my neurons. But the two thoughts ‘he throws a ball up’ and ‘it stays up’ are not themselves causally entangled. They are just sequential and connected by the word ‘and’. I have not created a world where there is no gravity. This is reassuring, since I can also imagine mathematical impossibilities, like a moebius strip in 2D or something inconsistent before I’m aware of the inconsistency.
Yes, qualia are physical. But what does physical mean??
Physical means ‘interacting with us in the simulation’.
To us, the simulated Jupiters are not physical—they do not exert a real gravitational force—because we are not there with them in the simulation. However, if you add a moon to your simulation, and simulate its motion towards the spheres, the simulated moon would experience the real, physical gravity of the moons.
For a moment, my intuition argued that it isn’t ‘real’ gravity because the steps of the algorithm are so arbitrary—there are so many ways to model the motion of the moon towards the spheres why should any one chosen way be privileged as ‘real’? But then, think of it from the point of view of the moon. However the moon’s position is encoded, it must move toward the spheres. Because this is hard-coded into the algorithm. From the point of view of the moon (and the spheres, incidentally) this path and this interaction is entirely immutable. This is what ‘real’, and what ‘physical’, feels like.
That would be to grant the assumption that the moon does have a point of view. That’s the issue being debated, so we can’t prove it by just assuming it.
To “simulate” (i.e. compute everything about) a really really simple Newtonian solar system, all we really need is knowledge of a few numbers (e.g. mass, position) and a few equations.
Does writing those numbers and equations down on a paper mean that I’ve now created a simulated universe that has “its own point of view”? I certainly don’t need a computer to simulate that system, one would be able to do the calculations of it in one’s head. And the moon wouldn’t even need the head doing the calculations, it would be perfectly defined by the equations and the numbers—that would ofcourse not even need to be written down on a paper.
This is then Tegmark IV: once you grant that a simulation of a thing has by necessity its own point of view, then that simulation doesn’t need any physical component, it’s sustained by the math alone.
Oops, I didn’t mean that the moon should have a point of view. I find it natural to use anthropomorphisms such as these, but don’t intend them literally.
Yes, this made me pause. Even while simulating the motion of a moon towards the spheres, there are so many abstract ways to model the moon’s position, could they all be equally real? (In which case, each time you simulate something quite concretely, how many abstract things have you unintentionally made real?) But then I decided that even if ‘position’ and ‘motion’ are quite abstract, it is real … though now I have trouble describing why without using a concept like, “from the moon’s point of view” or “if the moon observes” which means I was packing something into that. I should think about this more.
Perhaps. I’m not sure. The idea that all mathematical possibilities are real is intriguing (I saw this with the Ultimate Ensemble) theory here, but I have a doubt that I will describe here.
It seems to be the case, in this universe anyway, that things need to be causally entangled in order to be real. So setting up a simulation in which a moon is a position on a lattice that moves toward another position on a lattice would model ‘real’ motion because the motion is the causal result of the lines of code you wrote. However, there are cases when things are not causally entangled and then they are not real.
Consider the case of mental thoughts. I can imagine something that is not real: A leprechaun throws a ball up in the air and it stays up. Of course, my thought are real, and are causally entangled with my neurons. But the two thoughts ‘he throws a ball up’ and ‘it stays up’ are not themselves causally entangled. They are just sequential and connected by the word ‘and’. I have not created a world where there is no gravity. This is reassuring, since I can also imagine mathematical impossibilities, like a moebius strip in 2D or something inconsistent before I’m aware of the inconsistency.