A lot of places where it seems like the universe isn’t playing nice might just be a reflection of us not being smart enough or not having thought long enough.
I guess there can be some disagreement on what constitutes “a lot”, but it seems to me that some of these are not subject to this because they are proofs of limitations that can only be gotten around by either pragmatic means (assuming away the problem by limiting yourself the cases where it doesn’t arise) or by relaxing the strength of what the mechanism claims. Of the examples listed, the problem of perception (Chris calls it the problem of skepticism), Gödel’s theorem, the problem of induction, the problem of the prior (Bayesianism), and qualia (the problem of perception again) all seem fundamental in the sense that they are problems that arise from within the abstraction/system, so they can only be gotten around by pragmatism or transcendence/relaxation, and cannot possibly become more tractable by thinking about them more, even if we come up with better ways to deal with them pragmatically or to better transcend them by using different abstractions. In this sense the universe will continue to look like it doesn’t play nice from within those abstractions forever and always because it is a feature of the way those abstractions relate to reality.
I guess there can be some disagreement on what constitutes “a lot”, but it seems to me that some of these are not subject to this because they are proofs of limitations that can only be gotten around by either pragmatic means (assuming away the problem by limiting yourself the cases where it doesn’t arise) or by relaxing the strength of what the mechanism claims. Of the examples listed, the problem of perception (Chris calls it the problem of skepticism), Gödel’s theorem, the problem of induction, the problem of the prior (Bayesianism), and qualia (the problem of perception again) all seem fundamental in the sense that they are problems that arise from within the abstraction/system, so they can only be gotten around by pragmatism or transcendence/relaxation, and cannot possibly become more tractable by thinking about them more, even if we come up with better ways to deal with them pragmatically or to better transcend them by using different abstractions. In this sense the universe will continue to look like it doesn’t play nice from within those abstractions forever and always because it is a feature of the way those abstractions relate to reality.